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SELFHOOD AND CIVILIZATION

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SELFHOOD AND CIVILIZATION

A STUDY OF THE SELF-OTHER PROCESS

By

WILLIAM HEARD KILPATRICK

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK • 1941

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Set up and electrotyped—published June, 1941.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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THE V. EVERIT MACY LECTURES ON EDUCATION
TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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FOREWORD

What this book will discuss has perhaps been sufficiently indicated on the title page. The aim is to exhibit the essential self-other nature of selfhood and to show how civilization has grown out of such a compounded selfhood and must in its turn continue so to grow in order to develop and express this selfhood yet more fully.

The book has grown out of the four lectures delivered during the fall of 1938 on the V. Everit Macy Foundation of Teachers College, Columbia University. In the time since then the original lectures have been entirely rewritten and the whole has been considerably extended.

It would be misleading to claim any great originality for what is here presented. Much of the foundation theory was originally worked out by various groups of Hegelians, but it is here presented without their "idealistic" presuppositions. Possibly the fullest prior treatment of the general theme is to be found in the works of J. Mark Baldwin, which appeared a generation ago, and the most thorough treatment in the lectures of George H. Mead, given to the world in recent years by his appreciative students. Professor John Dewey, also, has made notable use of the general conception, especially in his ethical writings. But no one else has made just the sort of presentation herein attempted. If such an effort requires defense, it may be found in the fact that what has not been adequately put into everyday life and thought calls by that very

fact for further discussion. And it is further true that each succeeding generation needs to reconceive important truths in the light of its own problems and difficulties.

For much help at various stages in making the book, but especially for valuable suggestions for improving the text, my best thanks are due to my wife, Dr. Marion Ostrander Kilpatrick.

Specific thanks are due to the following named publishers for their kind permission to quote from their books: Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York City; Henry Holt and Company, New York City; Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston; W. W. Norton and Company, New York City; and Charles Scribner's Sons, New York City.

WILLIAM HEARD KILPATRICK

New York City

April 12, 1941

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CHAPTER I

THE SELF-OTHER PROCESS: HOW SELF AND OTHER EMERGE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO CONSCIOUSNESS

The intent of the early chapters of this book is to defend the thesis that human personality, in any desirable sense, is inherently a social product; that only by the self-other process substantially as herein discussed has historic man been able to achieve his distinctly human attributes of language, critical thinking, sense of responsibility, conscience, and the use of standards. And only by the same process can the growing child of today build these invaluable cultural achievements into his own character. In brief, the operation of the self-other process was essential alike to selfhood and civilization as historically achieved and is still essential in each individual case.

To make more explicit the general thesis just stated, the following specific theses are here set out, to be elaborated and argued later:

No one is born a self, nor is selfhood merely a matter of internal maturation (as this term is now frequently used). Selfhood has to be achieved.

Man alone of all living organisms has been able to achieve selfhood. No brute can.

The process of achieving selfhood is an extended one, involving various stages and degrees.

This selfhood can be achieved only and necessarily in a social milieu, and the surrounding culture enters essentially into the process of achieving as well as into the resulting character achieved.

Consciousness of self and consciousness of others emerge simultaneously to the individual, each growing and contributing during the rest of life mutually to round out and implement the other.

At any one time after the process has been well begun, each, the self and the other, is inextricably composed of both self and other.

The selfhood thus achieved becomes a highly significant factor in and for the further life of the individual and for society. Personality as such and civilization alike depend on it.

THE MEANING OF THE TERM "SELF": A FIRST DEFINITION

Although the fuller meaning of the term *self* will be pursued in its complexity throughout the pages of this book, we can here set down a first working definition in terms of the distinctions the child learns to make in ordinary social situations. It will be clear, as asserted, that man alone learns to make these distinctions.

We say that a child has achieved selfhood, at least in working degree, when

(1) he distinguishes himself clearly from others by the appropriate use of such pronouns as *I, me, my, mine; you, yours; he or she, him or her, his or hers*;

(2) he recognizes himself as an agent, one who can effect, bring to pass, and for this purpose uses such sentences as: "I didn't do it. Mary did." "I can do it. Let me do it all by myself";

(3) he has achieved a sense of time, past and present, including a notion of the continuity of his self, and for this

will use such sentences as: "I am going to Grandmother's tomorrow. I was there last summer. Grandfather showed me the calf, but Mother says it is bigger now"; and

(4) he has built a sense of conscious intent and of accompanying accountability and responsibility, as shown by using such a sentence as, "I hurt John's hand, but I didn't mean to do it."

It will be noted that the definition as given is an instance of operational procedure: the defining procedure has to work in life in order to be accepted for thought. The test as to whether selfhood has been achieved is that the pertinent words shall be used in an ordinary social situation to the satisfaction of competent observers. The child is not only to use these words and sentences of his own motion; but he must also intend them in their ordinary meaning, and the other person must be able to see (within reason) from the life context that they are so understood and so intended. All of which is to say that the words must function properly in ordinary communication.

The meaning of an operational definition as just used will become clearer when we later take up the discussion of objectivity; for, as will then be shown, this successful social use is at once the definition and test of objectivity. The further discussion will also add content and complexities not here implied to the preliminary definition given thus far.

THE PROCESS OF THING-MAKING

As a preliminary to the actual process of self-building, consider how the normal child comes to build a group of related experiences into a "thing." Such "thing-making" is so inevitable and is accomplished so early and easily that most have never thought of it as the personal achievement it is. The child's experience with his milk bottle will serve as an illustration.

A child ordinarily learns in time to suck from a bottle. From the use of the bottle and how it answers to felt want, the normal child learns to recognize how the bottle feels in his hand; he learns to shift it for more successful use; he associates pleasure with using it. Thereafter the sight of the bottle coming when he is hungry makes him expect handling and sucking and enjoyment. Now all these experiences, actual and potential, with more not here named, get somehow very closely associated in the baby's "mind"; he learns to recognize the bottle when he sees it or feels it and to expect the other experiences that are a usual accompaniment. These recurrent, associated experiences now constitute for the child a "thing"; the bottle has become differentiated from the "big, buzzing, blooming confusion"—to quote William James—of the environment around him, has become something more or less well defined in itself, something having a kind of existence of its own, suggesting certain meanings and arousing certain expectations.

This process of thing-making is, in its simpler and more concrete instances, inevitable with normal humans. However, names help with the process; frequent hearing of the words *bottle*, *milk* help to crystallize the situation. Helpful, too, is the fact that life in the family or group turns upon the common recognition of the thing under consideration. The child seeks to share in the common life process and so will in high degree accept from the others their practice, including specifically whatever of conception or distinction their practice may turn upon. It is under such circumstances that conceptions of things are built, each with its reliable unified abidingness. The milk bottle, for example, along with its name, becomes for the child a means of entering into effective relationship with the family life going on about him.

Along with the milk bottle go also many other analogous "things," such as crib, carriage, cap, foot, finger. But chief of

all the "things" that make up the child's world are certain moving objects which you and I, farther along life's road, call persons. Mother early comes to be of strategic significance, especially if she herself nurses the child. She is, to use our language, source and guarantee of security and protection, the reliable ever-present source and help in time of trouble. When life appears darkest and the child is at the last gasp of pain and despair, she (or another of these mysterious things) suddenly appears out of the chaos and all is set right. It happens not once, but every day and regularly. Its very occurrence defines reliability and regularity. Happy the child whose mother does so love him as to let him feel from the first thus secure in her sympathetic care!

In this way Mother comes to be the first object of call when the child learns to cry not simply as a reflex, but as a dawning means to his dawning ends. No mother but knows this difference between cries. Meanwhile other persons share also in this process. In time several such moving objects come to have for the now growing child each its defined place and type of expectation. The child is getting ready for a great advance.

ACHIEVING INTERNAL UNITY

While the "outside" world of things is thus taking on objective character, the child's internal life begins, so we believe, also to take on a certain interrelated unity. Although this internal process is not open to the same observation as is the external thing-making, still its actuality seems probable. The external process is subject to fairly definite observation; the internal remains more a matter of inference in the light of further developments. Certainly, however, the child has a succession of wants, pains, wishes, and efforts. Some of these recur sufficiently often to be recognizable even to the child—external movements seem to show this. As

already indicated, the child begins in time to cry in order to attract attention. He will even get angry when attention is withheld. Any observant person learns the signs. This fact of agency, of using means to attain ends, grows as a defined part of the child's life and begins to be a "willed" affair.

It is easy then to believe, but not essential to the succeeding argument, that the normal child does in various ways build at this stage a preliminary conception of himself, of his internal life as some sort of abiding unity parallel with the abiding unity we call external things. The full internal process can go on, it seems certain, only by contrast with other processes. This fuller process comes in the next stage, but it seems probable that in this first stage some dawning unity begins, growing perhaps out of the feelings that accompany efforts. The child continually meets obstacles. Efforts follow. Some external things seem friendly, others unfriendly. The feelings connected with these mutually opposed external things stay with the child, favorable feelings with the friendly things, unfavorable feelings with the unfriendly, but all together forming an interrelated system. It is in the abidingness of this system and especially in the feelings of effort involved that William James (*Principles*, I, 298 ff.) found the sense of abiding personal identity. It is easy to believe that some of this starts early.

THE SIMULTANEOUS COMING OF SELF AND OTHER

As the process of thing-making just discussed continues, there comes a time when interaction begins more definitely between what may, with a certain exaggeration, be called the child's two worlds, the world of observed things, on the one hand, and the world of more immediately felt wants, pains, efforts, on the other. What he knows "externally" (as we say) begins to be so related with what he knows "internally" that a new kind of growth takes place: what he

knows in one way begins to throw light on what he knows the other way.

What others call his hands and feet, he can move. Sister Mary also has hands and feet. They look like his; and hers, too, move. His and hers are small. Father's and Mother's are large. But they are all hands and feet.

He has a name, and Mary has a name.

He has his toys, and Mary has her toys. Mother will make Mary yield his toys to him and make him yield Mary's toys to her. It is an abiding distinction; Mother is herein again reliable and invariable. He hears Mary say, "It is mine, not yours." Eventually he says of his, "It is mine, not yours."

Mary falls, bumps her head, cries. Mother soothes her. Not long ago he, too, fell, bumped his head, cried. Mother soothed him. Now Mother says to him, "Poor Mary, she bumped her head. It hurts her, just as yours hurt you when you fell."

From such incidents consistently repeated, it gradually begins to dawn on this child that he (his body) is one among those other moving things and then that they feel pains like his. Enlightenment enters upon a higher stage. He now sees himself "from the outside": he has hands, feet, fingers, toes, head, just as Mary has. He now sees also that she, "on the inside," feels pains and cries, just as he does. Also she eats and he eats. She has little clothes, as he has little clothes. She and he are small editions of the same things that older people are.

In all of this a new self is in process of becoming, and these moving objects, persons, begin to emerge as other selves. His new compound self (composed in part of what he first saw in himself, in part of what he first saw in others) begins gradually to take over the conscious direction of his organism. He begins to act out of a self that knows itself.

The factor of gradualness in the coming of this process must be emphasized. It is easy, but wrong, for us to read into the child's meager beginning the fullness of thought and distinction that we have achieved.

But once begun, the process grows continually throughout life. Until one has lived, any literature, even the simplest, is a closed book. Until one has felt love, one cannot understand it in others. Until one has suffered bereavement, one cannot in any full sense sympathize with the bereaved. Self and other thus continue to grow, each by what it learns from the other. The two emerge, for conscious consideration, simultaneously. The self is thus, as said before, a compound from both sources. One part has come directly from one's own immediate "internal" experiencing; the other part has come from observing the lives of others. After the first beginning, the two parts are inextricably interwoven. And a like compoundedness holds of my conception of others. Each other is for me composed of things that I have seen first or peculiarly in others but also of things that I attribute to the other because I know them in myself. As will be emphasized later, each human old enough and advanced enough to be a self has achieved a selfhood inherently and inextricably social in origin.

It may be well at this point to call attention to certain other features of self-other making that at times manifest themselves in even early life—some ugly, others good. All who know children have remarked upon a negativism often prominent in the early years, apparently the result of the first clear recognition of the fact of conscious consent or refusal. Gordon Allport¹ tells of a child, not yet three who made a daily visit to his grandmother simply to announce, apropos of nothing in particular, "Grandma, I won't."

¹ Gordon W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation* (New York, Henry Holt, 1937), p. 165.

The exaggeration of an emerging trait is frequent.² This self-insistent negativism appears to be simply an instance in point. Having got far enough along to refuse and negate, the child simply does so in excessive and exaggerated degree. Disagreeable as this may be to others, it probably serves to augment his nascent sense of selfhood through an aggressive exercise of self-determination where it seems, at that time, to count for most. Similarly some children build a pathological self-centeredness. They simply must, for the duration of this interest, hold the spotlight, occupy the center of the stage. Few things are more annoying, or more hurtful to healthy growth, than this maladjustment in its worst forms.

A more pleasing and more serviceable early development growing out of the self-other process and helping it along is imaginative play. In this the child takes on now this character and now that in such fashion as to call for the study and use of the characteristics assumed.

In all these varied ways, and in many more besides, is the individual advancing to a new and higher level of being. Henceforth, in the degree that selfhood has been achieved, will the child be able to see himself as others see him, so that he can (and in some measure does and will) consider his acts as he thinks others will judge them. So achieved, this attainment will enter as a positive factor in all conscious life thereafter. Thenceforth all that he consciously does is affected by the fact and existence of this new compounded self. It is not simply that he is conscious of himself in a new light. More than that, this consciousness itself enters with its compoundedness into the very constitution of the self to affect inherently all that is done. It is most literally true that the individual henceforth lives on a new and higher level, a level to which none other of the animal world can aspire.

² For a discussion of this, see Myrtle B. McGraw, *Growth: A Study of Johnny and Jimmy* (New York, D. Appleton-Century, 1935), pp. xii, 307.

This higher level is at least an essential part or aspect of, if not scene and foundation for, all that we value most in human experience.

The remainder of this book is devoted in part to elaborating upon this process of self-other interaction and development as it is worked out in individual lives, in part to showing the significance of that fact to human life and conduct, especially on the level we call civilization.

CHAPTER II

THE SELF-OTHER PROCESS: AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY AS FURTHER DE- VELOPMENTS OF THE SELF

We have seen the compound origin and inherent social nature of the self. But what we saw was only the simple beginning. The full story includes much more. We wish now to see how the self takes on new characteristics as it comes to share more fully on its higher plane in the surrounding social life. Certain of these characteristics are new to the child in that his prior existent animal traits and functions are now informed by "self-consciousness." It is well to emphasize this word *self-consciousness*. It calls attention to the contrast with that prior stage, when the child did like-named things but without special thought that it was he who was doing them. He did them rather like the dog which is aware of the bird he is trying to catch but probably not aware of himself as trying to catch it. What we wish now is to see how the growing child does add the element of self-consciousness to his life and conduct and how new features of life result.

THE FACT OF CONSCIOUS AGENCY

From birth the child can perform certain acts and will do so upon proper stimulation. Later he acquires new processes,

with the ability to adjust hand and arm to what the eye sees. He can now see an object and pick it up. At the first, however, he does not think that he is so doing. Like the dog after the bird, he thinks of the object and of picking it up, but not (we believe) of himself as picking it up.

In time, however, especially as language enters, his attention is called to the fact that he can do certain things and that he is asked to do them. He learns to say "bye-bye" and to wave his hand appropriately. After that he is continually told to "say 'bye-bye'" or to "wave 'bye-bye.'" At first he may do these things rather solemnly, but in time he likes thus to share appropriately in a social situation.

And still more, as he gets older and finds praise meted out for achievement, he will insist on doing things "by himself." "Don't help me. Let me do it all by myself." Conscious self-agency—proposing and then doing, and doing both before onlookers—this also, when it is new, may take on the excess and exaggeration common in new traits and as such may annoy his elders. But it is the self-in-process-of-becoming that this emphasizes; it is growth in self-conscious agency.

The fact of conscious self-agency lies in such words as, "I can do it, let me do it myself." This involves for the child two new distinctions. First is the I, the self-conscious ego, in conscious contrast with others. This is herein coming into clearer conscious existence. Second is the fact of conscious power of effecting, of doing at will. Knowing that one can effect at will is also a new thing. It is oneself watching oneself at work, first to will, then to effect an operation. In times past when psychologists talked more in terms of instincts than now, they often included within the human list the instinct of "pleasure at being a cause." This "instinct" was their way of describing what has here been under consideration.

In such matters the social situation is a strong factor. "Let me do it myself" means almost the same as "Watch me do it myself." The child's "Look" or "Look, Mama" is often heard—too often for the patience of some elders. But the zest of life to humans, in contrast with animals, seems to lie in just this sort of thing, and that along two related lines. First is the joy of working at new things—not too new for successful management. Second is the joy of getting recognition as one does so effect. It is both these we see at work in the child as he achieves in his life the new conception of agency, the conception (in our words) that "I can bring things to pass." It may be added that these considerations of agency, self-conscious and self-directed agency, underlie the modern educational outlook, often called the "activity program" or the "project method." The effort to utilize this dynamic and the better learning it brings—this constitutes a new basis for educational method.

ACCOUNTABILITY

A second achievement, that of holding oneself accountable to others for what one does, grows almost at once out of the consciousness of agency as this goes forward in a social setting. The added factors are, first, attention to the results as effected by the agent (the child) and, second, the acceptance of praise or blame as appropriately ascribed by those who see and understand.

Being held to account is a common experience of childhood, especially in our culture. On the one hand, the child's natural activity easily leads him into what his elders call mischief. (Emerson said, "That which we call sin in others is experiment for us.") On the other hand, our culture is surcharged with ideas of blame and punishment. We demand to know, "Who did this?" and we proceed, on finding out, to mete out blame, and likely enough punishment, to

the wrongdoer. In these ways accountability is a distinction which the child early and often meets. To it he must adjust his life or suffer the resulting evil consequences. He thus learns the capital distinction between, "I did it, and I meant to," and, "I did it, but I didn't mean to do it," which lies at the basis of every sort of accountability.

Agency and accountability thus grow up together, the unavoidable results of our kind of culture. As terms, either word is beyond children and possibly most of their parents. But the working actualities back of the terms, as highly significant elements in social life—these are known and used by all among us from early childhood. Both are all but inevitably learned—accountability, to be sure, in varying degrees. The exigencies of our social life suffice to teach them.

THE CULTURE AND SELFHOOD

Reference has been made to the fact that our culture, being surcharged with the idea of holding people to account, makes it thus easy, even practically inevitable, for children to learn from an early age to understand and act upon the idea of accountability. It may help the subsequent discussion to say a word at this point about the part the culture plays in such matters.

When western civilization accepted Christianity, it took a great step toward stressing accountability, because on this very conception had the whole divine drama of original sin, particular sin, eternal punishment, and salvation been based. With Protestantism the personal element was further stressed; and with Puritanism, whether via New England or via Scotland, it was, if possible, still further emphasized. So that in historic America the idea of sin and accountability has permeated all life and thought. In contrast, the Greeks, while they recognized wrongdoing and punishment, still had no such pervading notion of sin and accountability; so we

may easily conclude that their children were probably, in comparison with ours, a little slower to build the conception of accountability in their characters. How any culture supplies for its people a pattern of character which the children build into selfhood—this is a theme that will later be more fully discussed. Here it suffices to say that the essential character of selfhood at any one time in history is supplied through the prevailing culture of the time and place.

THE ABIDING UNITY OF THE SELF

The early recognitions by the self of agency and accountability, when taken in connection with the conscious recognition of past and future, develop—as a further constituent of the self—the sense of the persisting identity of the self. As soon as the child is of the proper age, every day will include such sentences as:

“If you blow that horn again in the house, I’ll take it away from you.”

“No, you were at Mary’s just yesterday; you can’t go again today.”

“We are going to Grandmother’s next week.”

“It is John’s birthday today; your birthday will come next month.”

“You slept in this crib when you were a baby.”

In all of these experiences and their like the child is called upon to think of himself as persisting from day to day, week to week, month to month, and year to year. Parents and others so speak and act, and children have to learn what these words mean in terms of guiding their lives; otherwise they suffer. That they do so learn, even while young, to act on these conceptions, we cannot doubt. That children go beyond this and think consciously such terms as “persistence” or “the abiding unity of the self”—no, a thousand times no. The distinctions translated into experience, yes;

the terms here used to describe them to sophisticated readers, no.

Again it is because these distinctions have long been embodied in the ordinary culture, in the way people live, that children learn them, even learn them easily. We expect children to learn to live on these distinctions; nay, more, we demand it of them. And they do. In these things, as elsewhere, it is sufficient if the people concerned—here the young and the old—can understand each other well enough to act together with respect to the demands of the situation. There are deeper possible meanings which many, both young and old, do not get; but the young do make a good start and they may continue to grow.

SUMMATION OF THE FIRST STAGE OF SELF-OTHER DEVELOPMENT

As there are several more or less distinct stages or degrees within selfhood, so there are in advance of the coming of selfhood two distinct stages of life: first, the embryonic period, before birth, and, second, the conscious but not self-conscious period between birth and the achieving of conscious selfhood. For this period just after birth there appears no suitable name. Some call it an egocentric period, but it seems not quite right to say that the child centers on his ego before he has an ego. However, as we have no other term to use, this one will perhaps have to serve in spite of this objection.

In the first stage of the self (self-other) development the child learns to class himself among persons. His newly acquired selfhood has two inextricably interwoven component parts: the first consists of elements chiefly experienced within, as feelings, wishes, and the like; the second consists of elements first or best seen in others. The child, as a self, is now for behavior purposes inextricably both. If he says, "I," he consciously assumes the existence of others. If he says,

"Let me do it," the same assumption is, if possible, even more actively implied.

These dawning distinctions come but slowly to the child, but they long continue to grow, perhaps until senile decay sets in. At first the child does not use the pronoun "I"; he calls himself "John," as others do. Only later can he manage so slippery a term as "I," which Mother uses of herself and Father and Mary of themselves. It seems to him at the first safer to stay by words that to him are fixed, as "Mother," "Father," "Mary," and "John."

In time, however, he does learn to use "I." After that follows agency—as, "I did it"; and accountability—"I did it, but I didn't mean to do it." Then he learns past and future and the tenses—"I did," "I will," and such words as *yesterday* and *tomorrow*—and along with these the sense of his own abiding identity.

As the mark of his earliest postbirth period was to attend to what he did without being self-conscious about it, so the mark of this first stage in the self-other development is the building of an actual new structural organization out of which he now behaves, a compound of self and other, each of which is in turn also compounded of both self and other.

So much for the first stage in selfhood.

CHAPTER III

THE SELF-OTHER PROCESS: DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE, COMMUNICATION, MEANINGS

With language, the development of selfhood enters upon a second stage or, perhaps better, a second degree of complexity. This stage clearly overlaps with the one previously discussed, for language was there used instrumentally to help bring that stage into being. Here the concern is mainly to see how language as a medium of communication becomes therein a highly significant means for the further development of selfhood.

HUMAN SIGNS AND LANGUAGE VERSUS ANIMAL CALLS AND SIGNALS

Certain animals make calls and signs to which others of their kind appropriately respond. These seem at first a kind of language. Whoever has witnessed a hen mother calling and feeding her chickens will recognize the reference here made. The same hen will also call out, in a specific manner, the warning against a hawk, and other chickens will obviously take notice. While such may seem like language, the position here taken is that language is essentially different.

As a means of making the contrast between distinctively human signs or language, on the one hand, and animal calls and signs, on the other, we may note that man himself makes both kinds of signs. For example, a man may blush

and stammer and therein tell the observant onlooker more, and perhaps more reliably, than do his words. When we suspect that anyone is not telling us the truth, we try to lead him into unexpected traps and then watch *how* he answers, believing that we may learn more from the unintended *how* of his speaking than from his intended *what*.

These unintended signs are, from the point of view of the man himself, like the animal calls and signs. They were not intended to communicate meaning, and in that sense they stand on a non-self-other basis (though in another sense they may arise from a distinctly self-other conceived situation). In contrast, the words which the suspected man consciously uses he tries out first inwardly on himself, on his internal other, so to say, before he uses them on those who suspect him; he "thinks ahead," he considers a little how his words will sound to others, what they will mean to them. The blushing and stammering he did not so try out, and he did not willingly turn them loose to tell their tale, as he did with his chosen words. Even if he foresaw the blushes and stammering, he could not "himself" (as agent) control them. The blushes and stammering, then, are not language, whatever the onlooker may be able to read from them.

It is of the essence of language as a means of communication that it is first, in some measure, tried out before it is used. A big dog will growl at a little dog and frighten him off. It must not, however, be supposed that the big dog pictured to himself, in advance, the growl and its probable effect. Rather did the presence of the little dog wake the growling reflex; and the growl, like the suspect's blushing, just came. There was no more antecedent rehearsal in the one case than in the other. The growl was not language. Again, a dog, when his master comes home after a long absence, will greet him effusively, obviously glad to see him. He shows his gladness all over, his tail wags vigorously. The

master sees it all, the tail along with the rest, understanding and appreciating the welcome. But the tail wagging was for the dog not an intended sign. More probably he did not know that his tail was wagging or even that he had a tail. He was glad and the gladness, so to speak, wagged the tail.

It is of course true that a person may speak "before he thinks" or, more precisely, speak without adequate thinking. If so, he may very likely regret his rash act when he reviews what he has done and sees the evil effect of his words. Even so, such thoughtless speaking is probably still different from the hen-chickens sign behavior. In some measure he intended his words even though he did not intend their undesired effects. The subsequent regret clearly has a self-other origin, as we shall in a moment consider. The next time, in the degree that his present regret is sincere and sufficiently felt, the person will be likely to think more adequately before he speaks.

It may help with the matter here under discussion to point out that a lie, in the degree that it really is a lie, is always tried out—inwardly—in advance of speaking it. The longer time this takes than a truthful response is the basis for one kind of lie detector. To say that a lie is, by its very nature, rehearsed in advance is not the same thing as saying that every false statement is premeditated. A person may unknowingly tell what is false, thinking instead that he is telling the truth.

In the same way all "thievery," in the real sense, is premeditated, essentially self-other in nature. When Morton Prince said, as he is reported to have done, that "the infant begins his life a thief, impelled by the instinct of greed to grab whatever he sees," he spoke wrongly if he meant himself to be understood scientifically. If there is any instinct in the matter, it is an instinct to grab, not an instinct to greed. The child at first has no thought that he may not take what-

ever is in reach. Only after the self-other process has gone far enough to permit premeditated taking in the face of a recognized demand to the contrary, can the words *thief* or *greed* properly apply.

Two interrelated characteristics, then, distinguish human signs and language from animal calls. On the one hand, the human tells himself more or less clearly beforehand what he is going to say; and, on the other, foreknowing what he is going to say, he foresees and weighs the probable effect of his words and then—perhaps most crucial of all—thus foreseeing, he intends the effects he foresaw. He wills what he says. These varied things, we must believe, the hen or the dog does not do and cannot do. The ability to refer back and forth, to ask what the other person will think and do, and so to ask, “What do I then wish to think and do?”—all this is exactly the self-other process at work, man’s peculiar characteristic to distinguish him from the brute. Man tries out internally upon himself the signs and signals he would use before he willingly turns them loose to do their intended work. The brute does not try out his cries in advance but utters them as a reflex, native or acquired, according as the external situation stimulates him. Man intends the effects of the sounds he utters; the brute does not. These differences constitute language, communication.

MEANING, CO-OPERATION, AND COMMUNICATION

The term *intend* as just used in connection with language calls for further study. It may be well to point out here that our further study will show that the terms *intend* and *meaning* (in the full human sense) both arise in connection with co-operation and accordingly are elements in the communication that is necessary if co-operation is best to be carried on.

As illustration and exposition of this co-operative essence

of meaning, take a concrete instance where the communication is so simple that physical gestures suffice to carry the meanings. A nurse, say, is in charge of a patient greatly needing sleep. At a moment when the patient has just fallen asleep, the physician in charge appears. The nurse, having heard the doctor coming, meets him at the door, touches her finger to her lips, and points to the sleeping patient. The doctor nods understandingly and beckons the nurse into the hall.

Here all the terms under consideration apply—co-operation, communication, intent, and meaning—and all on a background of shared concern. The doctor and nurse share in a common concern for the patient's welfare. They co-operate to this end, and accordingly they communicate in order to carry on effectively the co-operation. The nurse knows in general and accepts what the doctor intends, so that her intent supports and implements his intent. They must co-operate both while the doctor is present and while he is away. On this occasion, in order that the doctor may effectively carry out his own intent, the nurse has to bring him up to date, so to speak. She therefore intends him to see and know what she knows, namely, that the patient is asleep. Her first sign meant that he was to make no noise, lest he wake the patient; her second sign meant him to see why he should make no noise. She intended as *end* to help the patient; she intended as *means* the signs she used and the ideas she thus communicated.

If the nurse had had no achieved selfhood to utilize, she could not have pictured in advance to herself the elements in the case: either (1) the situation as it existed in its relationships, or (2) the situation if the doctor should wake the patient, or (3) this in contrast with the situation if the doctor should be quiet. Nor would she (4) have been able to pick out, by internal trial, the signs that would (if she

saw them) work with her and therefore presumably would work with the doctor. Similarly the physician, because he, too, had an achieved selfhood, was able to "take in"—by trying them out on himself—the significance of the signs used.

In other words, in this instance of conscious (*i.e.*, self-other considered) co-operation we find communication a necessary means to intelligent (consciously efficient) co-operation. Each sign as used and accepted got its meaning and its acceptance from its intended bearing on the whole co-operative experience. It is these facts so related that together define what is meant by *intent* and *meaning*. True enough, after one has learned how to "intend" through successive instances of co-operation and communication, he will be able to intend by himself, using what we may call internal co-operation and communication. One can "intend," then, only as he sees and accepts the relationship of proposed act to end sought. He can "mean" the act only in the same way, that is, only as he sees (understands) and accepts (to act on) the relationship of proposed act to end sought.

Moreover, this kind of "intended" communication, which gets its original "meaning" from the conscious co-operation to attain the shared end sought—this kind of co-operative communication exactly constitutes, and so defines, language in its true sense. That the communication here went on through gestures alone by no means denies its essence as language. Mead, in fact, calls spoken language "oral gesture," and the description is distinctly appropriate. That meaning, intent, language are all possible only in and through human association needs no further argument.

This ability so to co-operate consciously and use intentional (self-other) communication in connection constitutes the second stage or level in the self-other process. And at the same time the self-other criticized sign-meanings, used in and for communication and co-operation, constitute, as

stated, the essence of language. Thus does language, when effectively used, indicate the attainment of this second-degree level of self-other development.¹

¹ It may be added in connection, for later use, that, because words have objective existence, they constitute an excellent device for so fixing meanings that these may in turn become objects of shared study, with the added result that communication and co-operation are in their turn greatly facilitated.

CHAPTER IV

THE SELF-OTHER PROCESS: MORAL CONFLICT, PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CONSCIENCE

With the conception of the moral we enter upon a third level, or degree, of complexity of selfhood. This stage must be third also in point of time, because of the necessity of using in it the prior developments.

PARTIAL SELVES

The characteristic of this level of complexity is perhaps most easily seen in the explanatory device of what may be called partial selves.

William James in his epoch-making discussion on the self¹ has much to say about one person's having many different selves and how various of these may be in rivalry with one another. Thus in a famous passage he goes on to say:

I am often confronted by the necessity of standing by one of my empirical selves and relinquishing the rest. Not that I would not, if I could, be both handsome and fat and well dressed, and a great athlete, and make a million a year, be a wit, a *bon vivant*, and a lady-killer, as well as a philosopher, a philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and African explorer, as well as a "tone-poet" and saint. But the thing is impossible.²

It would seem from this that for James an "empirical self" represents a specific organization of thought, acts, and other

¹ *Principles of Psychology* (New York, Henry Holt, 1890), Vol. I, Ch. X.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 309.

factors around some interest. In this sense a person would have as many partial selves as he has interests to serve as effective organizing centers.

Imagine, for example, a child tempted to do some act forbidden by his mother. He might talk thus with himself:

"She said not to touch it."

"I will touch it if I want to."

"She said good little boys mind their mothers."

"I will touch it; she won't know."

Here there is going on in this boy an internal conflict. He recognizes as one of his interests, as one partial self, the desirability of doing as his mother had told him. Against this internal voice speaking thus for the mother, there is, as a rival partial self, the boy's personal inclination to disobey and touch the forbidden object. The conflict is a back-and-forth between these two.

In the preceding chapters we have seen how the self is a self-other compound, composed of a self-component and an other-component. To picture the moral conflict within this child, we may then say that his self includes, during the conflict, these two partial selves contending with each other as to which will ultimately control his act. One partial self is inclined to obey his mother; it represents the influence of his mother speaking in imagination as if present. We may call this partial self the child's "internal other." The rival and opponent to this in the conflict is another partial self representing the child (as against his mother), his "internal self" we may call it.

We have here the "internal other," in the absence of the mother, upholding her wishes, while the "internal self" represents the child's opposing wish. In a very true sense, not here pursued, these two partial selves are characteristic of a state of moral or deliberative doubt and represent at the

given stage rival proponents in the inner struggle as to which will be "chosen" as the ultimate self of action.

It can be said at once that analogous partial selves were implicit in the discussion on language. When the nurse tried out internally the gestures that she proposed to use externally on the doctor, it was on an internally conceived doctor, a true internal other, that she tried out her proposed gestures; and she, the internal self, did the trying. The nurse's internal self thus tried out the gestures on an internal doctor who knew and understood as the nurse imagined the real doctor would know and understand.

With this conception of partial selves now before us we can proceed to the main discussion of the chapter.

MORAL CONFLICT AND RESPONSIBLE CHOICE

Moral conflict, it appears, can arise only with selfhood and then only after obediences to authoritative rule have become a fact and factor in the child's life.

We call it a moral conflict when an "internal self" is struggling against the demands of an "internal other" that a certain rule be carried over into outward act and fact. It is at once clear that in such a conflict the two opposed internal selves are in fact rival claimants for control of the actual child. In the case of the child tempted to disobedience, the "internal other" demands of him what the mother demands, while the "internal self" takes the stand, in opposition, that the child would like to take against the mother when she is actually present. These two partial selves thus struggle back and forth for possession of the child's active organism, that is, against each other as to which proposed program of action—to touch or not to touch—shall be made actual.

The act of choosing, which normally follows, is exactly the fact that one hypothesis or partial self has won out over the other so far as to carry the actual organism with it into

its proposed action in preference to the other's. In some cases the vanquished rival is so completely overcome as henceforth to offer no significant struggle; it thereupon disappears. In other cases, however, the vanquished self does not die but remains to carry on further struggle. In opposition to things as they are, it still hopes that with new evidence or a changed situation, it—the now vanquished partial self—may later become the chosen and dominant self.

In a case of such moral struggle, where a decision is made in the light of foreseen consequences and action consciously accepted accordingly, we say that the person has *accepted responsibility* for that decision. The "whole" self of this person has in this choice underwritten, as it were, that one of the rival programs of action as its own. The person is willing to stand thus before the world and to be judged and criticized accordingly. Accepting responsibility implies, then, (1) recognition of possible or actual differences of opinion in the outside world as to what is right and proper in the case at hand, (2) a conscious choice of one line of action in preference to other lines in the light of foreseen comparative results from the rival courses of action, and (3) a willingness to be known by the world as having identified oneself with the chosen course and its foreseen outcomes and so to receive the praise or blame that properly goes with the choice.

The phrase "identified oneself with," as used in the previous sentence, is worthy of at least a passing word. This phrase, closely enough considered, will be seen to describe exactly the analysis made of responsible choice in the foregoing account. Each such identifying implies two stages: in the first stage the whole self is, in advance of action, contemplating the rival partial selves with the contrasting outcomes they respectively imply; and in the second the whole self is in the act of choosing one of these hitherto hypotheti-

cal selves to be the actual self of conduct. It is in this second stage that the identifying takes place. The choosing is exactly the process in which the hitherto doubtful whole self identifies itself with one course of action in preference to any rival course. And the term implies a certain time process: the choosing self stands at the fork of the road and accepts the hitherto hypothetical self of one fork to be its own next stage, to be itself at that stage. It is all of this that is so precisely—and neatly—implied in the term “to identify oneself with a chosen course.”

CONSCIENCE

It may further be added that in such an internal moral conflict as that just described there will be appropriate feelings to accompany the different stages and phases of the struggle. In particular, as the “internal other” makes demands that the “internal self” is disposed to reject, there will be feelings accompanying these demands which reinforce now one consideration and now another. Among the reinforcing feelings so arising, certain feelings stand out as playing a peculiarly valuable role in the moral life, namely, those that accompany attention to authoritative aspects of the moral situation and therein stress the claim of oughtness. Such feelings, which reinforce the moral ought, we put in a class by themselves and call the voice of conscience. So important does conscience prove in the moral life that in the religious history of morals it has often been called the voice of God.

It takes little consideration to see that conscience may thus represent either a customary morality demanding conformity with the *status quo* or that it may accompany and represent a consciously made new moral demand. This distinction is necessary because there are those who say of conscience that it is “merely a sense of conflict with the

mores," a statement that is quite inadequate. Conscience may operate at that level, but that it is "merely" that and no more is simply not true. A savage does seem to act precisely from group mores; and a child may do so in his beginning development of selfhood, as we shall see later with Piaget. But the more fully one develops a thoughtful selfhood so as to act from a wider reach of considerations, the more creative the moral act becomes. Indeed, the later discussions of this book will show how the quality of one's civilization is the principal factor to determine both the nature of the selfhood a person builds and the range of moral decisions he faces in dealing with the problems of life.

The moral act in any full sense implies a thinking and responsible person confronting a situation where significant human values, as now seen, are in essential conflict. To deal morally with such a situation, this person has to see—and the more clearly the better—what possible alternatives of action there are and what are the probable respective consequences from these several alternatives. He must meanwhile have previously built by responsible thinking such a conception of the good life as will in his judgment best stand criticism before others. He must now consciously apply this conception of the good life to the respectively contrasted sets of consequences and must, if he is to act morally, choose to put into action that set of consequences which in his judgment best makes for the good life.³ And this choice

³ A word perhaps should be said about the fact of choosing, especially as traditional psychology postulated a faculty, the will, to interpose at the right stage and do the choosing. Many have gone on to add, miraculous though it be, that the will may choose "freely," that is, independently of the circumstances or of the previous character of the person. The discussion as here given has no use for any such faculty as the will and still less for any such alleged freedom. *Choice* is the descriptive name for the fact that, whereas a moment ago the organism was "in doubt," now it is acting. We say it "chose" the course it is now carrying out. But the word *choose* adds nothing except a label to what has otherwise already happened, to identify this termination of the doubt and uncertainty with other like instances we

must be such that he is willing to accept responsibility for it before the world.

Now each one of the foregoing essential steps in the moral act is already before us, in the discussions previously given, as possible only in a being that has achieved selfhood through a process of shared intercourse with others who are already living the distinctive features of moral conduct. From this analysis it is easy to see, on the one hand, why moral conduct admits of such widely varying degrees of perfection and, on the other, why it has so frequently been acclaimed as the highest manifestation of personality.

This ends the discussion of the third level or degree of selfhood. At the first, before selfhood has been achieved, the child stands, in effect, upon an animal plane. It acts, as the common inexact phrase goes, egocentrically, that is, without recognition of other selves as such and indeed without recognition of itself as a *self*. It acts out of reflexes, native or acquired. The child, beginning thus on this animal plane, proceeds to develop three successive stages or degrees of complexity of selfhood. First comes the stage when this organism can see and understand itself in terms of others and how they appear and behave and can understand others in terms of itself and how it thinks, feels, and acts. The resulting self thus formed is inextricably both self and other. Second comes the stage or degree of complexity in which the child can so put itself in the place of another as both to co-operate to common ends and to utilize language mutually understood in carrying on such co-operation. It is in this

experience. If the word *will* is to have any meaning, it is to be found in the way the organism has acted consciously in the light of considered consequences, possibly in the face of internal opposition and perhaps in spite of foreseen external hindrances. It is difficult to conceive any defensible sense in which the term *free will* can be used in connection without bringing more confusion than it clears.

stage that for the first time the self, in the full and proper sense of the terms, *intends* or *means* what it says in relation, having first tried out the words on the internal other. And finally comes the third stage, where the self, having learned specific obediences as such, finds an internal conflict develop between the internal other demanding obedience to some rule of oughtness and the internal self resisting the rule.

Any full selfhood of course continues to involve action at all four levels or stages of life. Certain innate and still animal-like reflexes continue to act in us all, as heartbeat, breathing, digestion, and the like, while any or all of the three levels or complexities of self-other action go on intermingled together.⁴ All distinctively human conduct, however, assumes the self-other process.

⁴ This is not to say that self-conscious life may not influence heartbeat, breathing, or digestion. The contrary is true. But it remains true that heartbeat, breathing, digestion, and the like continue relatively unchanged from the animal-like stage. Specifically they do not come under any full control of the self.

CHAPTER V

THE SELF-OTHER PROCESS AND THE CULTURE

This chapter begins the more explicit discussion of what has so far been only implicit, namely, the crucial role that the surrounding culture plays not only in the achieving of any actual instance of selfhood but as well for making possible society as such. Specifically in our own civilization it is our culture which makes possible the achieving not only of the kind of selfhood that we in our day and time know and approve but also of our actual social fabric. And the possibility of the continuing improvement within the culture gives us the right to hope for an analogous future improvement in the self-other life of the coming individuals and of society.

THE CULTURE AND HOW IT OPERATES

It may be well to say a word first on the meaning of the term *the culture*. As here conceived, the culture consists of all the man-made parts and aspects of the human environment. More specifically the culture includes everything contrived or discovered by man that has made a place for itself in the social process. It thus includes especially such things as language, tools, customs, institutions, ideas, standards, and ideals.

Typically the culture is transmitted from one generation to the next through the process of sharing in the life of the

group. And the culture so transmitted to the young molds them to its model. Thus the culture not only becomes the principal means of conserving significant discoveries and inventions, but it also serves as the chief means for perpetuating the distinctive characteristics of the group. We are not, however, to suppose that all members of a group will equally acquire all the available culture. Quite the contrary is true, especially in the more advanced societies.

What mainly concerns us here is the relation between selfhood and the culture. Throughout the long course of human history each of these two has acted to bring the other, in the aggregate, into fuller and clearer existence. As each has grown, it has upbuilt the other. The active process of the culture to affect the individual is naturally seen most clearly in the young. As was earlier stated, the particular culture of any group molds the rising generation of that group to its model. It is, in fact, this, and not differences of innate endowment, which will in the later discussion most explain why the French differ from the Chinese or the Germans from the Negroes.

THE THESES OF THE CHAPTER

The theses to be taken up in this chapter so interact with one another that it seems wise to state them all together in advance and in so doing to make more explicit certain assertions already less precisely made:

(1) Historically the growth of the culture has gone hand in hand with the achieving of an ever more complex selfhood. Each, as it has grown, has helped the other to grow into fuller and better defined existence.

(2) Active participation together in the group life is the chief means of transmitting the culture from old to young, from group to individual.

And the same participation with its resulting transmission

forms the chief means for the development of individual or specific selfhood.

(3) Only by slow and scattered advances has the race achieved the specific cultural insights and distinctions necessary for developing the type of individuality (or selfhood) now chiefly valued.

(4) The culture may, in a true and proper sense, be defined as communicable intelligence. In this sense intelligence has been built in the past, and may yet be built, increasingly upon demand, as the need arises—and this to the advantage both of individuals and of the group.

(5) The eighteenth century conception of the indefinite perfectibility of man, though then exaggerated, is still within limits a valid possibility.

(6) Institutions of law and order, both national and international, are essential for maintaining the gains of selfhood and civilization.

THE HISTORIC INTERACTION OF CULTURE AND SELFHOOD

Historically the culture and selfhood have developed together. Each has been at once both cause and effect of the evolution of the other, and this in an unending, though not necessarily consistent, ascending series.

The chief distinctive outer evidence of man's superiority to the brute is found in the fact and use of language and tools. That these two are in certain respects but different manifestations of the same psychological processes will perhaps become clear as we proceed. Thus three things have historically gone forward hand in hand—selfhood, language, and tools.

When Köhler's ape contrived the spliced stick for pulling bananas into his cage, he showed sufficient mental ability to devise, under human guidance, what was in our view a temporary tool. We cannot assert that apes would alone do

so much, but the important bearing of the incident on the present discussion is that this particular devising, brilliant though it was, did not constitute a cultural addition and achievement. Why not? The answer apparently lies in largest part in the absence of language. It is with the culture as with so many other aspects of life—"to him that hath shall be given."

If drawing bananas into the cage were a sufficiently widespread need among apes and if these particular apes had had a group language, the discovery of the spliced stick by this one ape would probably have resulted in a cultural addition. In the first place, the discovery would have provoked talk. This in turn might well have resulted in so selecting out the significant new element as to cause others to copy it. If so, a standardized tool would in probability have resulted. Ape culture (for the language here supposed would show at least that much culture) would have been by so much enriched. Corresponding changes in learning would have followed, with new additions to language, and—who knows?—ape imagination might possibly have been stirred to new inventions!

But the apes had no developed selfhood and no language. So what this one ape achieved died with him. It has made a difference to humans that this ape so learned, but not to his fellow apes. They were not ready to profit by it.

An historic failure of humans to build culture is found in the Old Stone Age. According to Boas, the men of that age, having achieved their stone implements, went for thirty thousand years without improving upon them. Progress in that age was so slow as to seem then (from our standpoint of knowledge and experience) demonstrably impossible. No experiments or observations known to us have run so long with such uniformly negative results. Few conclusions would seem so well founded as that progress under such conditions

had reached its ultimate state, never again to move forward. With our present knowledge we can easily believe that poverty of language was a significant factor in this failure to discover. It would appear that the Stone Age language (or languages) lacked conceptions of method of inquiry. Probably no one ever asked about further inventions.

The importance of language in the development of culture can hardly be overestimated. Dewey calls language "the cherishing mother of all significance."¹ "Events when once they are named lead an independent and double life."² They continue to be events in the causal series as they were before naming. But as named they lead a new kind of existence. Thanks to the self-other nature of language users, named events can be imagined and put into new settings. Both in conversation and in thought, consequences of new arrangements can be conceived and weighed. It is in this way that tools and other instrumentalities are possible only in social groups possessing language. Language thus becomes in an additional sense uniquely invaluable.

Language, as was pointed out in Chapter III, implies the existence of a self-other type of group, possessed besides of common recurring problems and the accompanying necessity of co-operating in connection. Under such circumstances words become primarily the means of effecting co-operations. Each co-operant must understand the common enterprise as well as the part each one is to play in the common effort.

This is the pragmatic origin of language. It is of course true that language may be used in ritual without having to meet the practical test just laid down. And language may be used also in such things as storytelling, where the doing is over and we are now simply listening to what has been done. But even storytelling involves co-operation and may

¹ John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York, Norton, 1929), p. 186.

² *Ibid.*, p. 166.

besides influence later co-operative enterprise. So, after we admit apparent exceptions, it still remains true that language primarily exists to facilitate co-operation on a self-other foreseeing basis. And it is this test that language must continue to meet if it is to serve as language.

We have seen, then, in a general way how language is necessary to the developing of tools and how selfhood is necessary to both language and tools. We may now turn the interactive development the other way about.

Tools, as we saw, grow out of common needs. A new tool thus adds a complexity to life even though it saves labor. There is not simply the added complexity of learning the new tool, but new processes and new relationships also arise. How the spinning jenny, the power loom, and the steam engine brought about that astonishing aggregate of social change called the Industrial Revolution is the classic example. The radio and automobile are showing like effects for our day. Life has by these things necessarily changed from what it was. Out of the changed life come new relationships with new chances of friction and consequently new problems. Language and selfhood must expand accordingly so as to take care of these new demands.

Each such new advance means, then, a more complex mind. Each self that participates along new lines is called upon to answer appropriately to others in the new affairs. With more complex minds, still new tools and new agencies become further possible, and these in their turn affect language and selfhood in still new ways; and so on in unending mutual round.

That practice may lag behind new conceptions of duty need not surprise us. It is but the common history of man. And in all this we must not forget the exceeding slowness of the first advances, as witness the thirty thousand years of the Old Stone Age. Also we must keep in mind that bar-

barians might come to conquer and destroy a culture which they could not appreciate. Even in our own day is this oldest phase of the old barbaric story repeated. Progress along all its possible lines thus moves with irregular steps. But, nevertheless, the greater the cumulation, the more points of interaction, part with part, and so the more rapid the possible advance.

In such ways have culture and selfhood developed each other hand in hand through the ages. Certain lags in the process will be considered a little later.

DEVELOPMENT OF SELFHOOD AND THE PERPETUATION OF THE CULTURE

It was pointed out earlier that participation in the group life is the chief means to the acquisition of its culture as well as to its perpetuation. It was also pointed out that participation and transmission together form the chief means for developing the selfhood of the specific individual. One or two problems that arise in connection now call for consideration.

Note, for example, how this process of cultural self-building goes on. In the beginning the child becomes aware of this world under family tutelage. What the mother says, on the whole, goes. There are, to be sure, exceptions and often these exceptions receive emphatic attention. But at the first the child simply cannot in most things conceive of any way other than the family way. Specifically the first definitions of things are simply in terms of what to do with them, and this is determined in any case by what the family actually does. A cap, for instance, is a thing-to-be-put-on-the-head; that is what a cap is; there is simply no other way to think about it. The child's carriage is similarly a thing-to-get-in-when-he-is-going-out. It is worth while to note the tenacity with which the child holds on to the ways he has first learned. Let any-

one teach a child a Mother Goose rime and then try later to use a variant form. The child will not admit the new and variant way; he is against it. William James said that old-fogyism begins by twenty-five; he should have said much younger. Of all conservatives the child is the most consistent. He begins that way and has to learn to be different.

All of these facts mean that the family-given components of the self really get in on the ground floor. The peculiar family appropriation of the group culture thus enters essentially and crucially into the child's very self. He becomes (in greatest measure) what they do, believe, think, uphold. And once family ways have taken root, they serve powerfully to select and so to mold all later additions.

There are many corollaries to the principle just laid down. Two of them will perhaps help the better to see and understand the principle itself.

It is now pretty well established that the I.Q. (as currently measured) depends in significant degree upon the type of family in which the child grows up. Identical twins, if brought up in different types of homes, may and often do develop different I.Q.'s. The higher type of family will cause life to turn upon finer distinctions more uniformly observed. The child, in order to share in the common family life, learns to live these distinctions and builds them accordingly into his very self, specifically into his mind. Further family living will turn on still further distinctions, which in their turn depend on the earlier distinctions. The favored child in this way builds his self—both mind and soul—on distinctions that may be absent from the less favored home. In time some item in an intelligence test will turn on his having lived—and so learned—these finer distinctions. The one twin, then, may answer what the other cannot.

Because most children live continuously in one type of family and community culture, the I.Q. tends in most cases

to remain relatively constant. The uniformity, however, is as truly in the environment as in the native factors of intelligence.

A second corollary, referred to earlier, can here be only stated, not argued—though the writer believes it is increasingly supported by the dominant competent opinion. This is that the so-called “racial” differences or nationalistic group differences are best explained as culturally formed. Germans and Jews, if they differ in mind and soul, so differ not because of innate (biologically transmitted) differences, but only in the aggregate because of different cultural histories. The Nazi-Nordic myth seems quite unfounded; science knows no satisfactory support for it. The self of the growing child, whether Jew or German, Scot or French, Negro or white, is built on the surrounding cultural model transmitted to him through the family and immediate community in which he grows up. The culture molds the child to its model.

THE HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF SELFHOOD PATTERNS

The third thesis may be restated as follows: The existing cultural distinctions and insights necessary for building the type of selfhood, or character, now chiefly valued have been achieved only through an extended series of historic steps.

The following quotation from Breasted³ will serve to introduce the discussion:

As the oldest known implement-making creature, man has been fashioning destructive implements for possibly a million years, whereas conscience emerged as a social force less than five thousand years ago. One development has far outrun the other; because one is old, while the other has hardly begun and still has infinite possibilities before it. . . . Man is morally still a mere child playing in a nursery full of the most dangerous toys.

³ James H. Breasted, *The Dawn of Conscience* (New York, Scribner's, 1933), pp. ix, 406.

The contexts in which this compound quotation is found carry the implication that a better society—in fact, the only defensible kind—is one in which each person feels himself in conscience bound to respect equally the rights and feelings of others.

To make more explicit the new pattern of self demanded by such a conscience, it may help to use the contrasting terms *broad self* and *narrow self*. To illustrate, any proper mother will, by common consent, include her child's welfare as a very dear part of herself. Thus to include, when the circumstances make it proper and right, any other self as a part of one's own active choosing self is an instance of "broad self." To refuse consciously so to include another self "within" oneself when properly it should be done is an instance of "narrow self." To take more space than needed on a subway seat and so to deprive another of a seat would be an instance in point. Willingly to follow the narrow self exactly defines selfishness. It is of course true that these terms *broad* and *narrow* are thus applied only when the user has already judged the case and in his own mind decided what is or is not proper.

Enough has already been said to indicate that, while this distinction of "broad" versus "narrow" self has overlappings with distinctions already made, it still represents a further complication in the study of self. It is, moreover, a further instance of rival partial selves struggling for acceptance as the final self of choice and act. Still further, since the conception of the "broad self" is applicable only to the morally discerning, it represents for this additional reason a stage of development possible only to humans.

If we contrast the broad self of the human mother with the ordinary conduct of the animal mother, we get two important but related distinctions. One of them is that, while the animal mother may exhibit perhaps an equal degree of

concern for her offspring, this concern is limited to the period of early helplessness. As the animal's young grow into maturity, the mother as a rule loses all her early concern. She knows them then no more as hers; they seem to her simply other instances of her own kind. It is not so with the human mother. This difference is probably the result of the second distinction, namely, that the human mother has achieved selfhood and her child has been *consciously* included, as an instance of the broad self already discussed, within her own self.

The human mother during the infancy of her offspring shares with the merely animal mother certain glandular secretions which incline her positively to mothering.⁴ And the human mother, with her own selfhood and her utilization of the culture, is enabled thus to turn her "natural" or instinctive (glandular-conditioned) behavior into an idea of her child and ideas of its proper treatment. These ideas may be studied critically so as to become in time cultural ideals insisted upon by the group as a whole. Then, in addition, the human mother's offspring stay longer with her in proportion and maintain as a rule, even throughout the rest of life, certain culturally approved relationships. An old British rime has it:

A son is a son till he gets him a wife;
But a daughter is a daughter all the days of her life.

This of course reflects one cultural pattern of continuing relationship; other cultures, as the historic Chinese culture, show different patterns. And it is only comparatively true as between sons and daughters in Britain and America. The family relationship of generations is, however, as a rule one of the very strongest of all relationships, though differing, to be sure, from culture to culture.

⁴ For a further discussion of this point see pages 88-89.

All of this leads easily to a consideration of the Egyptian conscience discussed by Breasted and what that contribution added to the enrichment of human personality. Probably a million years after humans first acquired selfhood and the human mother took her child in as the dearest part of her self, man made in Egypt another great step forward, namely, in the ethical outlook upon others. In the caste societies which had come to prevail as one tribe expanded by conquering and annexing other tribes, there grew up the common code provision that a given crime was more heinous if committed against a high class man than if against a lower. The Egyptians at length rose above this. When the soul was examined at death as prescribed in the *Book of the Dead*, it was expected to avow that in life it had meted out justice irrespective of social status. Personality itself, not its social status, had become the object of ethical concern. The Egyptian was called upon thus to include personality, in whomsoever embodied, within his own choosing and deciding self, as a part of his own ethical basis of action.

This advance apparently antedated by a thousand years any similar conception elsewhere. The early Hebrew code was tribally centered. Certain things were wrong if done within the tribe, but not if done to those outside the tribe. In contrast, the parable of the Good Samaritan shows Jesus defending the Egyptian position. The lawyer who had raised the question wished to limit the injunction, "Love thy neighbor," within the chosen people and so to exclude the stranger. Jesus rejected any such narrowing interpretation and instead expanded the obligation to man as man wherever and however found.

This ethical advance of the Egyptians—the obligation to equal justice—was, there is good reason to believe, spread abroad in time among the other peoples in that part of the world. In particular it was taken to Babylon and later brought

thence to Palestine. It was this contribution to human culture that Breasted had in mind when he spoke of conscience as beginning to emerge some five thousand years ago. It is interesting to add to this Egyptian contribution Plato's further development of inherent moral results given to the world some two thousand years after the Egyptians had made their great advance. One wonders how much he was, in fact, influenced by them and their teachings.

[Socrates] They do not know the penalty of injustice, which above all things they ought to know—not stripes and death, as they suppose, which evil doers often escape, but a penalty which cannot be escaped.

[Theodorus] What is that?

[Socrates] There are two patterns eternally set before them; the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched; but they do not see them, or perceive that in their utter folly and infatuation they are growing like the one and unlike the other, by reason of evil deeds; and the penalty is that they lead a life answering to the pattern which they are growing like.⁵

The Christian tradition, stressing the supreme value of the human individual, founded itself on the Hebrew and the Greek contributions as these in their turn had built on Egyptian, Indian, and Babylonian. We are the gainers in the degree that this conception of self has been consistently built into the culture, so as to mold the people generally, in tendency at least, toward this highest pattern yet attained. It is the present utter violation of this in the totalitarian countries which rouses such feelings of opposition in the rest of the world.

If the Egyptians enriched the world's moral outlook by contributing a new conscience to the subsequent ideal, the Greeks, in the judgment of Professor Dewey, added to the

⁵ *Theaetetus*, 176f. (Jowett's trans., 3d ed.; New York, Macmillan, 1892.)

world's intelligence no less than a "new dimension." By it the cultural ideal of human personality has been immeasurably enriched.

Before the days of classical Greece each social group had been conscious of its own culture at least to protect and transmit it. Each group knew its laws, customs, religious festivals well enough to act on them. But as yet no group had been culturally self-conscious. The individuals were not critical of what they believed. What they did believe they accepted, not after consideration, but before. What they thus believed they held therefore as prejudice, not as a body of convictions. They had never learned to ask what we, since the Greeks, now call fundamental questions, the *why* of what to think and do and *how* to find out.

For the first time in history the Greeks did achieve these searching new questions. How it happened is an extremely interesting story, too long to tell here in full, yet too significant to omit entirely. When history first rose, the Greeks had settled the islands and peninsulas where Europe and Asia come together on the Mediterranean Sea. In time the thin soil proved unable to support the growing population; many then took to the sea in ships, others founded colonies in distant parts. Whether they lived on the Asian coast and so came in close contact with the barbarians, whether they traded with distant parts, whether as colonists they were forced to modify their Greek ways to fit their new conditions, the effects combined to reinforce one result. They were forced to take conscious account of other ways of behaving, of other cultures. Athens was the focus where all these questionings were best brought together, and the effect was greatly heightened by the threat, then most seriously felt, that Persia might swallow up Greece. Athens led in the war of defense as well as in other ways. In particular Persia and Persian ways and ideas became an object of study by the

Athenians as no other people had ever before been studied in the history of thought.

The Greeks won the war; but, even more, they found themselves and in so doing discovered a new method of thought. Out of these varied experiences, the "other" component of the cultural self-other mind expanded enormously. The "internal other" was now able, in a degree never before attained, to view the scene from the point of view of other cultures and then, still more, to take its vantage ground of study outside of and above both Greek and barbarian. It was this unique expansion of the *pou sto* of inquiry (stand-point from which to question) that brought self-conscious cultural criticism to the Greeks and so led on to those multi-form searching methods of inquiry used by their great thinkers which have since remained the glory of classical Greece. It seems fair to claim that, next after the language itself, this achievement of the Greeks marks the greatest intellectual advance so far made by man. In it human personality took an astounding step forward. Since then, we may well agree with the statement attributed to Sir Henry Maine: "Except the blind forces of nature nothing moves in this world which is not Greek in origin!"⁶

A period of two thousand years after the Greeks was required to bring about the next great improvement upon their advance, namely, the experimental method of determining what to think and do—what we ordinarily call modern science. Whether the effect of this advance has been greater on man's soul or on his handiwork may be debated. Certainly civilization has been remade as never before and the ideal of human personality given far greater content.

⁶ While Athens was the intellectual focus of the whole advance, it is worthy of remark that each one of the great leaders of thought (Sophists) came from a place where the fact of contrasting cultures had forced itself immediately upon his consciousness.

Galileo was the first clear exponent of this new outlook, and his dropping of the balls from Pisa's leaning tower, whether myth or history, defines the advance. Popular opinion, entrenched in the University of Pisa, ascribed to Aristotle the doctrine—which it thenceforth held on his authority—that a five-pound ball being five times as heavy as a one-pound ball would fall five times as fast. That no one had cared to test out the proposition illustrates the hitherto prevailing attitude. The question had long been settled, really by tradition, though professedly by the authority of the Master. As against this, Galileo said (in effect), "Do not take my opinion; let us try it out in fact."

It is the principle of trying out any and every hypothesis under consideration, of letting the results alone tell us whether to accept any idea as true, that constitutes modern science. "Nature" thus becomes our object of study—the way things actually work themselves out. Men mark off some particular problem to study, as that of falling bodies. The general assumption is that in any particular case "nature" has a particular way of behaving, which we may find by proper inquiry. Men make their guesses—"advance their hypotheses"—as to what this way may be. Each hypothesis should tell us what to expect under the named conditions. If two hypotheses give us exactly different expectations, an experiment adequate to show which of the two correctly foretells is by definition "crucial."

In the case at hand the one hypothesis was that the five-pound ball would fall five times as fast. Galileo's hypothesis was that both balls would fall equally fast. The experiment proposed was therefore crucial. Galileo's hypothesis, when put to the test, won out. A new principle in physics, we may say, was thus established; but far more important was the new principle of inquiry. Before that time men had often followed authority as to what they should do or think—

the authority of the church or of the king or, more often, of tradition. In addition to accepting explicit authority, men tried also to reason things out, as in Euclidean geometry, where certain supposedly "self-evident" propositions were laid down as axioms and many other propositions deduced from these. Geometry seemed so absolutely certain that it possessed great fascination for thoughtful people. The most of serious thought prior to Darwin, or even Einstein, tried to found itself on Euclid as a model.

Science as now interpreted stands in fundamental contrast with both the method of authority and the Euclidean method of reasoning from self-evident truths. The practical success of modern science has been most impressive. Its far-reaching discoveries and the resulting inventions have so changed the world and therein so impressed the popular mind that science itself has become for many, if not for most, a new authoritarian source to be quoted much as was Aristotle in the Middle Ages. The true contribution of science as tested thought stands out in history as very, very great.

To sum up the third thesis: Evidence has been advanced to support the thesis that only by slow and scattered advances has man wrought the great insights and distinctions necessary for building the type of individuality we now chiefly value.

In the remote beginning of man as man, possibly a million years ago, were achieved the great foundations of all else—selfhood, language, tools. After almost the whole of that million years man began at length to make other great advances. Three of these stand out conspicuously from the rest, are indeed advances so great that most right-minded people (as we think) agree in wishing to see them embodied in the lives and personalities of all.

The first of these advances is the moral consideration of

respect for other persons on a basis of equal and just treatment to all. This we may take as the underlying essence of modern democracy, embodied earlier in certain of the great religions.

Second stand the ability and disposition to engage in self-conscious criticism of one's own thoughts and acts as well as of one's own culture. This advance has best embodied itself in the self-conscious and critical use of methods of inquiry.

Third comes the acceptance of criticized, tested experience as the final authority to tell us what to think and do. This is the method of objective study carried on within the experience process.

Only a self built on these principles can constitute the type of individuality that we of the modern world are willing to accept. The building of a social world to make possible such individuals and the building of individuals to make possible such a world—it is these two simultaneous and correlative tasks that now constitute, at least for the democracies, the common aims of civilization and education.

THE CULTURAL BUILDING OF INTELLIGENCE

The history of the culture, taken in connection with developing selfhood, throws definite light on the possibility of building intelligence: that we can by taking thought improve effective intelligence within the group and so in the typical individual.

The remote past offers definite help on the point. We have already seen that the men of the Old Stone Age in Europe went for 30,000 years without improving upon their stone implements. Let us consider the period since the Neanderthal men, who were, it appears, lower in the scale of intelligence than man as we now know him. Osborn says that "with considerable confidence we may record man of the modern time of *Homo sapiens* as entering western

Europe between 25,000 and 30,000 years ago.”⁷ According to the best available estimates these newcomers continued to live for some 15,000 or 20,000 years longer in the Old Stone Age type of culture (until 10,000 or 12,000 B.C.), still using only chipped flint implements, with no pottery, and making but little use of fire. After that for some 10,000 years longer (until around 2000 B.C.) man lived in the New Stone Age (of Europe), grinding and polishing his stoné implements, establishing the regular use of fire, and now making pottery. This, we may interject, is quite analogous to the stage reached by the Indians whom our forebears met when they first settled this country. Following the New Stone Age the Europeans entered upon the Bronze Age (2000-1000 B.C.), in which they put to use their new learned knowledge of how to smelt copper and fuse it with tin to make an alloy, thus furnishing implements far superior to those previously used. Following this came the Iron Age (beginning, say, at 1000 B.C.), which in point of history brings us

To the glory that was Greece
And the grandeur that was Rome.

In this recital of European development we see at the first these superior men taking at least 15,000 years—and probably much more if we count their pre-European period—before they established the regular use of fire or learned how to make pottery or how to grind and polish their stone implements rather than depend on the inferior process of chipping them. Then they took some 10,000 years further to advance to the next stage of making bronze implements, but

⁷ Henry Fairfield Osborn, *Men of the Old Stone Age*, 2d ed. (New York, Scribner's, 1916), p. 261. On p. 501 of the same, Osborn further says, “The sudden appearance in Europe at least 25,000 years ago of a human race with a high order of brain power and ability was not a leap forward but the effect of a long process of evolution elsewhere.” For the figures quoted here in connection see *Ibid.*, p. 18.

following that only one thousand years to learn how to get and use iron. If we take discovery and invention as the surest sign of effective intelligence, we see here a very considerable hastening of the process as men accumulated culture: from chipped stone to ground stone, from ground stone to bronze, from bronze to iron. When in addition we contrast even this accelerated rate of discovery with the very much more rapid rate of scientific discovery and invention of our modern times—when we make this contrast and repeat in connection that, so far as we can tell, our children are born now not appreciably more intelligent than were the children of these people 25,000 years ago—when we consider these facts, it seems necessary to believe that the explanation of the increased rate of discovery we now know is the growth of the culture and what this enriched culture can do for those living in it.

The argument on examination appears very strong. We see entering the world's culture from time to time significant new insights and correlative distinctions. After each such advance we find men using these new insights and distinctions in both private and public life, whereas before none used them or at most only a few and they but gropingly. The contrast for the world between such a "before" and "after" is very great. Also we now see every day many, many people asking questions, giving answers, engaging in processes, performing operations that even five hundred years ago were beyond the power of the greatest geniuses. We must further recognize from daily experience that men of lesser ability can and do learn to use ideas they have not created, ideas which presumably only men of greater ability could create. When we consider these facts, we seem compelled to believe that the growing culture, as communicable intelligence, can and does build up among the people a degree of effectual intelligence along a specific line of cul-

tural advance not before present even in the most capable of the group.

Specifically this was done by the Greeks in the matter of the critical study of many varied aspects of life. Since then, where lines of cultural contact have been suitably opened, we find nation after nation studying in ways they had never done before. As an outstanding older instance we see the historic transfer of such study from the Saracens to western Europe about the twelfth century A.D., with all that came in result. In more modern times we see a similar advance and a like spread taking place from western Europe and America to the older established countries of the Far East and in somewhat different fashion, before our very eyes, within all civilized countries the spread of new discoveries in natural science and in those areas of life where microorganisms affect health and the study of them affects medicine and surgery.

Still further, man has now learned as never before how to discover and invent. This is so true that we seem compelled to adopt, at least as a promising hypothesis, that, if man will but work long enough and intently enough along any given line of experience, he will make discoveries which will probably give significant control over the problems in that field. And those discoveries and their correlative processes can be so spread throughout the group as to raise significantly the effective intelligence of the group along that given line.

What man has done in the natural and biological sciences man should, granted time and effort, do also in measurable degree in, say, the social sciences. Since the coming of science it is wealth that the world has most consciously sought. If we wish a higher civilization, we must work for higher social intelligence. It may be that we have only well begun to find out how to use the experimental method. What is five hundred years in human history?

THE "INDEFINITE PERFECTIBILITY OF MAN"

The eighteenth century was extravagant in expressing its hopes for the improving of man and society, so much so that later generations have perhaps too readily concluded that the whole idea is visionary. There are, however, arguments both pro and con, and the consideration of these may well repay the effort.

On the negative side, the argument runs somewhat as follows:

First, it is claimed, an ever more rapid rate of discovery—such as we have been seeing in our day—must eventually defeat itself. It cannot go on forever. Discovery through invention means cultural change, and cultural change means social strain. If discovery then become rapid enough, the resulting social strain would become too great. Social coherence would give way. Chaos would result. It appears that something like this may have already begun in parts of Europe. The dictators seem, in fact, to have come out of just such threatened social chaos.

Second, it is further argued, men are so selfish and so prone to war that we can have no hope of a settled future. Inventions come just in time to give wars a new turn. It is the airplane, the tank, and the radio that give distinctive character to the present wars.

And, finally, in addition to these namable possibilities of evil, the future is not only unknown, it is also unknowable. Some undreamed-of development may at any time set civilization back. Only a few years ago we hoped that with Locarno and the Kellogg Pact we were about to conquer war. Now we seem farther from any general and lasting peace than any time since the Thirty Years' War.

We must of course admit the force of these arguments. Many possibilities of evil do confront us. We do not know

the future. The present wars may become devastating beyond anything known to history. In certain respects they have already become so, so that civilization may find itself in what seems like social chaos. This is a possibility, a grim possibility, as no sensible person can deny.

But however catastrophic the present wars may become, we need not feel that chaos has come to stay. Man can still learn, and he has a long cultural background on which to stand. Because men can and do learn, we can believe that wars will not last forever; they are too destructive of human resources, and the human spirit at last rebels against the waste and strain. Specifically in the present situation the dictators can maintain their holds only as they engage in ever more exciting wars, and there is a natural limit to such a program; granted the worst conceivable, men even in the conquering nations will at length crave peace.

But when peace comes, will not the trouble start over again? Possibly so, but possibly not. If in the long run men do in ordinary affairs learn by experience and thought, why may they not learn in international affairs? Moreover, men's interests do shift. In the Thirty Years' War men fought about religion or, rather, about religious differences. That question we have ceased to fight about. Now the occasion of fighting is nationalism—a new religion, if you wish, but, if so, a mundane religion and founded, it appears, on a bad economic theory. As men survey the ruins of these wars—and all will suffer, as we saw after 1918—they will study and think as never before.

The result of their study no one of course can foretell, but we can foresee some things reasonably well. The dream of organized universal peace that arose so strongly from the World War will not die; the hope of collective effort is too obvious in its appeal not to come forward for serious consideration. Indeed, looking back, it is quite possible for us

to argue that in 1928 the world did stand on the verge of collective security. Had this country gone into the League in 1919-1920—and it came very near to going into it—the situation as regards sanctions would have been markedly different. America is, to be sure, no Messiah—far from it—but it is easy to believe that, with us in the League, the rape of Manchuria might have been stopped and, in that case, that Italy would not have defied the world to outrage Ethiopia. With us in the League to give more nearly impartial balance, certain of the harsher features of the Versailles settlement might well have been mitigated in favor of Germany. That the situation is now so different from earlier hopes does not of itself constitute a convincing argument that things had to be this way. Had we of this country not failed the world, the situation today might well have been far better.

But to return to our specific topic, the so-called indefinite perfectibility of man. It was perhaps Condorcet who most clearly voiced the eighteenth century hope. Said he:

The result of my work will be to show, by reasoning and by facts, that there is no limit set to the perfecting of the powers of man; that human perfectibility is in reality indefinite; that the progress of this perfectibility, henceforth independent of any power that might wish to stop it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has placed us. . . . What a picture of the human race, freed from its chains, removed from the empire of chance as from that of the enemies of its progress, and advancing with a firm and sure step on the pathway of truth, of virtue, and of happiness.⁸

We may contrast this roseate view with a slightly soberer view of Thomas Jefferson:

⁸ *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, 1886), Vol. I, p. 19; Vol. II, p. 99.

And it cannot but be, that each generation, succeeding to the knowledge acquired by all those that preceded it, adding to it their own acquisitions and discoveries, and handing the mass down for successive and constant accumulation, must advance the knowledge and well-being of mankind, not infinitely, but indefinitely.⁹

It is of course true that Jefferson's "And it cannot but be . . ." is too strong. We may, however, recall what Breasted had to say about the million years of weapon making in comparison with only five thousand years of conscience building and add thereto his further statement that:

Civilization is built upon character, and the foundations are therefore still so new that we [need] feel no discouragement if the building has not yet reached the stability we may yet hope to see it achieve.¹⁰

Breasted goes on further to point out, what may prove most significant, that we who now live are the first generation of men and women to see clearly the history of this rise of conscience. When we think of these facts and recall in connection that it took two thousand years to develop modern science out of the Greek contribution, and especially when we see the great spread of experimental thinking within two centuries and the mighty works it has wrought—when we think of all this, it seems that we do indeed have a right to hope. And as the tempo of change is far faster these days, the realization of our hope need not be postponed indefinitely. Certainly the argument against hope now is as nothing compared with the argument that could have been made against any hope of progress in the Stone Age. The pessimists of that age, had they known enough to see their facts and argue from them, might well have used such

⁹ Philip A. Bruce, *History of the University of Virginia* (New York, Macmillan, 1920), Vol. I, pp. 45f.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 396f.

words as *proof* and *impossibility*, and there would have been no plausible answer to return. Twenty-nine thousand years would have been a long time to try out the hypothesis that no better tools could be made than the chipped stone axes and arrowheads they then made. But it would not have proved it.

We can, then, at least hold to the hypothesis that continually increasing social intelligence, at times consciously built for the purpose, may find a way out. And this hypothesis not only gives hope; it also furnishes besides a defined program of action. The end is not foreordained; the result lies in part with us. We must put forth intelligent efforts. An era of permanent peace and continually enriched civilization need, then, be no idle dream. But we can hope for it only as we are willing to work—and perhaps to die—that the conditions for peace may be established.

INSTITUTIONS OF LAW AND ORDER: THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE QUALITY AND FULLNESS OF LIFE

The general theme running through the successive topics of this chapter is the inherent relationship existing between the culture and the building of selfhood. From what has already been said it is clear that the cultural accumulation incarnate in the child's elders will lead him—if he is fortunate—to such appropriation of the race-wrought ideals as to build in him a finer and fuller selfhood than would otherwise obtain. His life promises accordingly to be by so much the richer and fuller. It was in this way, as we saw, that such self-other traits as agency, accountability, responsibility, and conscience are all but inevitable in the better homes of our own civilization. These fundamental traits constitute, we may say, the essential characteristics of a beginning selfhood; but how far any self will go on, beyond this beginning, to fullness and richness of life will depend on the actual sur-

rounding culture, whether it does or does not provide the adequate conditions for living the fine, full life. If these further conditions are also given, we may then reasonably expect the more fully developed self of such a culture to live more fully and more adequately than would another in a qualitatively inferior civilization. His selfhood is the finer and better organized and his life is in consequence the better lived. The better culture brings this about.

What we are to discuss here is law and order, not the inclusive question of the good life or the institutions needed to bring it. In their most general form these latter questions are very difficult to treat. It suffices for present purposes to take the simpler and easier question of the part played by institutions of law and order in promoting the good life. And the good life thus under discussion need not be defined with any fullness in advance, not beyond the one quality that it be the kind any well-informed modern would wish for his loved ones. What we wish accordingly to study now is the significance of institutions of law and order for such a desirable life.

History shows certain lines of development in respect of law and order. It is easy to pick a dozen countries such that in any one of them the face-to-face law and order are, in peace times, more adequate now than they were in any country of the world three or four hundred years ago. In this respect progress seems clear. For instance, two centuries ago the highways leading out of London were so infested by robbers that mounted patrols had to escort the mail coaches. The cause of such an evil state was partly the lack of effective police organization, partly the provocative resort of the government to terrorism as the means of restraining crime, partly the cruelly unjust division of wealth which not only called out the highwayman from the poverty-stricken lowest group but also gave him their admiring support even as he

rode to the gallows. This is one area in which the institutional upbuilding of law and order has been pronounced.

The terms *law* and *order* contemplate, then, orderly conduct between man and man, specifically the proper functioning of immediate customs and institutions as these in turn work to effect human happiness. In order to secure law and order, men have, on the one hand, devised a special set of laws and correlative institutional arrangements to safeguard externally, so to speak, the lives and rights of men and have, on the other hand, established moral codes or, better, moral attitudes designed to work internally to bring about proper conduct. Laws and moral ideals form thus, respectively, man's external and internal safeguards against disorder and injustice. Laws are the external arrangements to secure to men the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; while morality means, in part at least, the internal attitude to make the spirit of law and order prevail.

The bearing of moral conceptions on effective relationships between men shows an interesting history. We saw earlier that the Egyptians achieved the conception that in dealing with others one should look not to the social status, but to the fact of human personality: equal treatment to all persons irrespective of social status. This sanctity of human personality as such is at once the common foundation of the Hebraic-Christian religious outlook, of ethics as our best thought now sees it, and of democracy as a social process. From this point of view law and order mean exactly all those arrangements necessary to safeguard the individual in his proper personal life and development, that is, never in a selfish way, but always so as at the same time to promote on equal terms the life and development of all concerned. Another way of saying this is that rights, legal and moral, are simply the recognized—survival of fittest—best ways of behaving so that all may simultaneously prosper. Rights thus

have come to be seen as relative, not absolute—relative to the conditions obtaining and to the correlative rights of all others involved.

If we could imagine, as Hobbes and Locke tried to do,¹¹ a group of people living together without law and order and with no effective moral outlook, it would indeed be the unhappy state of war of all against all. The strongest would assert their wills against the weak. Except for strength alone there could be no security either to pursue or to possess the goods of life. Living in such a way would be sorry indeed. To bring law and order into such a group, at least three things must in time be developed: first, clear ideas and ideals of justice and orderly processes; second, settled and recognized procedures for settling disputes on a basis of reason and not by mere whim or desire; and, third, the determined will of an effective majority that the procedures of reasoned justice shall be the rule of life.

It appears improbable that there ever was anywhere on earth such a totally lawless group of people as Hobbes pictured. But the formula for improving holds, and history shows abundant instances of advance along each of the three lines suggested. Within the *Old Testament*, for example, it is easy to find growth in the idea of justice. In Rome we find improvement in the methods of securing justice. We can in our own American history find many instances of the growing support of law and order among frontier groups. The history of Great Britain is here again illuminating to show how proper conditions of peace and order can improve life for all. Once seven kingdoms warred continually with one another in what is now England, with a host of warring clans at the same time in Scotland. Now we find one area of law and order. Once there were great evils in the administration of justice; now there is usually good ad-

¹¹ See page 125.

ministration. Thus in that area have both the scope and the quality of law and order been advanced, with consequent great gain to all concerned.

It would be wrong to suppose that progress in this respect is automatic or inevitable. History often shows the contrary. In this country conditions have at times so changed that law enforcement has degenerated. For example, even now the most determined effort proves necessary in our largest cities to maintain proper conditions of law observance. The analysis just given indicates the lines along which effort must here also be made: actual working ideals have to be continually improved; new institutional arrangements have to be made to take care of new developments; and public support has to be secured both to maintain old standards and to advance to new. The task is never-ending.

While the reign of domestic law and order—in peace times—seems on the whole to have been advancing for the past few centuries, international law and order show a different picture. Before 1914 there had been developing for some two centuries better terms of intercourse between nations not only for peace times but also for the conduct of war. Each nation, however, claimed absolute sovereignty of decision, so that any important nation could effectually veto any proposed advance in international law. The League of Nations was an effort to deal with this situation, and for some years there were real hopes of success. Recently, however, the situation has grown suddenly worse. At this writing world affairs are the worst for many a long year. Indeed a “new order” has been proclaimed which means that force only, with no regard to right or justice, shall hold among men if this new wonder can establish itself. Already wherever Nazi influence has gone, the public treatment of Jews and other minorities is outrageous beyond words. It is exactly this threat to civilization which seemed to demand discussion of

law and order here. Civilization itself is threatened. Unless we can have effective world law and order, domestic law and order are precarious—as indeed is any decent pursuit of life or happiness.

As we consider this intolerable situation, we see the same elements needed for the world at large that we saw needed for any community. For the large world community we need, too, (1) new ideals of world order and world justice adequate to present conditions, (2) new and inclusive world machinery to establish the world order and world justice, and (3) an effective majority of the world community to enforce the working of the machinery. As just suggested, many had hoped that the League of Nations would supply these three things. It might have done so, it looked for a while as if it would do so; but this country refused to share with the other nations in such support of world law and order. While there were other factors involved, that refusal was crucial; we failed the world in its time of need. The result we now see: the lot of every man, woman, and child throughout the world is the worse for that failure of ours.

It is, however, not the task of this book to solve specific social or political questions, urgent though they may be, but to see how selfhood and civilization do and must go together. From the foregoing study two things seem clear: first, that law and order stand as absolutely necessary to any adequate development and expression of human personality and, second, that law and order everywhere and in detail depend, in this closely knit modern world of ours, on inclusive law and order throughout the world. In any community, whatever the size, we can secure effective law and order only as we clarify our thinking and our ideals on the subject, provide adequate law and order machinery, and support the working of this machinery against any and all opposition.

Here, then, as elsewhere we find that adequate institu-

tions are necessary to selfhood and to life. Just as there can be no initial selfhood except in a community of active selves, so there can be no adequate development or expression of selfhood except under conditions where the surrounding community of selves is free to pursue life on adequate terms. Law and order are exactly the institutional conditions for allowing this adequate pursuit of life. Without the universal reign of law and order there can be no surety for local law and order. And in order to have either of these, all concerned must unite in determined effort to achieve them. The situation repeats that seen by Benjamin Franklin: "We must all hang together or we shall hang separately." Universal collective security is prerequisite to orderly individual living. Effective law and order are prerequisite to the qualitatively good life.

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CHAPTER VI

OBJECTIVITY, STANDARDS, AUTHORITY

That the conceptions of objectivity and standards are necessary to well-ordered thinking will require neither argument nor discussion. The problem of authority, however, stands on a somewhat different basis. What, if any, authority shall tell us finally what to believe and do—that has been one of the most discussed of all problems since the days of the Greeks. The purpose of this chapter is to see how the self-other process can throw essential light upon these strategic questions. The account begins some three hundred years back in the history of scientific thought, with Descartes' trouble-making dualism.

The Cartesian dualism, which separated mind from matter—or, as Descartes himself had it, “thinking substance” from “extended substance”—has exerted profound influence on the subsequent history of thought. It is of course true that Descartes did not invent this dualism. He found it already deeply embodied in theology, which had in turn got it from Plato—to go no farther back. But it was Descartes who fastened the dualism upon modern philosophy and thereby “ruined” it according to Whitehead.¹

The Newtonian scientists preferred to ignore the problem

¹ Alfred N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York, Macmillan, 1925), p. 79. See a further discussion of this point in Chapter VII, page 95.

set by the dualism, but to do so meant only that they assumed uncritically one answer to the problem, namely, that as scientists they could ignore mind and build the world of science on matter alone. And on this foundation the more usual understanding of objectivity has been built. The discussion herein given refuses to go even the first step with Descartes toward his dualism, and accordingly it refuses to go with Newtonian science in banishing mind from scientific foundations. In Chapter III communication was discussed in connection with co-operation and meaning. This chapter will repeat a part of that discussion with, however, a changed analysis in order to consider here the conception of objectivity and to bring out more explicitly its self-other origin and nature.

OBJECTIVITY

Conventional science seems to think of objectivity as the state of affairs that would hold if men and their interactions with the situation were left quite out of the picture. There is a kind of validity which attaches to this view of the matter; but it nonetheless remains true that that view would, if adhered to strictly and consistently, take also the whole question of objectivity out of the picture along with the men. But objectivity, if it can be defended as useful, is a human conception created for service among men as they deal with one another.

To be consistently scientific about any actual instance of objectivity, we must have an operational definition of the term, that is, a definition that can be applied as we work scientifically. Such an operational definition is what is here sought, and the thesis in connection is that any actual instance of objectivity arrived at by scientific measures will essentially involve the self-other process. Let us begin with

a case admittedly social in character and proceed from there to see what objectivity must mean for the scientist.

Imagine a situation demanding attention from several people at the same time. The following six elements may be distinguished as necessarily present:

(1) The two or more people concerned (hereinafter called "we")

(2) The common concern which "we" feel

(3) A situation liable to go off "on its own." It is this situation which demands the attention from us. Unless we interpose, it will take its own course in such a way as probably to hurt our interests.

(4) The necessity for us to co-operate in order to interpose satisfactorily. In such co-operation we may either all pull together or act by division of labor or, by a kind of passive co-operation, decide to let matters take their own course.

(5) The necessity, if we are to co-operate adequately in any of these three ways, to communicate by words or other signs

(6) The fact that the situation sets certain conditions to which we must adjust if we would control the outcome

It is these last named imperious irreducible conditions that test our plans; these we must obey. But, to do this, we must first know enough about them to permit us in our co-operating to get successfully together. Some things in the situation we can change; others we cannot. It is then the *how* of the movable things that we have to know, how they behave under the various possible ways in which we may affect them. These, when they can be learned with reliable accuracy, the scientist usually calls "laws."²

² In Newtonian science the laws were conceived after the manner of Plato, as ideas or patterns true from before the foundations of the earth, nay, as supplying the foundations on which the earth was laid and all that is within it. That is, these laws were true independently of man. There was, moreover, a kind of wishful prejudice that the better we knew these laws, the surer were

It is such an autonomous when-left-to-itself situation, with the necessity that we get together regarding its pertinent behaviors, which calls into being and defines what we call objectivity. If we are to act upon the situation, and act co-operatively, we must get together regarding what to expect from it. We are concerned, then, to know about the elements of the situation so far as acting on them goes. Beyond that we need not agree. In the area beyond (if there be any such) anyone may "think" what he will. But as regards these imperious conditions our wishes do not count; our ideas and acts must fit them, not they us.

It is this effort to get more successfully together that has brought science into being. Common sense has always known that, where we are to co-operate, we must get together as to the facts, as to what to expect. Science begins with this common-sense position and tries to ascertain and state the facts and "laws" of the world of affairs more carefully, with a higher degree of accuracy, for use by any co-operants and—as far as possible—for any future purposes. The aim of objectivity is, then, not to eliminate the human element, but just the contrary. The point and purpose of objectivity are precisely to serve human aims and interests. This is not to deny that a particular scientist may become so interested in his problem as to think, carelessly, that he is totally unconcerned about other men. But he deceives himself. If he is scientist, he must, as will be shown, so act and so state as always to stand checking by his peers.

they to be few and simple. Since Einstein and Rutherford and Planck, our thinking along these lines has changed. Scientists now tend to think of laws as humanly contrived efforts to describe what men see happening. Besides, it seems now probable that the more we know, the less simple will the laws appear. All this is aside from the common but the highly unscientific notion that somehow a law has power to force events to its pattern.

For a discussion of these questions the reader is referred to P. W. Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics* (New York, Macmillan, 1927), Ch. IV and also *passim*.

To define and locate objectivity in terms of social aims, and consequently in terms of effective communication and co-operation for action, makes it at bottom depend on the self-other process. Anyone who undertakes to state a scientific law or fact must so state it (1) that others may understand it, (2) that they may by observation or experiment confirm or deny what has been stated, and (3) that any who wish may co-operate with one another successfully on the basis of the stated fact or law. That is, objectivity has been successfully stated in the degree that people can thus understand one another about it and so co-operatively act.

But understanding other people and co-operating with them implies such self-other types of beings as can share at least in criticism of one another's meanings. On no other basis is the use of objectivity possible. Furthermore, in order to be successfully objective, one must know the danger points of the field. In particular each one must be able to watch his own biases and know what they may do with him, and he must also understand where others are liable to misunderstand what he says.

And still further, different subject matters entail different difficulties and danger points. It is, for example, on the whole easier to be successfully objective in connection with merely physical things; and similarly it is harder to be objective in the degree that human wishes enter. Objectivity, then, belongs on a scale of more and less. It is quite misleading to speak as if a thing must be *either* objective *or* subjective. All instances are in part both. One can be surer of accuracy in connection with the weight of a physical object than with dreams. It is much easier to check the one than the other. But this does not mean that men have no knowledge of dreams or that the general subject of dreams has no objective basis. Nor does it mean that there is no subjectivity

in reading the weight scale. Take all the precautions possible, use the most carefully devised measuring instruments, shut out air currents, eliminate temperature difference, use a vernier to read the scales—do any and all of these and more, there will remain a human element in what is done and, with this, its personal equation of liability to error. In certain cases, to be sure, the probable error may be negligible, but it is still there.

From all the foregoing it seems fair to assert that the bottom foundation of objectivity is criticism, thoughtful criticism that we who have dealings with one another may more surely get together in what we are to think and do. And this criticism is possible only on a working basis of the self-other process.

Before considering further the problem of objectivity, let us consider how people accept standards. And this itself is at this point but the introduction to a discussion of standards later to be taken up. In fact, the study of objectivity was itself made primarily for its bearing on standards and authority and ultimately on freedom, especially as these serve to relate an individual to the other members of his social group. Now we wish to ask how individuals, especially the young, come to accept standards. The problem is one of great concern to parents and educators.

Piaget in his *Moral Judgment of Children* offers certain data which will give us a start. Some 150 children of varying ages were questioned on a story that had been read to them.³ The story runs in substance as follows:

A troop of Boy Scouts were out camping. Each had his part in the work of running the camp and keeping it in order. One did the shopping in a neighboring village. Another brought wood. Another swept. Once they found they were

³ Jean Piaget, *Moral Judgment of Children* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1932), pp. 275ff.

out of bread, but the boy who did the shopping had already gone. So the scoutmaster called another boy, one who had already done his work, and sent him to get the bread.

The comments and attitudes of the children, when questioned about the incident, were listed under two heads: first, the proportion according to age who accepted the idea of obedience in the case narrated as right and proper and indeed felt it as the dominating proper response for them and, second, those who counted fairness (equality of treatment) as the dominating question—so much so as to question seriously whether obedience should have been rendered the scoutmaster's request.

AGE	OBEDIENCE	EQUALITY
6	95	5
7	55	45
8	33.3	66.7
9	16.7	83.3
10	10	90
11	5	95
12	0	100

This table should be read: Of the children six years of age 95 per cent accepted obedience as the proper and dominating conception while 5 per cent stressed equality or fairness as the dominating idea.

There was also a second story similarly read to the children. This story and the tabulated replies of the children follow:

Once on the maid's afternoon off a mother asked her little son and daughter to help her with the work. The girl was to wipe the dishes and the boy to bring in the wood. But the little boy, instead of working, went out on the street to play. So the mother asked the little girl to do all the work.

AGE	OBEDIENCE	EQUALITY
6	89	11
7	41.2	58.8
8	22.2	77.8
9	0	100
10	5.9	94.1
11	0	100
12	0	100

It is at once clear that the younger children responded differently from the older and roughly according to age. For our purpose a further analysis by breaking up the two heads into four, as furnished by Piaget, is more illuminating though he does not give the correlative figures. The four groups are as follows:

(1) Obedience is right and fair; the chief scout (or mother) ordered it.

(2) The demand is not fair, but do it anyhow; the chief ordered it.

(3) The demand was not fair and should not have been obeyed.

(4) The demand, considered in itself, was not fair, but under the circumstances it was better to do as asked.

Translating these four successive age-group answers into terms of self-other discussion we seem authorized to conclude as follows:

(1) For the youngest the acceptance of authority, both as to what to do and what to think, was almost animal-like. The self-other process as such had not begun at this point to work on any deliberative or self-determination basis. Habits of animal-like obedience sufficed. These children had progressed sufficiently on the road of selfhood to recognize themselves and others as persons, to use language, to accept accountability and a certain measure of responsibility. But it was plain authority, acting simply as such, that told them

here what to do. There was almost no deliberation. The social conception of fairness, the comparing of the treatment of one with another, was practically absent—at least for the kind of experience cited. They accepted, animal-like, the obedience into which they had been conditioned.

(2) For the second group there was a dawning self-other comparison of self and other leading to a beginning sense of fairness; but the old habit of obedience, nevertheless, controlled. Thinking had begun but could not dominate.

(3) In the third stage the operation of the self-other process had brought a clear sense of fairness but with it a rigidly narrow insistence thereon. Thinking of a kind led and controlled, but it was a narrow thinking—an insistence on the specific right regardless of other considerations. Consequences were hardly considered. The range of vision was very limited.

(4) In the fourth stage self-other observation had brought fairness but had gone on further to form *a wider self*. This in turn saw *a wider situation*, in which one specific right did not alone suffice to constitute the moral rightness of the act. These older ones were willing to grant, in the words of Phillips Brooks, that “no one has a right to all his rights.” One must take other pertinent things into account before determining what line of conduct to approve.

It is interesting to find so clearly brought out as here the successive broadening of the self-other kind of thinking. Following a kind of obedience little better than a dog might show, there was clear growth throughout toward greater and greater effectiveness in picturing oneself in relation to others and to the related consequences of one's acts. The self-other process is seen in detail working toward an ever more complex selfhood with an ever broadening reach of conscious ethical outlook.

Before leaving Piaget's treatment the writer would like to

note his surprise to find here, as elsewhere in Piaget's writings, the low level of maturity in the early ages. The developing self-other attitude of these children followed of course the surrounding cultural patterns. It may be that, in comparison, these children had been shielded from the more exacting responsibilities which less sheltered children seem to show.

It will perhaps better prepare for the discussion of standards if we return for a moment to the principle of objectivity and apply that to the process of defining words and terms.

The basis of objectivity was found to lie in the social necessity of getting together in thought and understanding in order to carry forward effective co-operation. That the same principle is at work in the process of defining words needs but to be stated. Definition precisely means that we must understand each other in the same sense if we are to be successful in conferring and co-operating. If I am talking, I must somehow bring it about that the others concerned get what I "mean" when I use such terms as *red*, for example, or *stone* or *hard* or *self* or *internal other*.

In the case of the color red physical pointing may suffice. If we have before us a sufficient variety and range of colors and shades, I may by pointing say that "this" (or this range) is what I mean by red. If, then, the others present are not blind or color blind, they can experience the red to which I point in the color relationships as having a character of its own perceptibly different from the other instances; and I am accordingly understood, I have objectively defined my term. Also, if a standard scheme, suitably marked, is used, others having access to the scheme could likewise understand me; so again the definition is objectively made.

For common-sense purposes much the same discussion would hold for the term *hard* and perhaps even for *stone*,

but for needs of science a satisfactory definition of *stone* would probably be more complicated. However, even for science, a kind of generalized pointing would suffice. The scientist defines *stone* by talking about it in terms of things already so understood that any two scientists can "get together" for purposes of behavior with respect to it.

And even with so difficult a term as *self* much the same procedure can be utilized. If I would define *self*, I must talk about the matter in its various relationships until the others can act upon what they get in a way that in turn fits with what I mean. In other words, we must here also "get together."

It will be recalled that at the outset the original definition of *self* was presented in this way: The child had, it was stated, become a self (or had achieved selfhood) when he could use successfully in a social situation certain named pronouns and certain stated sentences. This as given was an operational definition and went back essentially to a kind of pointing, namely, pointing to the social operations in action. In general, then, any term has been defined when it has been so discussed in terms of related experiences already understood in common that those concerned can successfully get together for action on the defined content.

It needs no argument here to show that this whole discussion of defining is but repeating the discussion already given on objectivity. The essence of each is successful getting together for action; it is getting together on what to think so that the exchanged thought may guide co-operative action with reference to the matter under consideration.

In conclusion, then, the meanings of words and terms used in communication are in essence defined and tested by their bearings on action and shared experience of co-operative action, and these depend at bottom on the presence and use of the self-other process.

STANDARDS

The problem of standards as such is now but a repetition and extension of what has been considered in the discussions on objectivity and definition. A standard is any defined instance or unit element of experience used for making thought and assertions more easily and satisfyingly objective.

Possibly the earliest instances of standards were the ordinary spoken words of language. In the degree that language was progressively achieved, in like degree could men enter into an accuracy and range of co-operation not previously possible. And the process is unending. Each one today as he chooses his words for use must, through his own self-other compounded self, put himself in the place of the other who is to hear. And the one addressed must, by the same process reversed, understand what he hears. To act, then, on the understanding thus mutually effected brings objective results which both can see and appraise. The comparison that is then possible of the actual with the expected results tests the understanding and so corrects it for better further use. And this process by the ever better understanding of self in terms of others and of others in terms of self further refines ever more accurately both the self component and the other component of experience. The self can, if it will but try, continue indefinitely thus to upbuild itself for ever better communication and co-operation with others around it.

Following such a process, advancing civilization eventually got beyond the objectivity and standardization of mere language—important as that was—to other kinds of standards. Ceremonials, for example, must go just right or the gods would be angered. In this way ritual and times and seasons would become standardized. So important was the ritualistic function of the sun and moon to the ancient Hebrews that in the Biblical account of creation (Genesis 1:14, 15)

their use to establish "signs and seasons" came before their service in furnishing light. The demands of trade would go still further in standardizing counting, weighing, and measuring—standards proper, we may call them.

The part standards play in the management of any thoughtful work, writing, for example, may perhaps justify a further word. Thinking at its deliberative best may well be conceived as a kind of imaginative communication between two partial selves (each of which is typically seeking to become the actual self of decision and act). Suppose that I am writing something. As I write, I ask myself: "Is that clear? Does it say it?" The self that wrote is confronted by an internal other (resulting, typically, from past experiences of actual critics) which questions what has been written. The whole self (as opposed to the partial selves) weighs and, as we say, decides. Decision simply means that one way rather than another has won out in action, that one partial self (advocating that way of writing) has become the actual self of acting.

Now in this process of deliberation and decision there easily and helpfully enter standards worked out from past experience. These come from past self and other experiences and represent criticized instances and results of weighing. They are used for what they are worth in the back-and-forth of argument over various ways of saying the things under consideration. They serve the cause of objectivity by helping this self better to see (by a further self-other process) how other competent judges will weigh and accept what is written.

The term *competent judge* as here used calls for consideration. Competent in whose eyes? The first answer is, "Competent to the one who is deliberating and deciding, competent as he sees it." The "internal other" may—and at times does—claim competence above any judge actually available

or even one anywhere existing. Normally, however, both in prudential common sense and in science, one appeals to the corroborative judgment of his competent peers. If they all concur with him, he is satisfied. If any reject his judgment, then comes the further question as to who is right. If a given person differs in everyday matters often but not too seriously from "competent" judges (as we onlookers who apply the term see it), then we (the same onlookers) call that person stupid or queer. If he differs seriously, fundamentally, from the recognized competent and also from common sense (*i.e.*, from people generally) and differs so often enough, we then call him crazy and may lock him up.

But there are regions of opinion or judgment or conscience or taste in which men continue at long length to differ. Under such circumstances men may form parties or cults, possibly formal, possibly only informal. When they do, one may feel compelled to break with his hitherto "set" or group and join the opposition or form a new party. This is discussed by William James in these memorable words:

When for motives of honor or conscience I brave the condemnation of my own family, club, and "set"; when, as a protestant, I turn catholic; as a catholic, free thinker; as a "regular practitioner," homeopath, or what not, I am always inwardly strengthened in my course and steeled against the loss of my actual social self by the thought of other and better *possible* social judges than those whose verdict goes against me now. The ideal social self which I thus seek in appealing against their decision may be very remote: it may be represented as barely possible. I may not hope for its realization during my lifetime; I may even expect the future generations, which would approve me if they knew me, to know nothing about me when I am dead and gone. Yet the emotion that beckons me is indubitably the pursuit of an ideal social self, of a self that is at least *worthy* of approving recognition by the highest *possible* judging companion, if such companion

there be. This self is the true, the intimate, the ultimate, the permanent Me which I seek. This judge is God, the Absolute Mind, the "Great Companion."⁴

James's terminology is not quite the same as that used heretofore in this discussion and his problem is slightly different, but the case as given by him is pertinent. This ideal companion is an instance of the "internal other," that particular internal other which has been formed to pass supreme judgment. It is the supreme standard subjectively personified.

This road, some will say, leads straight to religion, at least to some sort of religion. Others will question. St. Paul meant perhaps this same thing when he said (Gal. 2:20): "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." Others later spoke of the Holy Spirit, meaning this same ideal companion. Some of course would see it as a highly personalized deity; others, less often in scriptural language, would see it as an immanent deity, possibly the Hegelian Absolute. Still others might have no theistic or metaphysical being in mind, but merely the highest internal other, as representing ideally competent judges not now in existence. But, however conceived, the psychological process remains essentially the same. Each one who stands out against others in any ideal sense does so because he has formed on the way an ideal or a standard—in our language, an internal other—which, on the one hand, takes into account significant external considerations and, on the other, turns the result in upon the self as a demand for conduct in accordance with the ideal. The religious problem, inviting as it may be, we shall not discuss; but it is here a matter of concern to ask how one forms such imperious ideals or standards. And this leads to the question of authority or final standards.

⁴ William James, *Principles of Psychology* (New York, Henry Holt, 1890), Vol. I, pp. 315-316.

FINAL STANDARDS AND THE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY

What shall be our final standard, or the ultimate method of deciding what to do and think?

Historically mankind has at different times accepted different types of standards, some externally authoritative, others internally so. Oldest among these, and perhaps even yet still the strongest, is tradition, the force of custom and habit. What we have "always" done, we continue to do. This is a clear case of external authority, but under modern conditions customs get upset. New developments come, new demands follow, old ways no longer suffice. At times the new is so widely accepted and the old ways so obviously interfere that "everybody" recognizes the proper break with tradition. The motor car is an instance of a widely accepted new, and many attendant changes resulting from it break the old traditions. Travel has very greatly increased. Old methods of road making no longer suffice. Roadhouses have been brought into existence. More intimately, "boy meets girl" in different ways; the parked car has often served to emancipate daughter from home surveillance. In many, many ways does tradition get broken in a changing world. And the more tradition gets broken, the more its authority gets questioned. Because things have been done in a certain way no longer suffices to make men believe that to be the right way. Once questioning begins, mere tradition loses its hold.

A second authority, still strong with many, is that ascribed to the supernatural. God through the Bible or the church is said to command certain things. This type of authority tends to be closely associated with the preceding; supernatural authority is strongest as a rule where it is traditional. But even this authority is sometimes questioned; and, when it is, there is usually a disposition on the part of proponents to defend it by some sort of appeal to reason or to criticized

experience. So that from both sides questioning gets in at least some work even here. In this also external authority tends to yield.

A third type of authority, which may commingle with the second as both do with the first, is the acceptance of intellectual absolutes. These may either be "self-evident" principles or be derived from them by methods of reasoning similarly attested. Euclidean geometry was long the stronghold exemplar of such. Until about a century ago all informed people from Pythagoras down had counted this a sure instance of certain and unchanging human knowledge. It seemed absolutely and unquestionably true, so much so that it set the model for many other lines of intellectual effort. Plato built on this and thus furnished the guide for most subsequent absolutists. Newton followed it in his mathematical physics. However, no worthy mathematician now holds to the necessary or certain truth of Euclidean geometry; there is, in fact, some evidence to the contrary. For this and other reasons the intellectual absolutist is less numerous than formerly.

A fourth kind of authority, the one herein accepted, is that men are to find their guidance from the sharable situations in life, using intelligence objectively much as has herein been discussed.

The problem we then put to ourselves is this: How shall we determine what to think and do? How or where shall we find the ultimate standard?

To begin with, what to think or do in a particular situation depends, in a changing world like ours, on the character of that situation. No prior made formulation could certainly be known to hold in advance for any given actual situation; the fact of change so demands. Life continually develops in novel fashion—never altogether new and not always significantly new, but always so that we never know, without some

fresh study, whether this situation that we now confront may not involve the significantly new. Under such circumstances we use past formulations, but only as hypotheses, some, to be sure, more likely to hold than others. These past formulations usually offer, if not a first approximate plan of action, at least some material out of which the needed new plan of action shall in part be built.

If we can thus never in important cases take past formulations without at least some study and usually also only after some revision, then the methods of study and concluding become—so far, at any rate—our most reliable resource. But even these must be used hypothetically. As we apply our methods we must also be studying them for the possibility, if not the necessity, of modifying them to suit the situation under study.

From these considerations—those just discussed along with all the preceding, especially those in the discussion of objectivity—we are ready, then, to state the desired final standard or authority as follows:

I must, in each sufficiently important matter, make such study and reach such conclusions as will in my best judgment promise best to commend themselves to further and, if possible, better study by competent others.

Either I must appeal to such further competent study as my final authority, or I renounce human effort, or I am insane. Moreover, these competent others are not to be chosen by me. The door is open. So far as known in advance, competence may come from the most unexpected sources. The judges may not be near me. They may not even yet be in life. They may, so I may justly think, have to wait and study what I am saying and perhaps change themselves accordingly before they can judge competently what I offer. But my opinion is finally to be judged by competent others.

These facts mean, then, in spite of the emphasis of democ-

racy upon the individual and its upholding of "freedom of conscience" (later to be studied), that I cannot appeal simply to myself to validate finally what I think. I may, to be sure, take my stand against the existing world, yes; but even so my appeal, if justifiable, is as always to the competent others.

And this hypothetical character of past formulations in present efforts at judgment, with the final appeal to the competent others whenever and wherever they may appear, holds of all things, even of my "foundation" conceptions of democracy and of scientific method. These along with all the rest I must use hypothetically, judging and criticizing and revising as the results may appear and demand.

The statements just presented do not mean that, because scientific method and democracy are to be used hypothetically, they are therefore to be lightly esteemed. The opposite is true. As already suggested, some hypotheses we hold to be already well attested; certainly scientific method is now one such hypothesis. Others, as democracy, lie in the realm of ethics, where the hypotheses have never been adequately tried; but the effects thus far achieved are such and the supporting considerations are so strong that many of us are willing to stake our lives upon these hypotheses as programs that must be made to work.

The foregoing statement regarding the proper final appeal for thought with the accompanying faith in democracy is here presented not as in itself a contribution to thought, but rather to show how these faiths, in democracy and in study experimentally conducted, depend at bottom and in essence upon the effective working of the self-other process. As for democracy, it is an ethical conception and moral outlook. The discussion on morality given in a previous chapter shows in detail how the moral process is at bottom a self-other procedure, alike as regards the thinking involved and the personal attitudes essentially implied. Like considerations hold

also for the final faith in experimental inquiry. Without the kind of thinking made possible only by the self-other compounded sort of mind, there could be no such critical study, no such experimental attitude, no such study of the process of study as are demanded by this experimental outlook.

CHAPTER VII

THE SELF-OTHER PRINCIPLE AND THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY

This chapter takes up explicitly the applications of the self-other principle to the study of psychology. In the preceding chapters there has been, to be sure, no lack of psychological bearings, but the main emphasis there was upon the exposition and defense of the general self-other principle. Here attention is directed primarily to psychology itself, specifically to the bearings of the self-other principle upon the scientific theory and practice of psychology. Later chapters will discuss applications to areas other than psychology.

THE EFFORT TO MECHANIZE PSYCHOLOGY

The first and principal topic of the chapter is the long-continued effort of modern psychologists to reduce the "higher" or distinctively human traits to "lower," mainly physiological or even physical, processes. The thesis herein maintained is that this reduction effort has been both a failure and a mistake—a failure in that it has not succeeded in its effort, a mistake in that it could not succeed without destroying these higher and most significant powers of man. Man's thinking, his moral responsibility, and his esthetic creativeness will not be reduced to merely animal or physical processes without ceasing essentially to be. The one un-

derlying factor to explain both failure and mistake is the disregard of the self-other origin of human mind and personality. Once the self-other origin and character of human personality have been understood and granted, the proposed reduction becomes alike impossible and unnecessary, the wish so to reduce vanishes, and psychology can once more be both human and humane.

For more than a century psychologists tried to make psychology scientific after the model of Newtonian science. Only within the last decade or two has the effort begun to falter. Now the trend is distinctly the other way. The underlying historic why of this effort at reducing and mechanizing will be considered later. Here we glance first at the specific movement of men and doctrines.

The term *psychophysics*, promulgated by Fechner in 1860, struck the characteristic note in the new movement. Müller, Weber, Fechner, Lotze, and Wundt led the way in Germany. Their successors in America long held the dominant position here. A pronounced stress was on the physiological, as if to reduce psychology to physiology. Newton and his followers accepted the Cartesian dualism, later to be discussed, and relegated mind to the role of spectator only. For the study of science, body alone and the movements of its physical constituents were the only proper subject matter. For psychology to be "scientific," then, mind must at least be subordinated and behavior explained as mechanically as possible. One special instance of this, among other instances, was the frequent and studied avoidance of purpose, or even any pursuit of ends, on the mistaken idea apparently that purpose somehow denies scientific "causation."

Thus even so catholic a student as Thorndike was unwilling in 1913 to define the term *satisfaction*, which underlies his law of effect, from success in meeting the wants of the organism as a whole, but instead insisted that "success-

ful [that is, satisfying] operation can in fact be satisfactorily defined . . . only as a characteristic of the behavior of the neurones . . . It is the neurones, not the body as a whole, whose life processes are primarily concerned in the 'successful' operations of a behavior series."¹ We may surmise that the principal motive here was to avoid making the pursuit of ends basic. Behavior must at all costs be made as mechanistic as possible. Only thus could psychology be "scientific."

A further effort at reduction was seen in the tendency to minimize thinking, to reduce it to some form of nonthinking. Thus John B. Watson sought to reduce thinking to inaudible speech movements as these in turn were counted to be nothing but unconscious conditionings.² The extreme of this reduction was seen in A. P. Weiss, who wished to make psychology a mere matter of chemistry and physics, where thinking is "nothing but" the motions and pattern shifts of electron-proton groupings.³ That such physical motions go along with thinking we may well believe, the organism seems to act as a whole, not by parts or aspects; that these motions, however, constitute thinking seems, as will later be discussed, but a plain denial of what thinking is and does.

While it remains true that the movement of psychological thought is away from these extreme positions, the reduction tendency is still far from dead. If the presentation of the self-other conception attempted in this book can help in the movement toward a more human psychology, a principal aim of the effort will have been attained.

Before taking up the theoretical argument against a mechanistic psychology, a very specific instance of the reduction

¹ E. L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology* (New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1913), Vol. I, pp. 125, 126.

² John B. Watson, *Behavior* (New York, Henry Holt, 1914), pp. 351ff.; *Behaviorism* (New York, Norton, 1930), pp. 224ff., 237, 265f.

³ A. P. Weiss, *A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior* (Columbus, Ohio, R. G. Adams, 1929), p. 54.

tendency, taken from physiological chemistry, may serve to bring out more clearly the position here attacked and at the same time show how the self-other process supplies a more adequate outlook. The instance cited shows an effort of physiological chemistry to get rid of psychology in the emotional realm.

A newspaper story attributed recently to the distinguished Professor E. V. McCollum carried the assertion that "maternal love, glorified by countless poets, can be boiled down to a mere matter" of the presence or absence of sufficient manganese in the system. It is the "boiling down" of maternal love to manganese to which objection is here made. If mother love acted as blindly as mere manganese at work in the body system, poets and moralists would be less loud in their praises and we who were once children would have less happy memories of our mothers.

That the mother shall love her baby may come largely from glandular secretions stimulated by manganese, but *how* the mother cares for her child includes more than manganese can give. In particular, the *how* of mother care depends, as we saw in Chapter V, largely on the culture. If mothers in our day and time did no better by their children than did their great-grandmothers—who seem, if anything, to have had access to more manganese than is used by present-day mothers—the death rate of infants would at once go up greatly. And if we compare with the Stone Age, where we may presume manganese, with some at any rate, was properly available, much more than the death rate would suffer in the comparison. The personalities the mothers built in their children, however adequate for that day, would not suffice for us today. It is the race-wrought ideals and knowledge, so much improved and increased since then, that must direct and supplement what manganese can do.

Dr. McCollum, then, is presumably correct in ascribing an

essential part of mother love to the action of manganese; but to say that it *all* boils down to that is indefensible. In particular, to repeat, such an assertion ignores the differences between the brute mother and the human mother, as discussed earlier, and between the human mother at the crudest state of historic culture and the human mother as taught by the best that is now known. These differences are very great, particularly in respect of the scientific knowledge and the race-wrought ideals now available to informed mothers. The mere wish to mother and fondle may be blind. Only as the mother knows about the need for regular sleep, proper nutrition, sunshine and air, and the danger from unsterilized bottles can she hope to give her child a healthy start in life. Also she must know the dangers from spoiling and teasing and must be willing to take the pains necessary to avoid these dangers. Besides all this she must have built into her own selfhood the high ideals of civilized life so as to be in these and other respects an adequate guide to the child as he faces the embodied culture to build himself upon it. No! Manganese, essential as it may be, does not suffice. Culture must guide nature if a worthy human being is to result. And this worthy humaneness, once more we may say it, depends exactly on the good working of the self-other process.

MECHANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY CRITICALLY CONSIDERED

The fundamental criticism of the proposed mechanistic psychologies is that *as psychologies* they are unsatisfactory, both as regards an understanding of human life and from the point of view of psychology as the scientific study of human behavior. As science, this mechanistic kind of psychology fails of scientific method. How this is so is not difficult to see.

The essence of scientific method is that it must start with the raw material of experience common to us all, study this

carefully in whatever ways seem best, and then come back to the rest of us, still facing that same raw material, and tell us more about it than we had beforetime known, more about how it fundamentally behaves, and so more and better about how to use it. In other words, science must start with the given, with certain given phenomena appearing in human experience, and, thus beginning, may proceed at will to analyze the phenomena and then go on to study the elements resulting from analysis and their relationships with one another and with any other things known to science. But in the end science must come back to where it started, to the originally observed phenomena, and tell us new things about them so that we can now better understand, manage, and direct them.

Consider, for instance, the experience of seeing. Science can start with actual seeing and analyze this (if it wishes) into some sort of wave motion striking the eye,⁴ and it can further proceed to study the wave motions and how they behave. Much has thus been found out, with many resulting practical applications. But in the end the resulting knowledge and the telescopes, microscopes, and diffraction gratings must and do come back to throw light on the original start—to seeing and to the things that are experienced in seeing. These findings and inventions then help us to understand better what we had previously been seeing: the stars, the rainbow, the bent-yet-straight stick in the water. And they may go farther to help us see and understand, and perhaps manage, things we had not before seen: the moons of other

⁴ We used to say this wave motion was of or in the ether, but all we knew about this ether was, as Lord Salisbury said, that it was "the nominative case of the verb to undulate." Now, since Einstein, we have dropped the noun. We still hold to the verb—the facts seem to demand it—but what, or whether anything, is waving, that is a matter about which we remain in ignorance. Possibly nothing; possibly common sense and science here part company, with science leading the way.

planets, the sunspots, new stars, the hitherto invisible micro-organisms and their determining part in health.

As science thus starts with the given and comes back after study to tell us more about it, we may learn that the originally given was quite different from what we had thought. In any and every case of successful study the given undergoes change as a result, but in some cases the change may be not so much addition as subtraction. Study thus at times tells us of positive mistakes we had been making. For example, much that was formerly ascribed to taste is now more accurately ascribed to smell. Such instances, however, in no wise contradict the general principle; they rather illustrate it. The distinctions we had formerly, but erroneously, ascribed to taste are not wiped out; they still remain as distinct as before. Now we know that they come from smell and therefore can better understand how with a bad cold food may not "taste" so good. The smell is obstructed because the nose is inflamed. The result of successful scientific study is always to understand better what it started with, generally to control it better.

With this conception of proper scientific method before us, we can ourselves now return to the criticism of these mechanistic psychologies. And the criticism is fundamental and crucial—namely, that, when they start with any of the more distinctively human phases of experience, as thinking, meaning, willing, or feeling of moral obligation, they somehow never get back to the original experience. Or, if they do get back, they present it to us in such a reduced or perverted form that we know less about it than before and have less, not better, means for managing it. Some of these psychologies even ignore the higher, more human phases of experience altogether as if somehow they are not worthy of serious study.

Take thinking, for example. Certainly nothing is more

characteristically human and nothing more important in human behavior. We should certainly expect a psychology to deal with it. Yet in Thorndike's three volumes on educational psychology, the indexes give only two references to this term, and both of those are only in incidental quotations from other writers. The term does not appear at all in the index of Watson's *Behavior* (1914). It does appear in his *Behaviorism* (1930), but note what is there said about meaning, which is the essence of thinking:

One of the chief criticisms directed against the behaviorist's view of thinking is that it gives no account of meaning. May I point out that the logic of the critic here is poor? The behaviorist's theory must be judged on its own premises [*sic*]. The premises of the behaviorist contain no propositions about meaning. It is an historical word borrowed from philosophy and introspective psychology. It has no scientific connotation.⁵

The statement about meaning exactly illustrates the criticism herein made. When we start with experience, we find meaning playing a real part. When a farmer says, "That cloud means rain," we all (outside of these psychologists) know what he means. When a boy says, "I stepped on Mary's hand, but I didn't mean to do it," we know what he means even though we may think the playing was too rough. To say, as Watson does, that the word has "no scientific connotation" is to tell us, not the results of any inductive study of the part thinking plays in life, but rather something he had chosen to believe apart from inductive study. When he says, "The premises of the behaviorist contain no propositions about meaning," he bears explicit testimony to the fault herein found. It is the premises of his study, not the results of his study, that deny meaning. He has belittled thinking and did so from the start, because meaning is the precise

⁵ *Loc. cit.*, p. 249.

denial of his assumed-in-advance position. To say that meaning exists only artificially in "philosophy and introspective psychology" is a curious commentary on all the people who have these many years been using the term in actual living and getting together understandingly in terms of it.

It appears from the preceding chapters that for certain very important phases and parts of human experience, as, for example, language, critical thinking, and moral responsibility, the self-other process is an essential factor. That these three, to name no others, are significant phases of social and individual life no one can deny. That the self-other principle appears essential to them seems clear from the discussions referred to: these processes can, in fact, go on only in terms of self and other compounded experience. That the self-other processes can themselves not be reduced to non-conscious, nonhuman components without ceasing to be such self and other compounded experiences seems equally clear. Accordingly the more validity is granted to the self-other principle, the less likely will any wish to reduce these "higher," distinctively human processes to nonconscious elements.

This is not to deny that there may be value in seeing how far psychology is a matter of physiology or how physiology enters into psychology; nor how far behavior can be studied from external observation; nor that conditioned reflexes may have a useful part to play in the explanation of certain human phenomena; nor that the study of neurones or $S \rightarrow R$ bonds can make a contribution. But it is to deny that psychology can be reduced to such as these and no more.

When the effort is made so to reduce human psychology, two kinds of bad results follow. First, as already intimated, we are not helped to understand the phenomena we started with. It does not help us understand how satisfaction helps learning to shunt the discussion off into neurones and their

alleged readiness or unreadiness to conduct. Satisfaction and readiness are phenomena of human life, and whatever else may be true of them they get their definition in human living. If the discussion of theory had been kept on the human basis—in which students of psychology are, in fact, most interested—the readers would have been better helped. The same criticism holds of Watson's discussion. To define thinking as "language habits . . . exercised implicitly behind the closed doors of the lips" is not to help; rather is it to refuse to help us understand the problem of the relation of language to thinking.

A second bad result from such reduction is that many, including a host of teachers of educational psychology throughout this country, are dissuaded from studying these "higher" phenomena, counting them negligible. These ill-taught teachers of teachers tend accordingly to tell prospective teachers that these "higher" processes are, after all, not so important as the more formal matters which lend themselves more readily to assignment and drill. The damage here was for years very great. Attention was specifically shifted from close concern for the child as a living, purposing personality to subject matter, drill, and tests. Psychological reduction has much to answer for.

MECHANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY HISTORICALLY STUDIED

A backward glance into the probable origin of this mechanistic psychology with its efforts at reductionism may help us better to understand the movement.

Much of the older "mental philosophy" was so unscientific in method and outlook as to be highly repellent to men who had come, justly, to admire both the careful procedures and the successes of natural science. The question thus arose as to whether it might not be possible to study human behavior with the same care and possibly with many of the same pro-

cedures that constituted the glory of the natural sciences. From such a point of view exact measurement and predictability of outcome seemed necessary if the study was to be scientific at all.

It has been now a full hundred years since the start to mechanize psychology was consciously made. Since then we have learned more about the conceptions formerly held to underlie the natural sciences. It was with such in mind that Whitehead, referring to the seventeenth century contribution in thought, speaks of "its astounding efficiency . . . for . . . scientific research . . . It has held its own," he says, "as the guiding principle of scientific studies ever since. It is still reigning . . . It is not only reigning, but it is without a rival . . . *and yet—it is quite unbelievable*"⁶ (italics supplied).

This seventeenth century contribution was, Whitehead goes on to say, "a scheme of thought framed by mathematicians for mathematicians." Its "enormous success has foisted onto philosophy the task of accepting them [its particular abstractions] as the most concrete rendering of fact . . . Thereby modern philosophy has been ruined. It has oscillated in a complex manner between three extremes. There are the dualists who accept matter and mind as on equal terms [*e.g.*, E. B. Titchener, against whom John B. Watson chiefly rebelled] and the two varieties of monists, those who put mind inside of matter [*e.g.*, John B. Watson] and those who put matter inside mind [*e.g.*, the Hegelians]."

Descartes, the philosopher of the dawning modern science, had been troubled, it appears, by the scholastic insistence that the "natural purpose" of anything must be granted

⁶ Alfred N. Whitehead, *Science in the Modern World* (New York, Macmillan, 1925), pp. 77ff. In anticipation of the next paragraph it may be recalled that Whitehead was Professor of Mathematics in London and Cambridge until his retirement in 1924, when he was called to Harvard as Professor of Philosophy.

priority over scientific insight. Thus the "natural purpose" of the sun to serve man stood, for the scholastics, in the way of accepting the Copernican theory that the earth revolves about the sun. For them the one that serves must do the revolving, necessarily so, and not the other way about. If Descartes, then, could get thinking and matter far enough apart to rid natural phenomena of "natural purposes," scientists could study matter as such and by itself and not be bothered with this unnecessary baggage of "natural purposes." So he revived, or utilized, another old doctrine, that of the contrast and supposed opposition between mind and body, which went back through Christianity at least to Plato and possibly to India. Utilizing also the doctrine of substances, he designated mind as thinking substance and body as extended substance.

The suggested dualism took and took tremendously. Thereafter scientists as they studied natural phenomena ignored mind. It was spectator and spectator only. Sound, for example, as an air phenomenon was real, objective, and must be studied; but sound as a human experience was subjective, and insofar unreal and therefore to be ignored. The laws of nature, while apprehensible by man's mind, somehow stood apart, partaking of the nature of Platonic "reals." They existed unchangeable from before the foundation of the earth; they controlled natural phenomena. Man must learn them and obey them.

When psychology undertook, as has been suggested, to make itself scientific, it was of course in a quandary. To be scientific, it, too (so it thought), had to ignore mind. But mind was supposedly the main thing in psychology; in fact, that was what psychology had hitherto meant, the science of the mind. But to be scientific, these modern students must follow the Cartesian-Newtonian model; scientific psychology also must ignore mind, even when it studied it. One way to

manage this was to keep mind and body parallel—"psycho-physical parallelism"—and somehow study them separately. Mind and body seemed, to be sure, to interact on each other; but on the parallelism view it was unscientific to believe it or, at any rate, to notice it. Thus Titchener, who, as one of Wundt's students, was a kind of foreign missionary of scientific psychology to America, said (probably under the influence of his Oxford training):

Especially must we be careful to avoid, as psychologists, the popular view that bodily states are the *causes* of mental, and mental states the *causes* of bodily: that a ray of light is the cause of the sensation of sight, or an impulse the cause of a physical movement ⁷ (*italics in original*).

This device of having both mind and body there, side by side, each always so moving as exactly to keep step with the other, yet neither affecting the other—this was of course embarrassing. It sounded funny, and it was certainly strange. When I wish my pen, my arm reaches for it; but my wishing, or at least the thinking part of the wish, could have nothing to do with the reaching. The two things happened independently. And still stranger: as I thought, my hand and pen wrote what I had thought, the very same words; but it was unscientific to suppose that there was any connection between what the mind thought and what the body wrote.

Naturally not everybody could accept so astonishing a view, especially in America, where tradition is relatively weak. Some other way of thinking must be found. It was out of this situation that there arose—on very old foundations, to be sure—the disposition to reduce thinking to something less than thinking. There were, as we have already seen, varying degrees of rejection of the mind side of the dualism. Many

⁷ Edward B. Titchener, *An Outline of Psychology* (New York, Macmillan, 1896), p. 843.

said little but quietly repeated the effort of Newtonian science, namely, to study the nonmental as consistently as possible, reducing the mental as much as they could. One way of keeping within the narrow path of "scientific method" was to work only with things that could be measured or counted. Thus arose the study of such things as reaction time and the use of statistics. Later these two combined to create standardized tests of many sorts.

The use of tests was counted by many to mark the beginning of a new era. That it was an important step is certainly true, but it has failed to meet expectations largely because these were too roseate. The demon of "subjectivism" will not be exorcised in this or, in fact, in any other way. Personal and critical valuation, improperly called subjectivism, is an essential part of intelligent action and cannot itself be standardized. Intelligent criticism will, to be sure, increasingly use data-recording devices; but valuation in any proper sense can never be done by any nonthinking devices.

Of the various groups who sought to reduce psychology so as to disregard or slight thinking the "behaviorists" were the most thoroughgoing. They would deny "consciousness" and all its professed works. This they did, according to one of the most vocal, so as to rid psychology of all metaphysical taint. In behaviorism, he said, "one avoids both the Scylla of parallelism and Charybdis of interaction. Those time honored relics of philosophical speculation need trouble the student of behavior as little as they trouble the student of physics."⁸

Here we have an understandable attitude but a mistaken solution to the problem. Instead of getting rid thereby of philosophical speculation, Watson had exactly committed himself to a particular philosophical speculation, namely, materialism, the position, as Whitehead phrased it, which

⁸ John B. Watson, *Behavior* (New York, Henry Holt, 1914), p. 9.

"put mind inside of matter." It so happens that this particular position had been pretty well given up in philosophy for the very reasons urged here, that it does not satisfactorily account for significant phases of human life and experience.

If Watson had been more consistently scientific and simply not assumed the conception of substance at all, if as scientist he had stayed by real phenomena, he would have at one stroke freed himself from the Cartesian dualism. He would then not have had to reject a thing called "consciousness" in order to deal adequately with human behavior. We do not have to believe in a thing called "consciousness" to understand what people mean when they say "acting consciously." The noun gives us trouble, but the verb and adverb are easy to understand. They form a descriptive term that can be defined objectively, as was discussed earlier in Chapter VI. We start by studying human behavior and let our study tell us what distinctions are helpful. To define psychology as the study of human behavior is probably to give as good a definition as can be given. But we must study all types and phases of human behavior. "Introspection" is one way of getting at certain phases of behavior. It needs its kind of checking before we can rely on conclusions from it. From this point of view it is easy to agree with G. H. Mead⁹ that a broad behaviorism well describes a desirable point of view.

It is a satisfaction to repeat in closing what was said earlier, that American psychology seems now clearly moving away from the mechanistic and subhuman emphasis to a broader and more humane type. In the long run this is Darwin displacing Newton as the basis of thinking about behavior. It marks, too, the broadening of science itself, as Poincaré, Einstein, Rutherford, Planck, and others have increasingly freed scientific thinking from the Platonic con-

⁹ *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 2ff.

ception of substance. Credit must be given to Freud for calling emphatic attention to the problem of personality maladjustment. We do not have to accept certain bizarre elements of Freudianism to grant him a genuine contribution in leading psychology to more effective sympathy with personality as such.

The main line of psychologic development appears, as already suggested, to stem from Darwin. The true unit of study seems to be the organism-in-interaction-with-its-environment rather than the organism standing alone. It was James more than anyone else who first laid down in psychology the lines of this Darwinian development, while Dewey has contributed to it not only a surer philosophic basis but also actual psychologic development. Gestalt psychology seems a German parallel of the same movement. This, in spite of its lumbering terminology, has helped America distinctly forward. Its animal experiments have been particularly useful.

What is herein said on the self-other process is an effort to make clearer one phase of the Darwin-James-Dewey line of psychological development, which stands in clear contrast with mechanistic Newtonian tradition, namely, that critical thinking, with all this means, is possible because the human mind is built on a plan that includes getting out of itself to look at itself. If emphasis on this can further the movement away from mechanism as such to a more personal and humane type of psychology, we shall all be the gainers.

A HUMANER PSYCHOLOGY

In connection with the rejection of the mechanistic psychology it may be wise to add a word of clarification as to the term *humane*, several times joined in the preceding discussions to the word *psychology* to suggest a content and outlook preferable to that of mechanistic psychology. While

the use here followed is justified by the dictionary, the full intent goes somewhat beyond that usually contemplated.

Three matters of content have been most in mind as reference has been made to a humane psychology, two well known, a third less often considered in connection. The first has to do with the considerate treatment of others so as to avoid giving unnecessary pain. This is perhaps the most usual sense in which the word *humane* is used. A second aspect of the term *humane* relates to the more refined enjoyments of life, as literature, music, and the arts in general. Within this area cultivation is generally necessary to fuller appreciation. In comparing these two phases it is at once clear that the first is rather a moral than an esthetic affair; but even for the first is learning necessary if one is to be able to tell another's feelings, while the nicer feelings in that area require refined cultivation as truly as in literature or the fine arts. The third aspect of a humane outlook is the disposition to treat each other human as a person in the full sense of this term, especially as a self-directing personality expected to make his own choices out of a rich individuality (as is later discussed in Chapter XI). A humane psychology, then, is one that makes full provision for these three sides or aspects of life, with especial consideration of the last as in a true sense underlying the two others.

It is the strong opinion of the writer, based on years of observation and study, that one's accepted psychological outlook does affect his appreciation of the several phases of experience just included in the definition of the term *humane*. One who tries, for example, to reduce human psychology to subhuman elements will by that very fact tend, almost inevitably it would seem, to put a lessened valuation upon what he is trying to reduce and a higher valuation upon that to which this is supposed to be reducible. This criticism must of course carry with it this precaution: other things

being equal. Some people, being elsewhere subject to humaner influences, can rise above the psychology they have been taught to accept; but, on the whole, observation will, it is believed, bear out the tendency as argued.

In the degree that the reductionist attitude is accepted, in like degree will teaching and school procedures based upon such reductionism tend to suffer. And this we see all about us where this mechanistic kind of psychology has had full sway, with its correlative emphasis on statistical tests and measures. Mechanical types of teaching and supervision flourish. Personality, whether in teacher or pupil, is slighted. Dictatorial methods drive out democratic procedures. Morality tends to be reduced to items in a formal code. Line and staff administration is encouraged. Personal judgment is everywhere made to fit preconceived and handed-down standards. The disastrous effect of supervision based on standardized tests centrally administered is too widely known to admit of reasonable doubt. Further, if more evidence is needed, there is the inhuman official labeling of one third of a school as dull—*dumbbell* is the name the other children use—and this in spite of the fact that it is statistically impossible to effect an all-round homogeneous grouping.

As a final instance the blinding effect of a mechanistic and statistical psychology was brought clearly home to the writer when he struggled in vain for a whole evening to get two of his "scientific"-minded friends to face the moral problem as a question suitable for study. They could see how to study the question as to what would happen under given conditions or what a man under given circumstances will as a fact wish. But to ask what a man in a given situation *should* wish, that became to them practically a meaningless question. Strange as it may appear, they could not, it seems, conceive the problem. Such had been the blinding effect upon these

two men of their restricted range of study following a psychology based on a mechanistic type of science. For them, when they thought scientifically, the term *ought* had no meaning.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICAL CONDUCT

In no realm of human interest does the self-other conception give clearer guidance than in the psychology of ethical theory. The foundation has probably already been sufficiently laid in the earlier discussions on responsibility, conscience, and standards; and the superstructure has been so well reared by others, notably by John Dewey in his ethical theory, that little more need here be said.

In order to see better how the self-other process serves the psychology of ethics, let us consider a view one hears from time to time expressed among those who, like the psychologist discussed earlier in the chapter, would like to make sociology similarly "scientific." One such has said specifically, "All immorality is by definition merely nonconformity with the mores." The argument seems to run as follows: Right and wrong are determined by the accepted standards (the mores) of society; they thus lend themselves to "scientific" study, that is, without recourse to the "philosophic" and subjective processes which the nonscientific have been inclined to use. In particular, this position preserves the etymology of the term *moral*, which is of course derived from *mores*, the customs of the group.

The etymological argument need not detain us. At best, such an etymology, like that of the term *manufacture*, for example, reflects only the prevalent opinion when the word first gained currency. This, however, is no adequate argument that the same meaning holds under existing conditions. *Manufacture* now means *not* to make by hand.

The thoughtful educator will strongly reject a morality of mere conformity to the mores. Such a conception of moral conduct would mean the reviving of the past with its posted school rules, its fixed codes of morals, and its consequent reliance on catechetical drill, punishment, and enforced routine to build moral character—all in direct contradiction with acting on thinking, with basing ethics on a thoughtful regard for consequences. To say it more fundamentally, we cannot find the distinction between moral and immoral conduct simply in custom, for then we should have no basis for the critical improvement of morality. To get this contrast the more clearly before us, let us consider a statement of thoughtful moral conduct more detailed than one previously considered (see pages 25-31).

Suppose that I face a situation of opposed alternatives. I must ask myself: "If I act on alternative A, what would follow by way of consequences? If I act on alternative B, what would follow?" Then, holding my mind in suspense as best I can, I consider the alternative sets of consequences. In general, one set will win out. That one I am then said to have chosen. This defines the verb *to choose*. But I "ought," if I am to act morally, to choose that course of action which, all things considered, brings into existence the best state of affairs that I can bring about by my choice and act. If I am a properly developed moral character, I shall have previously built a conception of "the good life," a philosophy of life, which I bring to bear on this case as my best hypothesis to date. Similarly, if I am a proper moral character, I have built the habits of studying life's situations and of choosing the "best" (as already discussed) to act on. As I face this situation to study it, I bring into play my philosophy of life, and the resulting interaction both helps me to decide the specific case at hand and in some measure remakes my philosophy.

If, as I look back on what I have done—and again I “ought” to do this—I see that I failed to live up to any of these obligatory measures as best I could, then, insofar, I have done wrong.

There are of course in the world of men all degrees of thoughtful moral conduct, but without a reasonable use of this dynamic conception of moral conduct men cannot properly face a changing and precarious world. True, some seem to speak otherwise; but surely any view of morals that restricts action to what has hitherto been done, to what has been thought in the past, is a poor resource in a world that presents ever novel situations to face.

In all of this the self-other process is at work helping essentially in what is done: I ask *myself*; I present to *myself*; I choose (considering, as before discussed, that I am thereby naming *myself* as responsible before the world for that choice). Really I build myself as I choose my acts consciously to fit my ideal. So to act requires the kind of being who knows what he is doing and relates his act consciously to its consequences for all thereby affected; the kind who, having considered, is willing to back his act before his fellows while he and they hold him to account for what he does and for what follows. And this kind of person could not so be and act unless his active being, his selfhood, had been formed on the basis of self-and-other interaction. The bottom possibility of moral consideration is that the agent has this self and other compounded origin.

As we study more closely this process of moral deliberation and see how it essentially requires the self-other interaction in order to be at all, it may not be amiss to glance once more at the mechanistic outlook criticized in the earlier pages of this chapter in order to see more clearly its fundamental inadequacy. Some illustrative quotations will perhaps suffice. One mechanist says:

The behavior of the physicist is just as physical as the physics he teaches.¹⁰

Another says:

Human conduct is in the last analysis dependent upon the postures and manoeuvres of our muscle-fabric.¹¹

The first one just quoted says in another place:

All human conduct reduces to *nothing but* [italics in original] (a) different kinds of electron-proton groupings . . . [and] (b) [their] motions.¹²

Still another says:

No new principle is needed in passing from the unicellular organisms to man.¹³

And the same one again:

We say nothing of reasoning since we do not admit this as a genuine type of human behavior, except as a special form of language habit¹⁴ . . . [and] we have no objection to saying that language is social in its essence provided we recognize the essentially mechanical nature of the formation of such habits.¹⁵

To locate more precisely the inadequacy of the point of view implied in these quotations, it may be well to present at this point a more detailed and rounded discussion of thinking than the scattered references previously made to it would together constitute.

¹⁰ A. P. Weiss, *A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior* (Columbus, Ohio, R. G. Adams, 1929), p. 51.

¹¹ R. C. Givler, *The Ethics of Hercules* (New York, Knopf, 1924), p. i.

¹² A. P. Weiss, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

¹³ John B. Watson, *Behavior* (New York, Henry Holt, 1914), p. 318.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 319.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

THE PROCESS OF THINKING

The mechanists seem to hold that thinking is at bottom some kind of physical motion in space. Both Weiss and Watson in effect assert this in the quotations just presented. We can readily admit the possibility that some kind of motion in space may accompany thinking, for the organism in all that it does apparently acts in some sense as a whole. But granted any such motion in space of whatever conceivable kind, it seems a plain denial of the pertinent facts to say that such motion in space *is* thinking in its effective essence. What, then, are the pertinent facts? For whatever we can properly believe about thinking must come out of an inductive study of "thinking" experiences.

Two phenomena seem to concur in any full instance of thinking—one man shares with the lower organisms; the other seems peculiar to man and depends, it appears, on his self-other origin and nature. The "lower" component of thinking is found far "down" in the evolutionary scale. As an example, Jennings tells how a shadow falling on the water above a sea urchin warns it of the possible approach of its enemy.¹⁶ Before the Gestaltists gave us their experiments, the mechanists claimed that it was the physical effect of the shadow and nothing but that which determined the sea urchin to action. But the instance of the goldfish which learned to respond to the brighter of two lights plainly denies that it was the specific physical stimulus to which it had learned to respond. Instead, the response was to a distinction—in the goldfish's mind, we may say. The fish was first presented with two lights of different intensity, and it learned to choose the brighter light for the food to be found behind it. Then it was again presented with two lights differing in

¹⁶ H. S. Jennings, *Behavior of the Lower Organisms* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1923), p. 297.

brightness, and again it chose the brighter. But this time the less bright light was the same as the former brighter one. Clearly, then, the fish was responding to a perceived relationship—the brighter of the two lights and not to the specific physical stimulus. The merely physical basis of conduct and learning is thus clearly refuted.

It may be added by anticipation that this conduct of the goldfish belongs, like that of the hare, higher up than mere physical stimulation on the continuity-discontinuity scale of animal-man conduct to be discussed in the later pages of this chapter. Both sea urchin and goldfish achieved meanings, the latter higher up on the scale than the former; but both show clear instances of the lower component of thinking here under consideration.

This lower component of meaning and thinking is present in all those instances of human thinking where we say that A means B, as the cloud means rain. It is accordingly as essential to human thinking as it is to animal behaving. But man goes beyond the animals in the use of such meanings. Someone has said that, if a man and a monkey sit alike on a hot rock, they both learn but they learn differently. The monkey will thereafter sit on no more rocks of any kind, but the man will thereafter sit on no more *hot* rocks. Whether or not the statement is a true account of monkey behavior, it illustrates one of the differences between man and the lower animals. Man is more critical than the beast. He has available more and finer distinctions; he thus possesses more alternatives better distinguished and more reliably checked. We saw the goldfish's finer distinction than the sea urchin's. Man goes far beyond both. His language and the culture in general give him the basis for far better thinking than any of the lower animals can effect, so much better as to be different in kind and not merely in degree.

It is not necessary to repeat here the discussion of Chapter

III on the difference between animal calls and true human language as consisting of the presence in man of a self-other type of meaning. When man goes through the full process of careful speaking, he tries out what he proposes to say on his internal other before he directs it to the external other in the effort to affect him in an *intended* way. A second use of the word *mean* tells the story: he *means* what he says. In the preceding paragraph the verb *to mean* was used with a neuter noun as subject—the cloud *means* rain—as the shadow meant danger to the sea urchin and the brighter light meant food to the goldfish. Here, in its second sense, the verb *to mean* has a personal subject—the speaker *means* what he says. This sense of *mean* implies (1) a foreseeing of the effect his words would naturally have and (2) a willing, an intending, on the speaker's part that his words *shall* have that desired effect. This second sense for the verb *to mean* is clearly limited to the kind of being that (1) can foresee probable results, (2) can weigh these results against other possible outcomes, and then (3) can consciously choose outcomes and will the means to effect them.

So the pertinent facts deny the mechanistic hypothesis. The goldfish instance clearly denies it for the first kind of meaning, even though other instances are not thus crucial. The case for the second kind of meaning stands, if possible, even more decisive. No mere motion of anything in space could *intend* its effect. That is why the mechanist has so strongly objected to the conception of purpose, for *intending*, which is inherent in purpose, lies beyond any physical contact effects. On both counts of meaning the mechanical theory stands denied. The facts refute it.

It may be well to say a few further words about the relation of language to thinking. First, as we saw in Chapter III, thinking is a kind of internal talking. But we are not therefore to suppose that in child development talking pre-

cedes any and all thinking. The evidence is clearly to the contrary. But the relationship is not single. In fact, the question as to which comes first seems almost a hen-and-egg affair, for any clear instance of either will show that particular one growing largely out of the other. Thinking in its simplest form we must believe began first, as, for instance, with the goldfish cited. Clearly language had nothing to do with its discriminating perception. But thinking in that early form makes little headway until, with man, language comes in to help. After that, for language and thinking each mutually helps the other into fuller active existence. And this is true whether we speak of the development of culture in the race or the development of mind in the individual.

How children practice the interrelationship of language and thinking is worthy of note in connection with the foregoing. Anyone who has watched younger children playing together will recall that they talk almost incessantly, but more often in a kind of dramatic monolog than in intentional communication or exchange of ideas. The practice is a good deal like an adult's singing to himself appropriate bits that describe this or that phase of what is on his mind. The children talk about what they are doing, they tell what they are going to do, they tell what happens almost as if telling a story, they ask questions addressed to no one in particular. In comparison, only seldom at this early age do children speak directly to one another with conscious intent to affect action or effect ends. This early age monolog kind of talking seems a further instance of the childish trait to engage in the exaggerated repetition of any newly acquired process that we saw in an earlier chapter. It may well be that this gives useful practice in connecting thought with word, in helping to "hold a thought in mind" to look at it better.

This growing power thus to "hold a thought in mind" so as to consider it, examine it, see it better in relationships, has

great significance for the process of conscious deliberation that lies ahead—at least for the more favored. We saw the goldfish making a distinction and acting upon it even under changed conditions. With man, the use of language to describe such relationships means the objectification of a given distinction so that it can not only be the more easily identified on further occasions, but even more—can enter into shared experience and so be the better tested, as we saw under the discussion on objectivity. In this way distinctions can not only be multiplied indefinitely in number, they can also be refined indefinitely in quality.

To consider, then, the children's monolog talking, it seems probable that this affords practice in getting back of words to the ideas that underlie them. If the goldfish can use a distinction without any trace of Watson's "inaudible speech," it is easy to believe that children can at least play with ideas while they play with words. They say the words and think the idea, then think the idea and say the words. In this two-direction way they can become increasingly able to deal with ideas as such, as well as increasingly able to go either from word to idea or from idea to word. It should, however, be said in close connection that there is a danger in this monolog type of talking. Taken alone, it lacks checking for accuracy and reliability of connection. If a word is used wrongly and the child knows no better, there is nothing in this bare practice to set him straight. How the child can get the needed checking is so important as to demand consideration.

The existence of objective—spoken or written—word forms allows, as we have already seen, conscious and shared criticism of meanings. No other factor in human history, it seems safe to assert, has been more effective in improving the quality of human meaning and thinking. It is shared living that gives to the young the needed objective testing

at the same time that it gives access, through contact with elders, to the accumulated stores of the culture. How this shared living does practically test meaning and improve thinking is easy to see.

Language, as we have seen, serves specifically as a means of co-operation, of carrying on shared experiences. As members of the family co-operate, the parent makes use of knowledge and distinctions necessary to the matter at hand. Through language he will call upon the child to co-operate accordingly. The child must get the idea or he cannot co-operate adequately. What is thus learned in its practical setting has concreteness and a cutting edge far above any merely verbal statement not carried over into shared action.

It is in this way, especially, that the parents have the opportunity to help build the minds of their children. And what the parents actually so build depends largely on them. If their conceptions are limited, so will the child's stock of conceptions and distinctions also be limited. If parents believe in superstitions, like the danger from Fridays or 13, the children are more likely so to believe. If the parents believe in scientific "causation" and live it at home, the children will be likely so to think and act. If the parental thinking is sloppy, if their words and ideas are not used consistently, if word and act do not fitly support each other so as thereby to test clearly whether the child has got the idea from the word so as to put it into effective co-operation, if there is little variety in the ideas used—if any or all of these faults attend the parents' dealing with the child, then the child suffers. It is along these various lines that parents can help their children in the matter of intelligence building. Dewey has well said that thinking is often and essentially dramatic rehearsal. The internal other and the internal self exchange views. As the external other is understood in the practical testing situations of life, so will the internal other, its image,

be clear and definite. As the parents talk and act, so will the child in general think. Clear distinctions, uniformly followed, furnish the key.

Especially should language get its primary definition in objective situations, where the results are open to observation. The whole discussion given earlier on objectivity and standards applies at this point. The child's living should be so managed that the successive situations not only call out thinking but also, in kindly and definite fashion, test his thinking in ways that all together must see. Thus is language best built. Thus is thinking best developed. Thus does the culture get best learned. So may the growing minds be built step by step into the ever-growing selfhood.

THE HUMAN MIND AS AN ASPECT OF NATURE

We come finally to a wider problem of psychology clearly implicit in the scientific movement discussed, namely the relation of the human mind to the rest of what we call nature.

One motive for trying to make psychology scientific was the wholly laudable wish to include the human mind and personality with the rest of nature. If a split were to be admitted among the phenomena of human behavior such that "causation," for example, should hold on one side of the split and some noncausal principle of consequence must hold on the other, the result would make human understanding and effort the more difficult wherever this split appeared. And this is exactly what has happened, as Whitehead saw, from Cartesian dualism. This particular dualism has, in fact, served as a refuge for all kinds of indefensible ideas and practices. If this dualism could be abolished once and for all, the cause of intelligent action would gain greatly.

The problem of dualism raises a more general question of continuity and discontinuity, and the consideration of this promises to help us attack more directly the relation of the

human mind to the rest of nature. This aside, if we keep the main problem still active in the background, will give us material with which to make the attack.

Let us begin with continuity and conceive in the field of human psychology a scale on which are distributed all kinds and aspects of human behavior. At the low end mere body acts; at the upper end appears the highest functioning of self-conscious personality. A little above the bottom of the scale would come the behavior of the body cells; they seem to live and act much as do the distinctly lower animals though meanwhile each somehow shares in the behavior of the whole organism. Higher up would come such complicated bodily functions as digestion, breathing, and heartbeat. These serve ends, but their functioning is not intentionally directed. Higher perhaps would come such appetites as hunger, thirst, sex, and the like. These, while not under definite conscious control, are still much under the influence of conscious consideration and are largely subject to conscious guiding. Whether man, after he has achieved selfhood, ever exactly parallels the conscious-but-not-self-conscious acts of the lower animals, as of a dog chasing a squirrel, may be doubted; but whatever he has of this sort of action would seemingly come next on the scale. Between these and the highest would come many habitual acts and other functions which serve human needs but are not directed with very definite conscious thinking. Finally, at the top of the scale, come the highest instances of intelligent purposing, critical thinking, artistic creation, and moral conduct.

That a continuous scale would result from thus including all the phenomena of human behavior seems probable. Such a scale would at once afford interesting comparison with lower-animal behavior, for much, if not all, of animal behavior would be found to occupy the lower part of the human scale. As for man, no account of his behavior would

be complete if it failed to consider him in his varied aspects and experiences up and down the scale. The various parts of the scale, moreover, interact. The higher often reach down to affect the lower, as when chagrin affects heartbeat and breathing or embarrassment causes blushing.

A particular named psychological function may appear over a wide range on the scale. The fact of acceptance affords an instance. Pavlov's dog "accepted," in a true dog-level sense, the bell as the sign of the savory meat; and the conditioning remained operative as long as he continued so to accept it. That this was true acceptance and not mere mechanical conditioning seems clear from the fact that, if the meat was not given often enough, the dog ceased to accept the bell as sign of forthcoming meat and the conditioning lapsed. While these facts were true of the dog, its acceptance was of course not so complex as was Pavlov's when he accepted for his purposes this psychological principle of conditioning. The term *acceptance* holds thus for a wide range on the scale but varies its content with the level of use. The instance is a clear case of continuity extending over a wide range of the scale and of the value of the scale in comparative psychology. The conception of continuity stands justified.

The discussion of discontinuity is perhaps more helpfully presented under the term *emergence*. However, since this term is often associated with the effort to support certain metaphysical doctrines,¹⁷ it may be well to disclaim any such intention here. It still remains true that the terms *emerge* and *emergence* can serve, without metaphysical implication, to fix certain distinctions useful in capital degree for describing the phenomena here under consideration.

¹⁷ See, for example, S. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity* (London, Macmillan, 1920) and C. Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution* (New York, Henry Holt, 1927).

Just what *emergence* means is easy to see. If, for example, we take the formula H_2O for water, it appears to be true that no amount of study of hydrogen and oxygen as such would enable one to foretell the resulting properties and behavior of water when the two are properly combined. We describe this state of affairs by saying that water is an "emergent" from hydrogen and oxygen. It appears further that the sweep of evolution yields a considerable number of such emergences, themselves forming a discontinuous scale analogous in certain respects to the scale discussed under continuity.

At the bottom of this evolutionary scale would appear physical matter acting in accordance with physical "laws." Next above would come the lowest forms of life. So far as we can yet tell, life has "emerged" somehow from its merely physical components; it grows out of them and, in the ordinary sense, out of nothing else; yet it seems that no amount of study of the "physical" properties of matter could enable us to foretell life and its behavior. In this sense life is an "emergent" from matter. Analogously it appears true that as physiology has thus emerged from physics, so does animal psychology emerge from mere physiology and purposeful (self-conscious) psychology from mere doglike animal psychology. In this way it appears true that the discontinuity scale of biological emergence is superimposed upon the continuity scale of animal-human behavior just discussed. Both factors, of continuity and discontinuity, seem necessary to an adequate understanding of the phenomena of life. It is in connection with the highest step of emergence that the self-other explanation seems essential for any adequate understanding of human psychology.

With the scale of continuity and the conception of emergence thus before us, we may now return to the main problem, the relation of the human mind to nature or, if we may

anticipate, to the rest of nature. The Cartesian dualism and the consequent split in relation to "causation" that we saw in psychophysical parallelism, discussed on page 97, raises the problem in acute form. If "mind" and "body" cannot "interact," then the human mind is no proper part of nature. If, however, the difficulty of possible interaction should disappear under scrutiny, the "mind" becomes therein a part of "nature." The conception of "causation" will afford a starting point, for with it the dualists have both seen, and given, most trouble. If we can clear up the problem of "causation" in relation to "mind" and "body," we can then see how mind is a part of nature.

The principle back of the terms *cause*, *causation*, *law of causation*, and the like is not so simple as many have supposed; nor, on the other hand, is it as mysterious as certain others have tried to make it appear. There seems no question that events interpenetrate and that the earlier events thus enter into and affect the later; also there can be no question that each event in human experience has many determining factors, not a single "cause," as popular speech and some more pretentious thinking have seemed to hold. It becomes, then, the proper concern of scientists to find the determinants for the various matters of human interest. For to know these determinants in any case is to furnish precisely the conditions necessary for fruitful understanding and the only promising basis for effective control.

However, in order to include the human mind and personality within the natural universe, it is not necessary to assume that identical principles of "causation" or understanding or control hold of all phenomena in nature. Pertinent here are the facts of continuity and discontinuity already discussed. For example, the sight of threatening danger will cause a frightened hare to seek protective shelter. That hares do so act "at a distance" is a fact of cer-

tain observation. No one can deny it. But this does not mean that the conduct is not "determined"; neither does it mean that it is determined in the same way that the hare's death would be determined if the dog's fangs should sever the physiological structure of its body. The "causation" in this seeing-at-a-distance belongs "higher" on the overlapping scales of continuity and emergence than does the action of the fangs. If any should wish to say that by definition a "mental" aspect is present in the hare's action at a distance, in its reaction thus to representative stimuli, he is within his right so to define the term provided that he takes due precautions in connection. To be sure, further study may analyze the hare's "mental" behavior into other and more general elements. In particular, such study might properly disclose the difference between the hare's kind of "mental" life and that of the normal human.

If the hare's foreseeing is thus not to be reduced to mere physical causation—the impact of body on body—neither can the self-conscious type of human foreknowledge be reduced to the hare's type of behavior. For example, foreknowledge of an eclipse will "cause" astronomers to prepare long in advance for extensive journeys to a distant quarter of the world for better observation. It would be idle either to deny this foreknowledge as a fact (within the limits of its reliability) or to deny that it is a true causative factor in determining the conduct of these astronomers. If the word *mental* was justifiable in the case of the hare, much more is it justified here, and this in varied ways. This case of foreknowledge is on an emergent level as much "higher" above the hare's foreseeing as that was above the action of the fangs.

The foreknowledge of the astronomers depends upon such critical thinking and such extended use of the cumulative culture as could not have come about except on the

basis of well-developed selfhood. This foreknowledge along with the critical thinking involved is, then, an emergent above certain other kinds of behavior, but it still remains within the order of nature. It can be discussed in terms of distinctions and propositions like those used for the inductive study of other natural phenomena. The human mind, once allowance is made for its peculiar phenomena, yields itself in other respects to the same sort of study used elsewhere in nature. Specifically there is no break.

We seem authorized to conclude that the human mind is both qualitatively different, on the self-other basis, from the lower-animal minds and still amenable along with them to study within the order of nature. We can be rigidly scientific in our psychology and still neither slight nor minimize nor reduce the highest manifestations of human personality. It is the recognition of the self-other process at work that permits us thus to be scientific and still—at the same time—cherish and study the most “spiritual” of behavior to be found among humans.

CHAPTER VIII

PHILOSOPHIC APPLICATIONS OF THE SELF-OTHER PRINCIPLE

The most fundamental aspects of the self-other principle have already been presented in the preceding chapters. There remain, however, to be discussed other specific applications of the conception. The most important of these will receive attention in succeeding chapters. Here are given several shorter, disconnected discussions that bear on certain problems more or less philosophical in nature.

The very existence of philosophy as the examination and comparison of ends, weighing of values, and the like is of course dependent on a self-other process. This was brought out in detail under the discussion of the culture. There we saw how philosophy in any full sense arose first among the Greeks, from the world's first self-conscious consideration of contrasted customs. There had been, to be sure, before the Greeks, or at least independent of them, great religions, as Hinduism and Buddhism, and great ethical systems, as Confucianism. While all of these had considered philosophic problems, none had reached the clearness of the Greeks in the actual process of philosophizing as such.

The question here, then, is not how philosophy is indebted for its existence to the self-other process. It is, rather, how the self-other principle is specifically useful in the consideration of certain specific philosophic questions.

THE FUNCTION OF DOUBT

Consider first the place of doubt in one's personal development along the road of serious thought. Many have naively supposed that individuals begin life questioning everything and later settle down to relatively fixed beliefs. The truth seems an almost exact reversal of this supposition. The child begins, as was shown earlier, accepting what his parents tell him, and for the most part unquestioningly. It is only as opposed and contrasted ways of doing and thinking present themselves definitely to the child's mind that conscious questioning arises for him. In fact, to learn to question in any thoroughgoing way what one has grown up believing is an achievement attainable only under favorable conditions. Most people, it appears, never attain any such inquiring attitude. One of the commoner features of contemporary life is the bitterness with which so many resent the questioning by others of their cherished doctrines and customs. One wonders at times whether the Bill of Rights, were it now up for original inclusion in the Constitution, could pass the opposition it would thus encounter.

It was Socrates, it appears, who first taught that "the unexamined life is not fit to be lived." But Cicero came nearer to the point here under discussion in asserting that "by doubting we reach truth" (*"dubitando ad veritatem pervenimus"*). The nineteenth century poet Philip James Bailey came even closer to the view herein upheld:

Who never doubted never half believed.

Where doubt, there truth is—'tis her shadow.

It seems to be true that belief in any thorough and valid sense can follow only after one has made a deliberate and, in a sense, sympathetic examination of the opposed position and specifically of the attacks liable to be brought from that

quarter against one's own position. Then one may know from personal experience not only the reasons for thinking as he does; but also, just as important, he knows the range of strength of his position. Probably no position holds without exception or variation over the whole field of conceivable application, not even so necessary an assertion as $1 + 1 = 2$. It is, then, the part of effective wisdom to know the geography of the strengths and weaknesses of one's views.

The process of weighing involved in such study must, as suggested, begin in doubt. No matter how broadly anyone may have been reared, no matter with what care one's parents may have indicated the limitations of their own views, it remains true that each one is under intellectual obligation to review critically what he grew up believing. And the needed review will hardly be adequate unless there is at least some doubt present to make it both personal and thorough. One may come out of such a review using the same words to state one's belief as before, but after such critical study the words as one uses them will mean something different. Mr. Justice Holmes has well said that "to have doubted one's first principles is the mark of a civilized man."

That this process of doubting has its origin in the self-other process seems clear, usually in the questions raised by others. It is next to impossible for anyone himself to question what he has never heard questioned. But the art and attitude can be cultivated. Possibly the hopeful line of approach is as follows: The individual hears questions raised about a position previously unquestioned so as now to see that something can be said for the other side. If he will think through this question, preferably in company with others, and will at the same time study the process of so questioning and studying, noting finally how the criticized position differs from the before-criticism position—then out

of it all can come a method, a conscious and criticized method, of taking one's own views in hand. If this can be made a characteristic, namely, to be consciously on the lookout for new things to question and for deeper and more discriminating questions to ask, then the person is on the way to becoming what Justice Holmes called "civilized."

A concluding aside will end discussion of doubt. Attention has been called to a widespread opposition to the questioning of common beliefs. A recent writer gained a certain measure of fame by exploiting the fears of those who feel this opposition in regard to religious inquiry. "Religion is losing ground in this country," he is quoted as saying, "because of the growth of the 'liberal mind.'" Liberal education and a liberal mind were denounced by him as "the most destructive" influences among us. Referring to the "liberal mind," he said, "It is the mind systematically cultivated to question the traditions and morals of the past; the mind habituated to doubt the old and place credence in the new; the mind which accepts the authority of its own reason."

The inadequacy of such a statement and view is easy to see. The process of self-other interaction may indeed lead to doubting, which the writer quoted seems to fear, but it does not stop there. Properly employed, the same process guards against what was at bottom there most feared. Criticism, it can never be too much repeated, is not simply negative. It should be "negative" where it finds no founded beliefs; It should be "positive" where it finds grounds for belief. In a word, genuine criticism is necessarily positive in final effect, for it seeks to found belief on valid grounds and no other. Moreover, valid criticism is just as critical of the new as it is of the old. And finally valid criticism, as was discussed under the head of standards, accepts nothing simply because one wishes to believe it, nothing simply on the authority of one's own private reason, but only as one's own reason

promises to be upheld by the most competent reason that can be brought to bear. We may at this point again quote Mr. Justice Holmes, "The truth is something I cannot help believing." If we really wish the truth, we must give large place to constructive doubt and criticism.

SOLIPSISM

What has just been said about not believing simply on one's own private opinion leads easily to the discussion of solipsism, the position that I am the only person or thing that exists. While few hold to solipsism—it would be a most uncomfortable doctrine—there are still many who are troubled as to how to answer it. The essential argument for solipsism has thus been stated by F. H. Bradley:

I cannot transcend experience, and experience must be *my* experience. From this it follows that nothing beyond my self exists; for what is experience is its [the self's] states.¹

As intimated, few believe in solipsism. Rather is it well regarded as the *reductio ad absurdum* of subjective idealism. But from the preceding discussion it becomes now possible to make a more positive statement. No one would, if he were the only thing in the world, have ever got to the place of asking whether solipsism be true or even of laying down Bradley's major premise. He would not have that kind of mind. If it is true that I can think in any full or deliberate sense only because I have, through language, talked with others; if I can ask incisive questions only as I have so built up myself by use of the cultural background, itself acquired by me from the social environment—if these conditions are so, then I cannot seriously ask whether I alone am all that exists. Also we must deny that experience is "*my*" experience in the solipsistic sense. My experience, at least when I

¹ *Appearance and Reality* (New York, Macmillan, 1893), p. 248.

am far enough along to consider solipsism, is what it is in largest degree because of the social contribution. In a word, as a thinking being I am inherently and inextricably social in origin, and this fact precedes and conditions all deliberative thinking. Solipsism is thus inherently impossible before we get to the place of asking about it.

THE SOCIAL COMPACT THEORY, INALIENABLE RIGHTS

Many people use glibly the phrase "inalienable rights." Let us see how this conception originated, how "inalienable" rights really are and what actually is the relation of the individual to society.

Hobbes first, and later John Locke, proposed the theory that men lived at first not in society, but as separate individuals, each possessed of all rights. But men, finding life on this basis to be—as Hobbes had it—a state of war of all against all (*"bellum omnium contra omnes"*) and experiencing consequently that the individual's life was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short," decided to come together to form society; and they did this, according to both Hobbes and Locke, on the basis of a compact. Hobbes held that in this compact all the individuals, saving only the king, gave up all their rights and that these belonged henceforth entire to the hereditary monarch alone; and accordingly the rule of that sovereign was absolute. If he should act wrongly, it was too bad; but his subjects could rightfully do nothing effective about it.

Locke saw things differently. He wrote after the Revolution of 1688-1689, which he accepted, and took therefore the opposed ground that, while there had been a social compact, men had reserved certain of their original rights, those that were in fact inalienable; and that chief among the rights so reserved was the right to change the government if sufficient reason should demand. It was on this theory of "in-

alienable rights" that our American Revolution was fought. It was of course good legal argument to urge under the circumstances, for it was on that theory that the House of Hanover was then reigning in England.

But the foundations of the argument are open to question. Once it is apparent that the human individual as a thinking being was inherently social in origin before he was capable of making agreements and that rights have been culturally derived and accordingly vary from age to age—once these facts are seen, the compact theory falls and the legalistic doctrine of "inalienable rights" weakens. It becomes much easier to believe, and mankind increasingly so thinks, not only that group life was the original state of man, but also that rights as we know them represent simply the present stage reached in the development of privileges granted by society to individuals. Moreover, any absolute and unchangeable right becomes, as we now see among certain conservatives, the excuse for withholding privilege from scrutiny and accordingly the hope of defending privilege on grounds other than merit. Evolving rights depend for their validity at any time on the argument by which standards were counted defensible in Chapter VI. They arise by suggestion as proposed answers to social problems. They get their justification, if any, because they, better than their rivals, allow men to live well together. It is, then, the wide social acceptance of this justification that gives to any social arrangement its status as a right.

The self-other conception thus directly contradicts the belief that thinking individuals able to form agreements existed prior to society, and it indirectly opposes the acceptability of absolute rights. If the argument herein presented be accepted, the historic doctrine of "inalienable rights" falls accordingly to the ground.

THE NATURE OF HUMAN NATURE

As the closing discussion of these philosophic applications of the self-other process, it may be worth while to consider how to conceive human nature.

Possibly the most common opinion today, even with the fairly literate, is that human nature is essentially unchanging. We frequently hear this idea expressed, especially by those who wish to fight off unwelcome proposed innovations. When reformers propose to limit armaments and banish war, they are opposed by retired admirals and others of like mind who declare that war is with us forever because the will to fight is an instinct, an inevitable manifestation of unchanging human nature; it always has been here, it always will be here. Similarly, when other reformers propose to abolish or seriously modify our capitalistic economy, the proponents of the *status quo* economy urge in reply that capitalism is here to stay because the profit motive is an ineradicable part of unchanging human nature.

When we look into the history of the question, we find that this notion of unchanging human nature was until recently practically universal in the western world. Charles Darwin and his *Origin of Species* broke the hold of the doctrine, but even as yet only with the best educated. The masses, including possibly most college graduates, still believe the old way. When we study further, we see that it was the older Christian theology, both Catholic and Protestant, which gave the doctrine its prevalence and that the doctrine in essence stems from Plato and Aristotle, both of whom greatly influenced the formulation of our historic theology.

Plato faced with great concern what appeared to him a disastrous disintegration of Greek civilization. As was natural under the circumstances, he sought a philosophic anti-

dote and remedy. The essence of his philosophy was that the universe at bottom consists of "ideas," fixed and ideal patterns of all things. There was thus one ideal pattern for a table, another ideal pattern for government, and another for education. It was the business of men by proper study to find these patterns and accept them for exclusive and unchanging use.

Aristotle built on Plato's foundation but gave his own system a biological turn. Plato's fixed-and-eternal-pattern ideas reappear for Aristotle in the biological species. For example, to each species belongs its peculiar pattern, fixed and eternal. This pattern lies at work in the seed, molding matter to its own form. The development of the seed is simply the process by which the pattern of the particular species takes hold of earth and moisture and sunlight to mold these to its own individual, prior-existing model. Our English words *potentiality*, *actuality*, and *perfection* derive from Aristotle's scheme. The seed is the potentiality; the actuality is the pattern realized, the full-grown plant or animal; perfection is present when the pattern is completely successful in molding the needed matter to its model.

For present purposes the essence of the historic Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine is thus the existence of an idea or ideal pattern resident in any process under consideration and guiding that process toward its own realization. In other words, the pattern is an active cause to effect the observed results. Various things may hinder this active pattern from realizing itself perfectly, but the effort is there and the general effect. Human nature from this point of view was simply the unchanging pattern of man actively at work.

This assertion of causal efficiency in the "spiritual" idea or principle at work is an instance of reification, a *making* of an idea or pattern *into a thing* that struggles to effect a purpose. In line with such reification natural laws were until

recently often, if not generally, conceived as Platonic-Aristotelian ideas or patterns at work in the processes of nature to bring about each its appropriate results. Thus the law of gravitation made bodies fall in its certain ways.

Similarly psychologists once asserted the existence of faculties and talked of these as if they did things for us. The faculty of memory was a kind of thing that did our remembering for us. And as a thing it could be trained like a muscle and thereafter it would remember better—the now discarded doctrine of “formal discipline.”² At a later time psychologists talked of instincts. These again were specific reified manifestations of assertive and unchanging human nature. An instinct might be modified—that much common sense demanded—but it could not be quite suppressed; willy-nilly it would break out.

Now, however, the present strong tendency in science is to resist reification everywhere and of all kinds. Careful scientists have ceased to think of laws as forces to control results but see them, instead, as useful descriptions of phenomena for guiding thought and action. So competent psychologists now reject both faculties and instincts, at least in their old sense as reified factors at work to mold conduct to their patterns. Human nature is not that kind of thing. Plato and Aristotle were hitting at truths, but they gave us a wrong start.

How, then, should we conceive human nature? No nicely formulated answer will satisfy all, but some statements can be made with reasonable assurance of acceptance. Whatever answer is returned, it must, to be defensible, be inductively reached. It must be an honest and helpful effort at describing observable facts.

² The rejection of “formal discipline” does not mean the acceptance of the doctrine of only specific trainings. Observation shows clearly that the question is not one of either—or.

Just what should be called a trait of human nature on an inductive basis is of course a nice question. Probably any scientifically full account would include all the traits found in all men in all time, with some indications as to the conditions under which they seem to arise and of the comparative frequency with which they manifest themselves in the group. This, however, is too cumbersome for ordinary speech. The Platonic-Aristotelian definition still holds among us in the general tendency to restrict the term *human nature* to those traits that seem to rise more spontaneously, as if hereditary, and are accordingly, perhaps in consequence, the more prevalent.

When we try to decide inductively what, if any, behavior traits are thus common to the human family under the ordinary conditions of life, two quite distinguishable aggregates, or groups, of such phenomena present themselves. One set, rather strictly hereditary, is shared largely by man with at least the higher of the lower animals. The other aggregate seems peculiar to man and depends on the existence of selfhood.

Under the first head we may list as interesting to us here such things as (1) the bodily features of man with their appropriate functioning, as the eye and seeing, the ear and hearing; (2) certain psychological urges corresponding to some of the functionings just named, as hunger and sex, for example; (3) certain glandular secretions that affect many aspects of behaving, including in particular certain of the urges just referred to; (4) certain emotional manifestations, as fear or anger, for example, which are affected by the glandular secretions referred to; and finally (5) the ability to learn, to bring new behavior into existence and into continuing action. Each "normal" human being will show the characteristics thus set out, though in varying degrees.

The part played by learning in this first aggregate is sig-

nificant in that learning does change the traits in certain respects and degrees, and it is precisely at this point that the problem of human nature as such arises. If learning can bring about or create an interest or urge or if learning can totally eliminate such a trait, then by a common-consent definition such an interest or trait is hardly to be called a part of human nature, at least not in the sense most like the older usage. Such traits as are widespread and refuse to yield in fact to learning—it is these that we may say belong to human nature. Hunger, for example, cannot be eradicated by any amount or kind of education though what to eat and when and how are all matters that vary by education. Hunger therefore may be called a trait of human nature. Similarly with sex, though in particular cases learning will here go farther toward establishing controls. At least for some people sex lends itself to control in ways that hunger will not, for hunger denied will become so strong as to go beyond ordinary powers of control. Emotional demands also vary greatly through training. There are, for example, a goodly number of persons who seldom give way to feelings of anger though most, if not all, retain possibilities along such lines. Anger, then, while variable, is to be listed as a trait of human nature. It is too common not to be included.

The tendencies discussed under this first head are in a true sense individual, not social, in source and origin. But any control over them is learned, and this learning proceeds almost exclusively under social guidance following cultural standards. It is these two opposed aspects of appetite and passion, the original as inherited and the learned as coming under cultural standards, that explain the historic moral and religious problem of the “flesh” lusting against the “spirit”; but that we need not follow up here.

The second group of human characteristics, those depending on selfhood, have less frequently been so discussed. It is

exactly the self-other origin of these that makes it appropriate to discuss them—and this topic—in this book. Of these second-group traits it is interesting to note that, though they are clearly learned and so differ somewhat from group to group, the results of their learning are, under a given set of cultural conditions, practically inevitable for persons of “normal” endowment. Moreover, once they have been learned, at least some of their resulting demands are as imperious and inevitable as are most of the hereditary demands discussed. It is from these considerations that they are here classified under “human nature” in the inductive meaning of the term.

Possibly one clear-cut instance of the second group of human-nature traits will so illustrate the classification that any long list will become unnecessary. Take, for example, the widespread desire for recognition. That this is practically universal few would deny; nor that it is very insistent. In fact, Thomas lists it as among four impulses such that, if they be sufficiently denied, maladjustment is likely. It is clear that this trait belongs to the second group rather than the first. It grows directly out of the self-other origin of human selfhood and depends for its existence upon the contrast between the self and the other. That it should be so strong among men with no deeper root in animal nature may be surprising, but the pertinent facts seem clear.

If any wish further illustrations of the second group, we may list the recognition of agency (once called the “instinct of pleasure as being a cause”), the sense of oughtness, the acceptance of responsibility, the existence of conscience. To be sure, the three last named differ very widely in content from group to group and from person to person in any group. But in spite of these variations, wide though they be, it still appears that these traits are in essential character practically inevitable results when a self-other type of being lives under

group conditions. Two other widely common traits may close the list here to be named. One is the desire to hold communication with one's fellows. This is not simply the desire to be with one's kind—that holds widely on the merely animal level—but, beyond that, to exchange ideas with others. The personal satisfaction of entertaining an idea—apart from its utility value—lies largely in being able to share it with one's fellows. A second trait, related to the preceding and a little complicated in the telling, is the desire to know anything that we think others know which concerns us. This might be explained as simply part or instance of the general activity of the organism to maintain itself or, with humans, to take care of one's interests—often carelessly called the instinct of self-preservation. But the trait appears so early in life and manifests itself, at least with children, on so little of a prudential basis that this "self-preservation" theory seems hardly an adequate explanation. With increasing age, it is true, the trait shows appreciably greater emphasis on the prudential wish to know about anything that might conceivably affect one's interests. This trait will prove useful in a later reference to possible natural tendencies toward democracy.

Many like to ask, as we study human nature, whether man is to be counted by nature moral or immoral or amoral. The older theological answer was that man as we now know him is by nature depraved. The answer here to be returned turns on the meaning to be given to the term *by nature*. If the question refers to some possible innate endowment or character such that man is innately disposed either to choose or to avoid the moral good, the answer supported by practically the whole previous discussion would be that at birth man is amoral. He has no innate or instinctive endowment either to tell him what is right rather than wrong or to incline him,

in general, either toward or against what others would recognize as the morally good.

The answer just given would refer to traits of human nature belonging to the first group distinguished in the earlier parts of this topic. But if we go on to the self-other phase of the individual's life with its second group of "natural" characteristics, there is more to say. The natural and practically inevitable outworking of the self-other compounded personality living normally in a social group is to develop what may be called the moral-nature or moral-character machinery of human personality. This of course is no guarantee that the person will thereafter choose the morally good deed but only that his act can have, and normally will thereafter have, moral quality. In other words, the self-other personality, as we have previously seen, will normally develop the self-conscious traits of agency, accountability, and sense of oughtness, with more or less of accompanying responsibility and conscience. Such a being has thereafter the personality equipment for moral conduct. What use he will make of this equipment, what proportion of his deeds will in fact be counted morally good—that depends on the character he builds and the way this interacts with the environment. On the self-other level, then, man ceases to be amoral. His conduct will have moral quality; it may, however, be either good or bad.

The present crisis in world affairs, taken in connection with the paragraphs immediately preceding, lead easily to the question as to whether the self-other personality does not incline more or less definitely to democracy. Recognizing that unusual conditions—a world war, for example—might interfere with the outworking of democratic tendencies, we may nevertheless ask whether a self-other type of personality does not demand a democratic society for its own inherent development and whether therefore it may not be said that

in some sense and degree democracy is fixed in human nature.

At the outset it seems fairly clear that the self-other personality readily compares its lot with that of others and, having achieved the conception of justice, is therefore the readier to note and resent instances of injustice. It is of course true that the organism, as the outworking of its essential equipment, can and does learn not to attempt what it believes impossible. So that caste societies have been built embodying flagrant inequalities, with the children of the underprivileged growing up in them to accept their unequal treatment as admittedly just for people of their station. But it is also, on the other side, historically true that the underprivileged, when they have learned of possible amelioration, have on the whole been quicker to see and feel the injustice of their treatment than have the "better cultivated" privileged. One phase of these tendencies we saw in the foregoing discussion to the effect that people are "naturally" interested to learn anything that others may know which concerns them and their welfare. This may well disclose results not originally contemplated. In connection it may be pointed out that an organism just because it is such strives to attain its wants. If this is true of the ordinary organism, certainly it would be no less true that the self-conscious organism would also work for its wants, particularly for those which intelligent criticism would approve and also count feasible.

When we put these various considerations together, it seems not reckless or unwarranted to conclude that the intelligent self-conscious organism will in the long run work rather for than against freedom of speech, that it may know whatever is to be known that might concern it. Similarly such an organism will work rather for than against a share in deciding on policies that concern its welfare and that it will prefer treatment based on equal justice rather than unequal. In the degree that these points be admitted, in

like degree has a case been made for a general tendency toward this much of democracy. This conclusion must of course be interpreted in the light of what was previously said, that tendencies to one kind of behavior may be overcome by contrary tendencies. War and zeal for success in war notably lessen, at least for the time, the three democratic tendencies just named. Other conditions, perhaps as yet unconceived by man, may in the years to come similarly militate against these tendencies. So that we cannot, from what we now know, assert that democracy as a long-time policy will persist in history. Untoward conditions may destroy it.

But we do seem warranted in saying that, whenever conditions do permit it, these three named tendencies of the intelligent self-other personality will assert themselves and that some at least of the more intelligent personalities will keep the idea alive by working for freedom of speech, for a fair share in deciding on public policies, and for criticized conceptions of individual and social justice. And if—as many of us now believe—war seems fundamentally to deny and negate these ideal wants and cannot otherwise stand critical scrutiny as a group policy, may it not be that the same abiding tendencies will in time turn adequate attention to the abolition of war? The more we look at it all, the surer seems the long-run outlook for democracy and ethics, as well as for peace and justice.

In conclusion of the topic on the nature of human nature it may be said that the phrase *human nature* has become a doubtful term to use, certainly misleading to a serious degree in its old Platonic-Aristotelian sense of an unchanging pattern that asserts itself to mold events to its model. If the phrase is to be used at all, it must seemingly apply in somewhat different sense to two diverse groups of tendencies, one group of hereditary traits that man shares largely with the higher of the lower animals, another of traits that arise from

the self-other origin of the human personality. Perhaps the most outstanding trait of human personality is its extreme variability to fit varied conditions. Modern anthropology has extended the range of such variability far beyond anything previously believed possible. Habit, once made, may and does resist change, but "human nature" is plastic almost beyond belief.

CHAPTER IX

EDUCATIONAL APPLICATIONS OF THE SELF-OTHER PRINCIPLE

In a true sense everything so far appearing in the whole book relates to education, for the heart of the educative process is the self-other process at work building personality, or selfhood, within the social milieu. While this is true, it is still well to bring out more explicitly certain educational bearings of the general self-other thesis.

Education from the new and more democratic experimental point of view is, on the aim side, a process of helping the child so to utilize the conditions of shared living that he may learn ever better to observe, size up, weigh, and choose as he deals meaningfully with the various situations that life presents. Through this process he should progressively build—through the very act and fact of living, with its consequent inherent learning—a character and a personality that take ever more into account, and take it all ever better into account, as he weighs and decides. At the same time the child should, on the means side, show ever greater facility in practical effecting and ever more definite and better discriminated attitudes toward the various needs and interests of life.

In this whole process, as has been fully discussed already, the surrounding culture incarnate in the members of the

social community—older children, parents, and people in general—leads the child to feel the needs recognized in the cultural forms of both play and work. It accordingly helps him to form purposes, pursue ends, make distinctions, and use information, all of which in turn calls further upon the resources of the culture. And all this is education *par excellence*, as the newer schools increasingly make manifest.

We are not, however, to think that the culture through this process creates personalities simply on its sole model and therefore on one uniform pattern. A general likeness there will be, to be sure, among the members of any distinctive group, but a closer view will always show each individual to be in some sense and degree unique. In other words, the actual pattern of personality in any one case is an interactive affair. Each child begins life as an active and (except for identical twins) unique bundle of possibilities. In the building of his selfhood he is a unique source of reactions to his environment, and this fact plays a strategic role in determining his character and personality. He accepts or rejects, on the one hand, according to what he is at the time and, on the other, according to the stimulating and suggestive conditions of the situation. What shall result is thus determined in dual fashion: the surrounding culture contributes a general part, the individual himself contributes a unique part. He builds himself out of the cultural possibilities, just as the cultural arrangements call out from him his appropriate potentialities. In this sense and manner he creates himself. The process is education. The result is his unique character and selfhood.

The growing child thus, each at his own level, increasingly employs the various elements in the culture on a sharing-of-life basis, which unites the objectivity of a co-operative process with personally felt purposes. In this way three things emerge simultaneously: the self-other compounded

self, the consciousness of others, and the objective standards of performance. For best results guidance is helpful. Where this is adequate, each of these emergents helps the two others into fuller and better defined existence. Self and other check each other; and the imperious external conditions, checking both, set up standards to which both must conform. The better the child can feel both self and other inherently checked by the conditions, the more inherent and binding does he feel the standards to be.

HOW LEARNING TAKES PLACE

The more formal discussion of educational applications may well begin with a study of learning as underlying all else in education. It is of course true that this is no place to give any full discussion of the psychology of learning. It does, however, seem appropriate to a study of the self-other process to present a conception of learning which takes its point of departure from the self-conscious human type of learning rather than from the mechanist's beginning with animal learning whether of the conditioned reflex or the blind trial-and-error variety. No fuller treatment will be attempted than seems necessary, on the one hand, to show the self-other character of this higher self-conscious kind of learning and, on the other, to prepare for the later discussions herein given, especially on personality adjustment and character building. For the sake particularly of the last named, stress will be laid on the immediate functioning of what is learned within the further continuous development of the normal experience process. This immediate use of learning stands in marked contrast with the more usual emphasis on learning merely for later use, with consequent stress on the ability to recall or repeat on demand.

If we study with really open mind typical instances of ordinary human experience and behavior, we find the con-

nection between learning and experience at once more usual, more intimate, and more important than most treatises on learning would lead us to expect. In fact, common opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, the normal instance of learning in ordinary life seems to come into existence primarily to serve the learner's experience then and there under way and, as regards origin, only secondarily to serve later experiences. It is quite true, and the fact is of course of capital importance, that what is thus learned for the present experience may remain on tap, as it were, to serve later experiences also; but the normal and original purpose of most learnings, it seems safe to assert, is to serve the present experience.

It is the necessary part that learning plays in every conscious experience that here concerns us. How the actual living itself gets learned and how this kind of learning is necessary in order that this very experience as such may itself go on—these constitute the principle of learning here upheld. By *learning* as here used is meant the observable fact that parts or phases of a given experience do, in fact, stay with one in such way as to influence—from the inside, so to speak—the further phases of experience, definitely and necessarily of the same experience and in most, if not all, cases later experiences also.

A simple, apparently trivial instance will, it is hoped, make clear the principle here maintained and at the same time show how the principle seems to be general, if not universal, in application. My friend A called me a short time ago on the telephone. The knowledge that I was speaking to A, and not to B or C, entered into all the rest of the conversation to help determine how to take what I heard, what I should answer, and how I should answer. The beginning phase of the experience—that it was A speaking—stayed with me

throughout the remainder of the conversation to affect all the rest of the experience.

Here we have a very simple case of learning, so simple that to many it will at first hardly seem learning at all. In fact, not a few will ask: "Well, what was learned that you did not already know? Certainly you already knew your friend. How were you different, after the experience was over, from what you were before?" For answer it may be replied that the case as so far given is admittedly trivial, but it does illustrate the present main point. I did not know, before I heard the voice over the telephone, who was calling. After that I did know. As soon as I accepted the idea that it was A speaking and this acceptance had begun to function, learning had taken place. And that new knowledge thus learned—that it was A speaking and not B or C—did stay with me and enter as a positive factor and even essential factor in the further experience. It was this knowledge staying with me so as to work from the inside of my further experience—it was this, and not my ability to recall later on demand, that made it a true and effective instance of learning. How important it was the next day that A had been talking at this time has nothing to do with the psychology of learning, which is here under consideration. The instance does illustrate. The original claim is clearly proved. And we can at least begin to see how such present learning does, in fact, always enter essentially into the further intelligent management of the same experience and does therein so permeate the rest of that same experience as to give all the rest its own pertinent contribution and character. This is what real learning may be expected to do. Much school learning, on the contrary, is so superficial as to effect almost nothing of this interpenetrating permeation of subsequent experience.

However, lest any think that the principle of learning here enunciated holds only of the obvious and trivial, let us pursue

further the instance given to see whether more important matters of present learning do similarly stay with one to affect the further course of present experience—as well as more probably to affect later experiences besides.

In the same conversation, as soon as A learned that it was I who was listening to him, he told me news of deep concern to us both: a dear friend had just been killed in an accident; his wife, who was with him at the time, was so seriously shocked as to be now unnerved; no relative of either was at hand; there were probably legal and business complications; someone, preferably some close friend, must go at once to take charge. As we talked, he and I independently thought that, considering all the circumstances, I was perhaps the one of all who should thus go.

Certainly these matters are important, so important that for many long years to come the world will be a poorer place for me; and the responsibilities I began thus to undertake have already had further far-reaching effects to make me a different person. But, for all that, the learning involved follows the same formula: each succeeding item as here stated was in turn a present phase of the poignant experience; each such stayed with me to influence, from the inside, all the succeeding phases as I lived them. I did, in fact, act on each as I took it in and lived it, going on from it as a basis of action to the next. Each such time the three typical stages and phases of learning were present: (1) a living experience, a creative welling-up within me, a presentation to myself of a new phase of the developing situation; (2) an acceptance in some sense of this as something to act on; (3) what was accepted staying with me to permeate—and so help form—the further experience.

And the resulting learnings that came to me during the experience were not simply of what to think. The pain and sorrow that came to me as I took in the awful facts—these

also stayed with me to influence me and all I did. I thought differently. I spoke differently. I felt differently. And this difference of feeling permeated, as only feelings can, the further course of my pertinent action. In a word, because the organism enters as a unitary whole into each active experience, so does the resulting learning include not only thinking but also feeling, impulses, decisions, bodily acts—any and all phases of life itself.

The last item listed in the fuller account of the conversation as here given, that I myself might be the fitting one to take charge, well illustrates a complexity in the learning process that should be noted. The analysis follows naturally the three successive stages of learning just listed.

The first phase of any specific learning consists of one's initial reaction to what has just gone before. Here in the case at hand I reacted with several rival suggestions: that I might be the one properly to go and take charge; that, on the contrary, there might be others better fitted to serve than I; that possibly some responsible relative could be summoned to take charge.

Second, I weighed with A's help these rival suggestions. This weighing involved of course the complex foreseeing of consequences and all the rest, much as was given in Chapter VII in the discussion of ethical conduct. Finally, after consideration, I reluctantly accepted the idea that the duty was mine.

Third, this decision as accepted stayed with me to permeate and affect my further conduct. I put aside my personal doubts and fears; I arranged my immediate domestic and office affairs; I went to the home of my deceased friend to offer my services.

The matter of special concern here is that the simple three-fold analysis still holds, *mutatis mutandis*, of a more complex situation: (1) the reaction here included rival pro-

posals; (2) the accepting had to follow the elaborated weighing of these rival proposals against one another; (3) what was accepted involved an extended and complex application. Each of the early phases of the developing experience, however, got at once to work to help, from within the process, the development of the further steps of the process. Learning thus took place at once and began to function at once. That learning did thus take place meant that the new element was fastened in with the old to make a compound new formed of both new and old. The resulting new compound included the relationships out of which the new addition arose and also the relationships in which the new worked. As the new addition arose out of the old and then permeated the newly developing experience, so its learning meant the resulting rebuilding of the self so far as it was engaged in the experience. This remade self will accordingly behave differently hereafter. This is the richer conception of learning, with its effect on selfhood, that the discussion has meant to present.

And it may be added for use later that one thus learns in some sense and degree all that he consciously lives—and along with this learning of what one consciously lives there come also all those ramifying connections of behavior of which he is not conscious. That one learns all the content of one's conscious experience—including all the suggested thoughts, feelings, and impulses, together with all his bodily motions in connection—this may seem a bit hard to accept. Yet it appears true. Each thing that is proposed is somehow disposed of, perhaps rejected, as preference is given to what seems a better proposal. But even if rejected it is still learned as not to be used or, better, as to be used by being let alone. It may be further asserted, here without discussion, that we learn things in different degrees and according as we count them important—the more important, the better learned.

Taking acceptance, then, in this algebraic sense to include negative as well as positive instances, we may state the general principle of learning as follows: *We learn what we live. We learn each thing as we accept it to act on, and we learn it in the degree that we count it important.*

It may be added that, while learning has here been presented in fairly intellectualistic terms, the same discussion appears to hold with appropriate changes for any level of learning. In Chapter VII the term *acceptance* was seen to hold at different levels of the animal-human psychological scale, both for Pavlov and for the conditioned dog. In fact, the term *acceptance* was there chosen for illustration in anticipation of this very discussion. The dog learned on his level by the conditioned reflex; under the circumstances it was the best he could do, and his learning stayed to affect pertinently his further living. Pavlov learned also, but at a higher point in the scale, and his learning stayed at his level to influence his further experiences. With appropriate changes the learning formula presented here holds alike for man and beast.

So much for learning and how it takes place.

PERSONALITY ADJUSTMENT

Before taking up any direct discussion of personality adjustment, it may be well to place the conception of such adjustment and maladjustment in a wider setting.

Life at any level is exactly the continual interaction between organism and environment. The human individual as a self-conscious personality is thus continually called upon to adjust his own life to conditions that arise about him, at times to mold these conditions to his aims and purposes, at other times to submit himself to conditions that he cannot control. In this sense life is continual adjusting. Now the human organism, like any other structure, must itself be in

good internal adjustment, part with part, if it is to do its work well, if it is to be successful in meeting life's situations. It is this internal adjustment of the organism that we call personality adjustment. The self-observing self builds itself, its character and personality, into some degree of effective stability as it works continually at adjusting in life. And the building goes on exactly by the process just discussed under learning. The learning builds the structure of the self.

Maladjustment is of course failure at adjusting. It is the way the self-observing self builds itself as it realizes its failure at adjusting; it is the kind of self that is built in unsuccessful reaction to difficulty. In fact, what makes the phenomenon a matter of "personality maladjustment" is exactly that the self as such gets hurtfully involved. Disregarding for present purposes certain individual physiological deficiencies that do not yield to educative treatment, we may say that maladjustment in the sense here taken is a matter of learning. Specifically, if one does not adjust effectively and wholesomely to life's demands, he has therein learned to live in a way that constitutes an ineffective and probably unstable character; in short, he has built a mal-adjusted selfhood.

The full problem of personality adjustment is of course too complex to discuss here. But it cannot be too strongly urged that it is the self-other process at work which determines the kind of personality that gets built. What the person sees, feels, and takes account of, how he reacts, especially to his own sense of failure and to what others will think in connection, and how he tries by various subterfuges to maintain a self-deceived self-respect—it is such things as these that we find when we study how maladjustment actually takes place. Two illustrations will perhaps suffice to show

how personality maladjustment is precisely this unfortunate self-building.

One child, for example, builds a self that refuses to face reality. How does this come about? As the child in his ordinary living sets up aims for himself and works to attain his aims, the inexorable conditions of things make their demands. If a baby would set one block upon another until a tower is built, certain conditions of placing the blocks have to be met or the tower falls before it is finished. These conditions he must somehow learn. And similarly, as he grows older, for every other such aim he may set up; each one presents its conditions which call for sizing up, making distinctions, and then acting on what is necessary to meet the situation. He meanwhile builds his self-conscious self out of his reactions to the ways he does and does not learn for meeting these varied inexorable conditions.

At this point the character of the child's present self as it is treated by others enters crucially into the making of his future self. If for any reason the child fails to build up efficient attention to necessary conditions and begins to excuse himself and blame other persons or other things for his failure, he is headed for maladjustment. It may be that in comparison with others he feels slow at learning and so gets discouraged; it may be that he lacks proper guidance at a strategic moment—whatever the cause may be, if he builds the habit of disregarding the necessary means-consequence relationships and instead tries to run his life on some pattern of excuse and blaming, of seeing only what is easy and pleasant, and builds his self-conscious selfhood accordingly, then he is by so much maladjusted. This particular maladjustment is one of the most disabling of all, because it strikes at the crucial point of the active management of life itself. To fail here is to fail indeed. And the locus of the failure is in the self, in the character of the self thus formed to save

one's self-respect in the face of this specific kind of failure.

Another common maladjustment has to do with the balance effected between the self-demands and the other-demands as one builds his selfhood. As the child acts in relation to others, it is of the very essence of self-building that he compare himself with others. It is also almost inevitably inherent in that operation that he come to enjoy attention paid to himself. And therein lies the danger. If the child builds an undue desire for attention to himself, it becomes a maladjustment most destructive of happiness for all concerned, as well as one of the most stubborn of all to eradicate. Some children—and some elders—simply must occupy the limelight; they must be the center of attention. It appears that the surrounding elders are the chief factors in permitting this unfortunate trait to be built in a child.

A common cause of desire for attention is a feeling of insecurity. The child who does not feel sure of his mother's care may very readily build this trait in self-defense. In fact, the demand for attention at school or at play outside may be because the child has so completely lost out in getting consideration in the family at home. Of all who deal with the child the mother is the most strategic. She is the one who should help the child through this difficult stage. How shall she act?

The question is whether the growing child shall learn, as he first makes his self-other relationships, to take just account of others. The crucial factor seems beyond any doubt to be the thoughtful, loving care of the mother—or later of the nursery-school teacher. The child must feel secure, must feel that he has no impelling call to fend for himself against anyone—say, a father or a teasing older brother—who can get at him in spite of his mother. If he feels thus secure in mother or nursery-school teacher, then she can help him build several simultaneous and supporting attitudes and conceptions:

one, that others do, in fact, feel as he, that their troubles are as real to them as his to him; another, that he should consider their feelings as being (at least under ordinary circumstances) of equal (or nearly equal) importance to his and that others will so treat him; still another, that there is (to use adult language) such a conception as justice and that mother, father, teacher, and all right-thinking people follow it. If the mother or teacher can herself live these things with the child and let him feel that he and the other children can live on this basis, then the child will build at his childish level the beginnings of a desirable personality. And once the foundations are well laid, the further superstructure is more easily built.

CHARACTER BUILDING

The discussions just given on learning and personality adjustment, together with the prior discussion on thinking in Chapter VII, lead easily to a consideration of character building. We are particularly concerned to see how the conscious self-other compounded self is all the while building its experience-effects into that interpenetrating seamless web which alone can properly be called character.

In the discussion of learning we saw that any part or aspect of experience runs normally through three phases: (1) it arises (whether as thought or feeling or impulse or bodily movement) in response to something that has just happened in experience; (2) the specific reaction, after more or less of consideration, is accepted in some sense to act on; (3) what is thus accepted stays with one in such way as to pervade pertinently the rest of the experience and so helps to determine its further course. We are now ready to add that this staying with one to permeate and influence the further course of experience is not only a definition of learning but is also at the same time an assertion that what is thus

learned is therein built at once into character. That the new learning grew out of the prior developing experience and at once re-entered the further stream of experience to permeate it pertinently means that character is not a mechanically formed aggregate, made like a brick wall by piling one brick on top of another. Instead, a continuing permeation marks the process: each new character element as it comes is itself permeated by the prior elements of character whose reaction brought it into existence; and it in turn, as it gets pertinently to work, permeates the rest of the developing experience. By the act and fact of learning these active permeative relationships are built into structure—the structure we call character—there to remain, as character does abide, to influence further living.

Because many identify learning with the ability to recall, it may be well to say a word further about the different thing here under consideration. The practical utility of available recall is of course not in question; that is priceless. But it is a mistake to confuse the abidingness of an element so interwoven into character with the ability to recall it consciously. An element once interwoven in this interpenetrative way so affects other elements that it cannot drop out until the whole network goes. Ability to recall stands on quite a different footing and has to be kept alive in a way so different as to demand its own treatment. As regards what we are here concerned with, Dewey and James use strong words in describing how an element once woven into character stays fixed. Dewey, using the word *habit* in a somewhat generalized sense for each addition to character, says that “in actuality each habit operates all the time of waking life”¹ and adds that “were it not for the continued operation of all habits in every act no such thing as character could

¹ John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Henry Holt, 1922), p. 37.

exist. . . . Character is the interpenetration of habits.”² James saw it from a slightly different angle and is, as usual, more dramatic:

We are spinning our own fates, good or evil, and never to be undone. Every smallest stroke of virtue or vice leaves its never-so-little scar. The drunken Rip van Winkle, in Jefferson’s play, excuses himself for every fresh dereliction by saying, “I won’t count this time!” Well, he may not count it, and a kind Heaven may not count it; but it is being counted none the less. Down among his nerve-cells and fibers the molecules are counting it, registering and storing it up to be used against him when the next temptation comes. Nothing we ever do is, in strict scientific literalness, wiped out.³

As long, then, as normal life lasts, so long is character thus in continual process of building. The new of each successive phase of experience is by the fact of learning interwoven always with the old. Each new fact is interwoven *immediately and directly* with all the old that was consciously involved in the process, as has already been discussed at length. It is interwoven *mediately and indirectly* through these conscious involved elements with all the constituent parts of character with which these consciously used older elements had themselves been previously connected.

But the process of character building has yet one further complexity to be pointed out, an element that was implicit in all the foregoing weighing, but an element to be made explicit as constituting the distinctive essence of human character as opposed to a mere animal aggregate of habits.

The whole behaving-learning process goes on under the oversight and directing scrutiny of a parallel overthinking, in which the conscious self notes all that is done and inter-

² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

³ William James, *Talks to Teachers* (New York, Henry Holt, 1899), pp. 77f.

venes to control the process by giving or withholding approval. First, it weighs the fitness of the act in process to answer to whatever end or interest the self is at the time concerned to follow. The interests thus pursued will vary infinitely, from person to person and from time to time. Second, the self approves further in the light of all its other more personal values that may happen to get involved in what is going on. Third and finally, it judges all in the light of its own highest and most impersonal ideals as these are implicated in the consequences of the proposed act. Only as the self can approve under all three heads will it in fact wish to go ahead along the proposed line. Only as the self can approve in the light of its ideals is it acting ethically; only thus is it willing to stand before the world as the acknowledged author and maker of its acts.

The varying degrees of care with which different persons thus give approval and the varying degrees of sensitivity involved—these of course range the whole gamut of human excellence from the lowest and worst to the highest and best. But each person at his own place on the scale—a shifting place, to be sure—thus builds the structure of his own character, good or bad as the case may be, by the successive decisions that he makes. Each one as the weaver-creator of his fate thus weaves on the loom of life the seamless web of his own character.

On the psychological side it may be pointed out that the individual character thus self-consciously woven provides, by its successive and aggregate interpenetrations, that continuity of personal identity which we presuppose in the responsible relationships of life. To be sure, each new experience does in some measure remake the structure of the abiding self; and each actual deliberation as to specific conduct begins as a balancing of one proposed self against a rival proposal. But once a decision has been reached the continu-

ity of the new self with its predecessor is assured. The interpenetrations of new by old and of old by new effect it. By this process, except for those rare and odd cases of multiple personality, the continuing fact of personal identity is maintained.

The bearing here on experience itself is worthy of note. The stream of experience is manifestly not uniform either in intensity or in internal unity. While normal waking life shows no actual breaks in experience—experience is, in fact, a stream—there are evident fluctuations in intensity; and each such period of greater intensity at the same time shows, as a rule, its own peculiar internal organization. Each such we call “an experience.” In this way the stream of experience includes a succession of more or less distinct experiences, separated each from its predecessor and its successor by transitional experiences where attention is usually less active. And in all this the process of learning and the fact of interpenetration act together, first, to make, as we have previously seen, experience at all out of what would otherwise be a mere time succession of atomistic happenings and, second, as we have here seen, to bind the successive experiences together into a single stream, the self-conscious stream of personal identity.

So far we have been discussing the psychology of character building. As we are here concerned with educational applications, it may not be amiss to consider certain ethical demands in connection. More vigorous questioning may be aroused as to how to conceive character in this honorific sense if we begin with certain earlier and astonishing statements regarding women in relation to character. Immanuel Kant said of women, “They have but little character anyway,”⁴ while Pope said a little earlier, “Most women have

⁴ Quoted in Edward F. Buckner, *Educational Theory of Immanuel Kant* (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1904), p. 228.

no character at all.”⁵ Kant perhaps gives us the clue to what he had in mind in his defamatory statement by saying in the same paragraph, “A man who acts without settled principles, with no uniformity, has no character.” He further says, again in the same paragraph, “Character means that the person derives his rules of conduct from himself, and from the dignity of humanity.” As we put these two latter sayings together with the earlier saying, we of today wonder indeed at his low opinion of woman; it so little fits with what we now think. Further reading possibly suggests the answer to the riddle. “Woman,” he says, “must know men rather than books”;⁶ and again, “Man must be independent that woman may depend entirely upon him.”⁷ It seems rather probable that the women both Kant and Pope mainly knew were, in fact, so entirely dependent on men, and accordingly must so study to please their husbands, actual or prospective, as to show little or nothing of those individually built principles of conscious action that were counted to constitute character. Instead of showing dependable conduct based on personally criticized convictions, the woman had to vary to fit the demands of the man. She could not be herself. She could have no character of her own.

At any rate, whatever may have operated in the minds of Pope and Kant, we of this day think that the ethically desirable character must be one that decides consciously in the light of principles increasingly based on conscious criticism. The better such principles are built and the more surely decisions are based upon them, the more dependable is the resulting character; and the character is not only more dependable in the sense that others know what to expect of it but even more that its acts are more consistently defensible.

⁵ Alexander Pope, *Moral Essays*, Epist. II, line 2.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 226.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

All of this has been implied in previous discussions; but possibly its pertinence to character building justifies bringing it out more explicitly here.

What we wish, then, from the educational point of view is to join what has just been said with the psychology of character building presented a few pages before. If youth is to build desirable character, it must have abundant opportunity at making decisions, more and more thoughtfully, and must make these decisions—under wise guidance—in such way as to build two things simultaneously, one of them a body of consciously criticized principles on which to act, the other the settled practice of deciding deliberately what to do. Democracy and the more forward-looking educational practices here go hand in hand. In this way the ethically desirable character is built.

But there is yet another desirable dimension or quality of desirable character to be considered, namely, strength. We mean by strength of character not simply that one perseveres, in spite of difficulties and oppositions, in a course of action once entered upon—that might be mere stupid obstinacy. We mean, it appears, three things, all more or less interpenetrating one another. First, we mean that the person should have consciously defensible reasons for what he is doing such that, if conditions change, he can and will make changes according as an intelligent consideration of the present facts may demand. This provision guards against mere stupid obstinacy. Second, he must so think through the present confronting situation—and must have built in the past such reliable principles of thought and action—that he has wide-reaching and well-rooted convictions and reasons for what he proposes to do. The roots of his convictions and actions, it may be well to interpose, tap all the pertinent values that the person's life includes, physical, intellectual, esthetic, social, ethical. Third, the person must have formed

the strong habit of acting on thinking, of putting into positive action the highest and best decision that his thinking has reached. In the degree that these three can concur, in like degree will a strong character be likely to result.

The analysis just made leads in effect to the conclusion that conscious convictions furnish greater strength, as well as more intelligent flexibility, than will any mere training or indoctrination at the hands of another. The recent years have heard frequent denials of this position, with many assertions that, on the contrary, much thinking makes for weakness of character and futility of action.

When we study the source and origin of this suspicion of thinking, we find, to be sure, some grounds for just complaint. There are those to whom the fun of playing with ideas becomes an escape from reality, an escape from the crude world of evil and ugliness. But this is not the whole story. We find only too often that the outcry against thinking arises from impatient partisanship speaking in behalf of a program accepted as final and absolute. Anyone who holds to absolutes is insofar no longer seeking for the truth—he already has it. He knows the answers, and very likely he “knows that he knows.” He is then likely to be impatient with any further examination of his positions so held.

In fact, one seldom reaches absolutes by a truth-seeking logical process, but much more likely by some less conscious route—possibly through unquestioned tradition, possibly by the order of some accepted absolute authority, possibly through indoctrination by such an authority, possibly by one’s impulsive willing. It is the accepters of absolutes who most loudly call for “action.” “To hell with thinking,” one of them said a decade ago. “We’ve thought long enough; it’s action we want.” This particular man, it is interesting to report, is now among those repentant radicals who are more suspicious of Moscow than formerly.

Space forbids a detailed discussion of "acting on thinking." As intimated, it is only too true that here, as in many other situations, some "think" and never "act" while others "act" without prior thinking. It is neither one of these situations alone that we wish, but both together. The parallel thinking we saw accompanying behavior will perhaps support the answer to the problem. As we try to act on thinking, it is good parallel thinking that is to guide us at each point: first, to say how much of preparatory thinking is needed before the execution of plans may wisely begin; second, to guide overt action as we carry out plans; and, third, to watch developments to see what new demands may arise from new developments. It is this last function of thinking that troubles the absolutists; they wish their made-in-advance plans to hold absolutely. That "thinking" might in this way stop "action," stop their chosen "action," seems to them treason. At this point all absolutists seem to act alike, militant patriots, Communists, Nazis, Fascists, absolute religionists. They know and they "know that they know"; there are no uncertainties in their faith. The rest of mankind try to be less dogmatic. For the latter the free play of intelligence is to be their guide, a human and ever-inquiring sort of intelligence. Acting on thinking is their program, with thinking to watch and guide both thinking and acting.

The character, then, that can win approval is one founded on the free play of intelligence. This is the character whose building is described in the foregoing analyses. For many of us this building is to be founded on the democratic outlook—we think intelligence demands this. The character thus sought can be, and can be understood, only on the basis of a continual self-conscious criticism of life as it is lived. And this in its turn is possible only on the basis of the self-other process. On that in essence it all turns.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOOL MANAGEMENT

The three topics just discussed of learning, personality adjustment, and character building have together been building the two correlative conceptions of the desirable personality and of the educative process necessary for bringing such a character into existence. When we add to these three discussions those on thinking and ethical conduct in Chapter VII, we have the foundations at least implicitly laid for a school management correlative with the educative process thus desired.

The personality desirably to be developed is, as sketched in these combined discussions, one that follows the self-other pattern of knowing what one does and willing one's successive acts only after these have been approved in all their foreseen bearings and so accepted as properly appropriate for the ideal self that one responsibly intends to be. The needed educative process was essentially suggested in the discussion on learning. If the child learns what he lives as he accepts it within his own heart to live by, then the educative process becomes identified with life itself and the quality of that living becomes the primary end and aim. This fixes, then, the prime characteristic of the school. It must be a place for living, a place where children can and do live as children. And the supreme effort of the school authorities must be that the quality of each child's living must be as high and fine as is possible to be effected.

When we ask for ways in which to improve the quality of children's living, we face the crucial difference between the new-type school and the old-type. The old-type school expected the teacher to assign fairly abstract and formal subject matter to be learned. And the assignment was under penalty: if the assignment was not learned, the authorities contrived that something unpleasant should happen to en-

force the learning. Various considerations previously discussed condemn this older school procedure. For one thing, it effected at best a learning about life, not a living of life. So that what was thus formally acquired was but little lived, and accordingly it but little permeated further experience to remake it. It was therefore but superficially learned; it could but little enter the structure of mind or character to rebuild it. For another thing, the quality of living cannot be enforced under penalty. We have always known that in the esthetic realm it was impossible to compel the appreciation of music or literature, and any effort in that direction was likely to recoil. From the discussion on learning we can the better understand why learning to appreciate a piece of music demands two things, both taking place inside the child; first, the music must be lived as such, that is, it must be heard and felt on its merits by the child; then, second, the hearing must be accepted as likable, as being the kind of music the child likes to hear. The first we can in a degree compel, but the second, no. That lies beyond us.

Now the same things hold true in the social-moral realm, at least in larger measure. If one is to act morally in any adequate sense of that term, he must in his own heart feel the rightness of what he proposes to do or the wrongness of what he refuses and he must then, with this in mind, consciously will the consequences of his act while at the same time he wills to be the kind of person to do it. These conditions again we cannot compel. We may be able to help with the necessary thinking and we can encourage; but compel we cannot. We may, to be sure, compel certain outward behavior, as when a teacher requires a pupil to apologize for his wrong act. But the teacher has not thereby made this pupil feel regret for his act. When we elders do thus make a child say he is sorry whereas in fact he is not, we have not simply failed at making him regret his wrongdoing; we

have in addition made him lie and, besides, have probably aroused resentment against us in connection. No, we cannot in respect to morals compel the quality of living.

Also in intellectual affairs much the same holds. You can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make him drink; you can give a child a lesson, but you cannot make him think. We can, within limits, compel a pupil to "learn" an assigned lesson in history or physics or geometry so as to be able to "recite"; but we have not therein made him accept in any adequate sense the argument involved. That he will do only if he himself so feels the problem that he wishes to solve it. In the first place, he cannot feel the problem or even think the idea unless he is ready by previous thinking along that line to interpermeate new with old and old with new, as we saw in the discussion on learning. And, in the second place, unless the problem or the new subject matter somehow answers to a felt need or interest involved for the learner, he will neither feel the problem nor turn the matter over sufficiently in his mind to give to the new the necessary opportunity to be adequately interlaced with the old; nor will he accept it as sufficiently important to effect the needed learning. So again in this realm also we can help, but we cannot effectively compel.

It is from these varied considerations that the newer-type school bases its program on life itself, on the normal process of child living. It helps the pupils as best it can to live rich, full lives, facing educatively the successive situations that thus arise. With each such situation it helps the pupils, under sympathetic teacher guidance, to think through what to do and why and how and then to carry out the resulting conclusions as thoughtfully as they can. In all of this the effort of the school is to make the pupils grow in the disposition to accept responsibility, in the power to think creatively over

their problems, and in the habit of taking ever more into account in ever better ways. A guiding motto is acting on thinking, ever better thinking and ever more thoughtful action. An inclusive aim is ever more adequate self-direction. One major test of success is the degree in which this thoughtful creative living can and does take root and grow, so that the pupils continually show more of life better lived.

One decisive difference between the older traditional outlook in education and this incoming newer lies, then, in the different relationships seen between subject matter and the educative process. The older view takes subject matter as initially and essentially extraneous to the present life process of the learner, so much so that he must either be forced or cajoled into the efforts necessary to acquire it. The newer point of view looks on subject matter as whatever may be inherently needed in order that the learner's very life process may on its own terms, in fact, go on.

The intimate relationship previously discussed between building the self and learning the group culture may make clearer the inherent relationship of this better considered "subject matter" to life. The child best utilizes the various elements of the culture when he needs them. He learns them as he lives them in his own life, and he will learn them well in the degree that he thus consciously sees and accepts each successive item as needed by him for some purpose in which he himself can see point and meaning. This purpose may be to pursue some end that concerns him; it may have to do with the thoughtful manipulation of materials needed for some further end he has in mind; it may, as he grows older, be the organizing of his thinking in this or that area—scientific, literary, social—into a reasoned and defensible systematic whole.

It is in these and many other ways that the newer type of

school tries to base itself on the principles herein shown to depend on the self-other process. Nothing less, it seems, could suffice either to set up adequate aims for the school or to determine its necessary processes if effective education is to result.

CHAPTER X

FREEDOM

Freedom is a word of many meanings, more than can here be considered. Moreover, not all problems of freedom belong in this discussion, in the sense of depending for their solution specifically upon the self-other process and making at the same time for civilization. Among the many kinds four seem on this basis to call for explicit treatment in this chapter: freedom as self-determination; freedom in the face of universal causation; freedom from prejudice; and effectual freedom through proper institutional forms.

FREEDOM AS SELF-DETERMINATION

Choice is the most characteristic activity of a self.—John Dewey

The impulse of mere appetite is slavery, while obedience to a self-prescribed law is liberty.—Rousseau

The designating title for this first kind of freedom is not altogether satisfactory, but possibly the differentiating meaning will become clearer as we proceed. It is of course personal and not national self-determination that is to be studied.

If we contrast a brick, a dog, and a man, we see at once three degrees of self-determination and accordingly three degrees of freedom. The brick has nothing that we should

care to call self-determination. True enough, what happens to it depends in part on its own physical properties, but in contrast even with a dog the history of a brick is the story of very specific outside determination. It "stays put." Beyond resisting pressures it contributes nothing to its fate; it sets up no ends, exerts no efforts, engages in no activities.

A dog in comparison is very much alive. It emphatically does not stay quietly put. It pursues obvious objects of desire and with varied efforts. It engages in a multiplicity of activities. How far does the term *self-determination* apply to the dog as he engages in these activities? The answer is not easy, partly because we have not yet clarified our thinking as to what self-determination means. It may help to start a little lower down in the scale.

Certain moths in sight of a lighted candle will fly into the flame; and, even though the first trial should burn and not kill, the moth will, if possible, still return to the flame. It seems unable to learn from the experience. Granted opportunity, the result is fatalistically determined. The lighted candle of itself suffices to determine what the moth will do. The moth does not learn; it cannot resist. The instance seems to define the lack or absence of determination on the part of the moth. It is not so with the dog; he is clearly free in a sense and degree not true of the moth.

Or, again, certain fish can be taught to overcome their "natural" fear so as to take food from the hand of a person. But, if the fish, as they are fed, are frightened and repeatedly so, then they become (so we are told) permanently conditioned against returning to the hand. Even though they be starving, they will not now return. They have, it appears, ceased to learn on this point. Their further behavior, then, at this point is now fatalistically fixed in advance. As regards self-determination, accordingly, the continuing ability to learn is clearly an essential element. So that again the dog

is freer. He can learn; so he has more adaptability, more flexibility in behaving. He is therein more self-determining.

Our concern is as to man and his ethical freedom. Just what ethical freedom means we shall consider in a moment; but in any event it presupposes personal ability, within limits, to act appropriately to a situation, and this means at bottom the ability to intend what one does and then, within environmental limits, to do what one intends. In popular language this is the ability to will and to do. In any full sense one wills or intends a thing in the degree that he thinks not only to do it (as a dog may think to catch the squirrel he is chasing) but thinks also of the act in its setting and, further, that he is doing it and that he is, under the circumstances, knowingly seeking the foreseen results. This may be a bit complicated, but it does, in fact, seem the ethical definition of intent. As was said earlier, this necessarily implies a self-other compounded person as doer. No lesser one could do the necessary imagining, and no one could do this imagining adequately—so it surely seems—who had not had, in building his self, access to certain race-wrought distinctions relative to agency, accountability, responsibility, and the like. Only such a being can act ethically.

Observation supports the assertion that man can in this full sense both will and do, which means that man shows the kind of freedom and self-determination necessary to ethical conduct. He not only effects, but he also learns to understand that he personally effects; and he can, within limits, distinguish cases of intentional effecting from the accidental and unintentional. He does these things in social situations where other persons are concerned; and he and they, again within limits, can agree that certain kinds of conduct are praiseworthy and other kinds blameworthy. And out of many such situations he and these others, profiting by the cultural contribution, come to use the term *ought* to

designate certain kinds of conduct as under given conditions binding upon them. A child growing up within a social group whose members generally have thus profited by the race-wrought culture will himself, as a rule, learn to accept more or less fully these conduct distinctions to act upon them. Now, when these conditions are true of any person, we say by definition that he engages in ethical conduct, and observed facts support the assertion that such conduct lies within the range and capacity of all normal human beings.

When therefore a person thus learns to shape and direct his life thoughtfully to the respecting of the rights and feelings of others, he is insofar showing ethical self-determination. This description of conduct defines the term. It might make the description more nearly complete to add that in such ethical self-determination the person, in the degree that he thinks of what he does, accepts the intentional conduct as his own. He identifies himself with it. He is willing to admit to himself and to others that he is, and proposes to be, the kind of person who will do such things. The ability and disposition so to act defines one kind of freedom. To engage in such ethical self-determination is to be ethically free.

Many questions arise in connection and must receive consideration. Is it not a fact that one man often thoughtlessly or ignorantly injures another man? And, if so, how does ethical self-determination apply since intent was absent? In such cases is not the very essence of self-determination absent? This question we now take up for consideration.

If we say that the dog has no self—that is, he is not “self-conscious,” does not think of himself as the agent or doer of his acts and accordingly does not will or intend his acts—we get the orientation to answer the question of ethical self-determination in connection with admittedly unintended results.

We saw a moment ago how willing or intending in any ethical sense involves not only thinking of what one proposes to do so as to foresee the probable results to all concerned but also willing these results and seeking them knowingly. We saw, further, how the ability thus to intend ethically depends on a selfhood that has built itself adequately on such race-wrought distinctions as agency, accountability, responsibility, and the like. We know in connection that the child only gradually builds up the systems of association necessary for him thus to intend adequately in the ordinary situations of life. It is on this basis that the law has held that children under a certain age cannot be counted to have committed a crime. Presumably one of lesser age could not typically build up the complex self with such adequate meaning relationships as to do full intending.

However, parents and schools have, wisely, never waited for this age of legal criminal competency before they begin to hold children to account for their acts. But in holding their young thus to account they have properly had an educative intent in mind. In addition to securing the good conduct, considered by its objective effects, those in proper educative charge of children have thus sought to secure from them such attention to what was being done as would probably result not only in a better understanding of consequences but also, if possible, in a clearly willed choice of the best set of consequences. In the degree that these educative efforts are successful, in like degree will the range and effectiveness of conscious and intentional choice be extended in the child's life and character.

But, as the child grows toward maturity, a general exercise of such related thinking and learning is more and more demanded of him. He is, we say, under moral obligation to think before he acts; and he is similarly under moral obligation to learn to foresee all ordinary results from his proposed

acts and to take them properly into account in deciding what to do. The specific moral obligation to act on thinking becomes thus universal for all who are sufficiently mature. The only exceptions are those who cannot learn. All others we hold to account, demanding of them that they use reasonable diligence to foresee the probable consequences of their acts.

If, then, a mature person excuses himself that he didn't think, we say (with James): "Why *didn't* you think? What were you there for but to think?" And, further with James (*Talks to Teachers*, p. 187), "We read them a moral lecture on their unreflectiveness." It is, we hold, the moral duty of each one to form habits of acting thus on thinking. If he has the ability to learn, he must do so; and we run our social life on this basis. This, then, is the answer to be returned to the question of holding people accountable for the unforeseen results of their acts. Only the self-other type of character can so be held to account.

UNIVERSAL CAUSATION AND FREEDOM

When we were discussing how the brick and the moth were not self-determining because it had already been fatalistically determined what should happen to them, we could have raised in different setting the like question regarding man. Is it not true that all phenomena of nature, including man's behavior, come about under the "reign of natural law"? Specifically is not "the law of causation" so universal and so inclusive that all the acts of each individual man are as completely determined as are the brick's or the moth's and that man therefore is, in fact, no freer than they are but only different, as a cat's behavior is different from a dog's and the action of hydrogen is different from the action of oxygen? So important a question we must consider and, at some length, if necessary.

The old syllogism regarding causality and ethical freedom used to run somewhat as follows: All events are caused; whatever is caused is determined to be just that and nothing else; therefore each event is determined in advance to be just what it later turns out to be. By this syllogism any claim to human freedom was counted to be an illusion. The choice was already fixed in advance by the inclusive law of causation. Man's career would, on this basis, be fixed in advance along with all other events happening in time.

The argument has not always been stated in so formal a manner, but its influence has in the past been widespread, particularly among students of the natural sciences and those who accepted natural science as the model for psychology and other human sciences. Many have felt compelled to accept from scientific reasoning what Omar Khayyam stated so strikingly in theological language:

Yea, the first Morning of Creation wrote
What the Last Dawn of Reckoning shall read.

The argument, however, proves too much. If, because of universal causation, all events that are to be have now already been fixed in advance, are already written down in the book of time, then all effort and all planning become very different from what they seem; in strictness, they appear vain and foolish. Of course no one ever accepted a doctrine of fixed-in-advance results for ordinary living. Every housewife has always known that, if she did not plan and put forth proper efforts, there would be no dinner to eat. Also, every Newtonian scientist, however much he may have proclaimed his acceptance of this universal fixed-in-advance determinism, knew all the time that, if he did not plan and execute carefully, his experiment would not work. He also knew that, if he did not publish the results, people would not be likely to hear about his contribution; so he took good

pains to get his paper published where it would be most adequately read. In other words, he emulated the housewife in acting as if events were contingent, contingent on his taking proper thought and pains, and not at all as if the outcome were already fixed in advance.

Postponing for the moment any further direct attack on this inclusive fixed-in-advance cosmic determinism, let us make a flank attack.

Consider the experience of mankind. Is not the most universal of all experiences that what one wishes one must seek? And seeking means that one take appropriate steps to get. If the housewife wishes to have dinner ready at the appointed hour, she has to plan and act in ways that promise to get dinner ready in time. And the more she knows about such ways, the more surely (other things being equal) can the family rely on dinner being ready at the right time. If the farmer wishes corn to sell, he has to plant corn and go through the other steps necessary to raise and harvest his crop; and the more he knows about such steps, the surer will be his success. In a word, man has wants; "nature" (we say) offers conditions under which, possibly, these wants can be met; man has to know those conditions and devise means to meet them so that his wants may be satisfied. Wants, purposes (ends), means, efforts. Man has the wants; he has to learn what ends to set up as aims in order to meet his wants and what means will attain these ends. Finally he has to put forth efforts to bring the means adequately into play. This is a formal statement of most of human life—and of all human effort—and it is a fairly accurate statement of man's reason for wishing practical knowledge.

Does man in any particular case know beforehand that he will succeed? He does not; he has to take risks. Life is like that. In our kind of world the stream of affairs has ways

of its own and will usually, if man does not properly intervene, run away "on its own" and ignore his wishes. He has to study "nature" and learn her ways, so that he may make nature work for him. Man has thus learned, for example, about planting: about times and seasons, about fertility of soil and rain and cultivation, and proper seeds to plant, and ways to cultivate and harvest. Having this information, he is able to use appropriate planting-means so as to effect his planting-ends. Science helps him by telling more precisely how nature acts.

Specifically science has found out certain uniformities in nature (often called "laws") which man can use to his advantage. The more man knows of these uniformities in nature, the more chances he has to find means appropriate to his ends. In this case knowledge is power. In other words, the more man knows, the freer he is practically to effect his purposes. The laws of nature become in this way means to freedom, giving man more power to effect his wishes than beforetimes he had.

These laws of nature deserve closer study. Each one of them, in effect if not in words, begins with an *if*: If bodies are allowed to fall freely, they all fall equally fast. This does not mean that all falling bodies do actually fall equally fast; for the most part they do not because on the earth they are seldom allowed to fall freely. Snow, for instance, ordinarily does not fall so fast as sleet or hail; the air interferes. If snow and sleet and hail fall in a vacuum, they do fall equally fast. A law of nature always has this operational *if*, or its equivalent, at the beginning to introduce certain named conditions. If these conditions operationally hold, then certain and such results may be expected to follow. We say that water is H_2O . This may mean that, *if* hydrogen and oxygen be combined suitably, water results. Or it may mean that, *if* water be suitably treated, we get hydrogen and oxygen. But to say

that water is H_2O does not say that either operational *if* will be followed. To have water on hand is no guarantee that we shall soon have hydrogen and oxygen on hand available for use. So the laws of nature do not tell us what will *absolutely* happen; they tell us what will *conditionally* happen: if certain and such conditions be met, then such and such results may be expected.

Now let us consider man and let us grant—for the “sake of argument” at the moment if any are timorous about it—that he, too, is a natural phenomenon. Does it therefore follow that, if he brings thinking to bear on a situation and changes it, we have renounced science? Not at all. All the science we know we found out by studying phenomena. Let us act in the same way with man. We find something going on that we have long called thinking, and this thinking seems a very important thing. In practical affairs it appears that some people can think better than others, and on the whole (other things being equal) those who can think best in any given field come out ahead in that area. The history of science is principally the history of the great thinkers.

The special service of science has been to find out and make available useful uniformities in nature. These enable man to foretell the specific consequences of possible acts. Now we do observe, beyond any question, as was brought out earlier, that for an intelligent man to foreknow these possible consequences may and often does become a true causative factor to determine what he will do: this knowledge so influences him that he chooses a course of action which puts the law of nature to work for him. These are facts which no one can deny. There is in this no denial of the “law of causation”; on the contrary, there is in it nothing but the application, causally, of knowledge to man’s behavior.

Look further at this thing we call thinking, considering

particularly its creative aspect. When we study thinking in individual lives and in history, we find that men are continually thinking new things. Most of these are new only to the individual man; a lesser number are new also to history. That any are new to history means that thinking creates new thoughts, which in their turn may bring new lines of action. No one can deny these facts. And the assertion is again no denial of science. Exactly the contrary, it is the glory of science that it is true.

And now, finally, what about all events being fixed in advance? We have two hypotheses before us, one of inclusive or cosmic determinism, already discussed in part—that all things, all events in every detail, have already been fixed in advance from the beginning—and the other of specific or local determinism—that we live in a world of actually emerging novelty, where the outcomes of events are precarious though in each detail nature acts with reliable uniformities.¹ Which hypothesis better fits the facts?

If the hypothesis of inclusive cosmic determinism be admitted, then all thought and effort become so different from what we have been holding them to be that they seem useless and futile. Why worry about the future? Why try? Why plan? All things that are going to happen are already fixed. Effort does not count; we only mistakenly and therefore foolishly think so. The moral "ought" makes no sense. All the people who have been concerned about it have been mistaken. There is no such thing as responsibility. Man is not free to plan. Planning makes no sense.

If we take the other hypothesis, we see that effort and responsibility not only make sense but also are supremely important. We lose no science on this hypothesis. In fact, in keeping with it science appears as man's supremest effort at control amid precariousness. Each new discovery of science

¹ For reference to the modern principle of indeterminacy see page 176.

may mean that man is by so much freer to control the course of human destiny according to consciously chosen ends.

And, as we compare the two hypotheses, it appears odd, not to say suicidal, that the man who claims the first hypothesis bases his claims on scientific principles which have been discovered by experiments conducted in every detail on the second hypothesis. And, if this proponent tries to refute my argument, he is again by his very effort illustrating the second position.

The more, then, we think of it, the more it appears that we are under no necessity to accept the doctrine of cosmic or universal determinism but rather compelled to take the other. The future is not yet determined. True enough, if we lived in a universe composed of a finite number of discrete objects, the laws of mechanics (it appears) would enable us to foretell their future movements in advance for all time. But we live in an infinite universe, infinite as to the number of things in it and infinite in the parts and aspects to be found in it. In such a universe determination cannot be fixed in advance but only at the moment of the happening of each event. In the as-yet-undetermined universe man becomes a real factor in creating the world in which he will live.

As regards freedom to effect, man begins, then, with a certain animal freedom of movement and increases this with accumulating knowledge and skill. In particular, through language and the criticism which interacting language and selfhood make possible, man has devised scientific method, which vastly increases the range of his freedom to effect.

Before leaving this phase of the problem of freedom, it may be worth while to add that the discussion has at no point assumed "freedom of the will" nor has it availed itself of any modern principle of indeterminacy. As was discussed earlier, "freedom of the will" seems to belong to a remote

past when psychology believed in faculties. "Will" was one such faculty, which decided what one would choose; and it was counted free, in some obscure way, to choose apart from the interaction of organism and environment.

This writer rejects such a "will" and knows nothing of any such freedom. So far as he can see, the process of deliberation is a fact known to all and the essence of the process consists of finding and elaborating the probable consequences of the various pertinent alternatives. When these elaborated consequence contents are considered, some one of the elaborated contents in general wins out: the organism acts on that alternative. When this has happened, we say, by definition, that the person has *chosen* that alternative. This is what *choice* means. In this process the elaboration of consequences will go on according to the accumulated and organized prior experiences of the person and in accordance with his habits of deliberation as all of these are called out by the situation. The final choice depends on the respective pulls that these several elaborated contents have on the person as he then is (*i.e.*, as he then sees and feels things). At the moment of decision action is as much determined by the factors therein involved as is ever true in any other determination in nature. One set of foreseen consequences proves to have stronger pulling power than any alternative set. That is all. Causality holds; but it holds in detail as it should, not otherwise.

As regards the modern scientific doctrine of indeterminacy, first promulgated by Heisenberg, that has not appeared at all in this argument for effectual freedom. That some scientists find in Heisenberg's principle their long sought freedom to choose seems to argue that they have not understood, and still do not understand, the kind of freedom that ethics and psychology need.

FREEDOM FROM PREJUDICE

When we were considering the problem of self-determination in moth, fish, dog, and man, it became evident that continuing ability to learn is an essential element in freedom of action. Now observation shows that people learn unequally. The question thus arises as to the degrees of such freedom and, in particular, whether prejudice or other hindrance to thinking and learning must not be counted by just so much also an interference with freedom of action.

If we are to think effectively, and in this way secure adequately either of the freedoms already discussed, any prejudice acts by just so much as hindrance. Prejudice means that one has taken a position without critical thinking, or at least without critical thinking at the point where the prejudice acts. The evil effect of such a prejudice, in the degree that it is intrenched, is that it acts as a dog in the manger not only to stand in the way of present better thinking but also to stand in the way of the search for better thinking. Intelligent conduct requires that each position on which it is based shall have been examined critically and so held on its critically understood merits. To act intelligently on any opinion or principle, one should know its weaknesses as well as its strengths, one should know how far one may safely go with it and where danger begins.

More specifically it is acting on thinking that we wish. As one faces a situation, then, it is highly important that he know clearly what the situation is; else he cannot act wisely upon it. It is also highly important that one consider, if the present facts demand it, whether one's hitherto way of acting is the best available way for meeting just this situation. In other words, one must really think before one acts, think enough in each specific instance to see how much

thinking this case demands. This much thinking one must do before his acting is wise.

Now prejudice faces a given situation with some important phase of the thinking already short-circuited. Insofar examination will probably not be made; a review and reconsideration will probably not take place. But life develops, as we have many times noted, always in novel fashion, more or less so. Always there is something new about it. Prejudice in effect denies this. Prejudice, insofar as it is present, is therein exactly a denial of acting on thinking. The effect of prejudice is thus to bind the person and agent to the past, to the past which gave birth to the prejudice. In the degree that prejudice is present and active, in like degree is the person bound and enslaved, not free.

What has been so far said helps us by generalization to define now a new kind and quality of freedom. A person is free in the degree that he decides his course of action himself and decides it not on whim or prejudice but on the merits of the case carefully examined.

Several constituent kinds of freedom converge in what has just been said. First is freedom to think without the hindering effect of prejudice or of any hindering habit to lessen the quality of the thinking. Attaining this freedom to think without internal interference is an achieving which each one has to make for himself, and there is no end to one's work in behalf of the ideal thus staked out ahead.

A second constituent freedom in thinking is the social or political freedom to decide for oneself. This clearly differs from culture to culture and is just as much a matter of general cultural attitude as it is of political rights. In many small towns in this country there is little freedom to differ from the community conceptions although the constitutional rights of free speech and the like may be legally respected. For example, one's dress is practically everywhere bound by

custom. To disobey such custom is to court dangerous reactions from the community, reactions that as a rule only the mentally or morally unbalanced will care to brave. Perhaps in the distant future we shall attain the same freedom in matters of dress that we now have in religion.

A third constituent freedom in thinking rests on the philosophy in terms of which one thinks. This is perhaps but the opposite, writ large, of the small-town type of slavery, but still it deserves explicit statement. One can be free to think only as one has a philosophy that makes for thinking.

This philosophy of freedom is the key to a finer conception of individuality. Each child begins life as a biological organism, at the first not much above a sensitive plant. If he is normal, he can learn; and he does learn the life about him. But he learns this life in terms of his narrow and childish outlook. His parents may be never so intelligent and broad-minded, and he may profit from such a home above the children of most other families; but it nevertheless remains true that, when he is a child, he will learn as a child. These childish and inadequate learnings will be built into him as habits and prejudices, so that, as he grows older, he has the unending task of remaking these previous learnings.

Specifically each one of us, especially in childhood and youth, accepts many views without examining them. This is inevitable. We should expect, then, as we grow up, to question, in the aggregate, everything we have previously thought, so as to rebuild it better. After we have remade it, the wording of our belief may, as words go, be the same we had previously used, but these same words now mean different things. The words now hold an experienced content they could not have in those early days. Matters stand now in relationships formerly unknown. The strengths and weaknesses of the position are held now consciously on

merits seen in their relationships as they impinge on other things in life.

It is this kind of thing that John Caird had in mind when he said:

In the idea of a spiritual, as distinguished from a merely natural being, is involved the notion not only of self-consciousness but of self-determination. Not what I am or find myself to be by nature, nor what I am made to be by any foreign or external power, constitutes my spiritual life, but that which by conscious activity and will, I make myself to be. This does not imply that a spiritual nature is one which is absolutely self-created, or that the spiritual life of the individual has no limits or conditions imposed upon from without. But it does imply that, so long as there is anything within or without—any element of my inner life which is simply and immediately given, and not taken up, transformed, and, so to speak, re-created by the free self-assertion of the rational will, any outward conditions which constitute a limit to my nature, and which have not become the means of its self-development and self-realization—so long and to that extent I have not attained to the true life of the spirit.²

We need not take Caird's conception of the spiritual and the natural in his neo-Hegelian sense—this illustrates what has been said about one's background of philosophy—but we can see in his words a genuine outlook upon individuality and an insight into a very valuable kind of freedom. In this general area, as we shall wish to discuss later, the self-other process gives a foundation for individuality which opens infinite possibilities to the future.

In an earlier chapter we considered the highest standard for determining what to think and do. We now meet again that same ideal here. To gain the highest, spiritual freedom

² John Caird, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (Glasgow James Maclehose, 1901), pp. 247f.

I must, as I continually build or rebuild myself, build on this evolving highest standard, must enthrone it, as the highest I now see, in me as the law of my life. I must love my neighbor—each other person wherever found—as I love myself and on a basis of true ethical equality. Further, I must govern my decisions and acts in accordance with the highest ideal of approval that I can imagine. And, still further, I must so enthrone these insights within as my rule of faith and action in all affairs both great and small that I—this selfish, egocentric self—shall cease to rule and in its stead shall rule this highest self—an objective internal other that represents what ought to be rather than what I have hitherto wished or might in some narrower sense demand. If I am to gain the highest type of personal freedom, it must be on this plan and plane that I build myself as on each occasion I decide what to do.

This unselfish freedom will bring happiness but not always the kind of happiness that many think they wish. The happiness that it brings is the kind visioned by George Eliot in *Romola*, where she said:

We can only have the highest happiness, such as goes with being a great man, by having wide thoughts, and much feeling for the rest of the world as well as ourselves; and this sort of happiness often brings so much pain with it that we can only tell it from pain by being what we would choose before everything else, because our souls see it as good.³

FREEDOM THROUGH INSTITUTIONS

This final kind of freedom is freedom to live, to live the good life; it is the institutional opportunity to put the preceding freedoms to work; it is providing such institutional arrangements as enable the individuals of a group to work

³ George Eliot, *Romola* (Edinburgh, Blackwood, no date), Epilogue, p. 508.

out together the good life for all concerned. The problem, then, is to find such institutional forms as will let men live and grow toward ever better living.

For such growing-living at least these three things must concur: first, a selfhood adequate to live well and grow better; second, the external counterpart of the good life, not only food and the like but also opportunity by proper effort to live beyond the elemental needs; and, third, social institutions adjusted both to supplying these needs and to ordering life properly in connection. For all three the actual culture is strategic. If, then, we are to live well, we must have a culture adequate to that end. And for this we must have not only the basic freedom to use the existing culture for what it is worth but also the further freedom to improve that culture whenever and wherever we can. This we may say is the formula for effective institutional freedom.

Keeping these things in mind, let us consider our existing culture and ask as to the opportunity our social institutions do, in fact, afford us to seek and live the good life. Such a study may help us understand better what we mean by effective institutional freedom. First of all, how does the culture we have affect the selves being built? Does our culture so interact with selfhood as, on the one hand, continually to enlarge, refine, and integrate the selves actually in process while, on the other hand, it continually provides more adequate freedom of expression for these selves?

For example, to what extent are men used in our competitive business system merely as means to someone else's ends, and to what extent are they treated as ends in themselves? To what extent do they share in the processes they operate? And in the output? What care is taken that operatives shall, in fact, grow and live as persons? For that is the only kind of freedom worth talking about. Some may ask about the words *free* and *freedom* in connection. How do

they fit with self-building? Some twenty years ago, when the twelve-hour shift in the steel mills was a question and many earnest citizens were urging that such a long work period must hurt the personality of the workers, the management (so it was reported) denied the injury, saying that, when the men left work, they did not engage in dissipation but, instead, were too tired for anything but to eat and go to sleep. The principle here at stake is clear: whether workers, anywhere and everywhere, are to be free to live the kind of life that a wise and good man would choose for himself and his loved ones. The inquiry is not so much as to what is feasible today—though that is, in fact, pertinent—as it is to find the direction we should take, the kinds of changes we should seek in our institutional opportunities, and the spirit with which any changes should be made. As we study, then, our present competitive business system, we seem compelled to admit that at present it too much denies effective freedom to those who work on the lower rungs of the ladder. These do not have adequate opportunity to develop full selves; they are denied the privilege of living finer and better lives. The culture does it.

This inquiry as to the relations of selfhood and effective living is of course not suddenly introduced here as an intrusion into the thread of the whole discussion. On the contrary, there has been implicit in the whole preceding discussion, indeed as a secondary thesis of the book itself, this proposition: the more of self, the more of life. The building of this "more of self" has been the explicit consideration in all the enlargements and development of selfhood so far treated. The "more of life" has so far been only implicit. Now it is the explicit relation of the two that we are studying. We ask in so many words what amount and kind of freedom our social institutions afford whereby the self can

build itself up. John Dewey has defined freedom as "the release of capacity from whatever hems it in."⁴ The relation of institutions to freedom and the correlative building of selfhood is thus an essential part of our whole inquiry. How selfhood, freedom, and our social institutions can so interact as to release capacity—this constitutes the problem of institutional freedom.

Many have conceived the relations of institutions to freedom in quite too negative a sense. Rousseau, for example, seemed, in some of his moods, to count the fabric of civilization as the root of human evil: "Everything is good as it comes from the hand of God; it becomes evil by the meddling of men"; "man is born free, yet is everywhere in chains."⁵ But, if there is any clear lesson from the French Revolution, it is that a mere destruction of institutions is evil, not good. Institutions are necessary. Civilization as life in and through cultural forms is necessary to any good life. That civilization depends on the existence of a culture, an accumulated social inheritance, came to clear consciousness first as men studied the theory underlying the French Revolution. That this social inheritance is essential in any serious study of man no one now doubts. We have seen in preceding chapters not only how selfhood emerges from its surrounding culture but also how the excellencies of selfhood flow in the main from the selected contributions of the ages to the culture. It is equally clear that the good life, in any sense that we care to accept the term, depends on the institutions that surround and condition it. What we demand of the culture is institutions that will so develop human personality and give it institutional freedom as to lead continually to the ever better good life. John Locke, though earlier, saw better

⁴ *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York, Henry Holt, 1920), pp. 207f.

⁵ These are the opening sentences respectively of *Émile* and of *The Social Contract*.

than Rousseau: "The end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom."⁶

Because government holds so much of power, it affords a crucial instance of the bearing of institutions on individual life and freedom. The development of the individual's share in democratic governing has been the noteworthy development of modern times—until its recent shocking denial by the dictator countries. Whether the Protestant religion or modern trade gave the first great impulse may be debated. Possibly the Revival of Learning, which preceded both, gave the start. The Protestant religion, however—building apparently better than it knew—gave great impulse to individual freedom and to the correlative remaking of institutions to fit. The growth of trade, coming both before and after, spread the same impulse from another angle. Soon the movement took hold of government, notably in the Great Rebellion against Charles I. The Revolution of 1689-1690 gave final recognition to the British subordination of the crown to Parliament. And John Locke in defending this gave the classic statement on which our own Revolution was fought, that men are "by nature free, equal, and independent"⁷ and therefore free to set up what government they would.

The word *liberty* or *freedom* was perhaps the term most used by our people in the early days of the republic to describe what they thought was the crucial element they had won. In a true sense our government marked the first effective modern assertion on a large scale that institutions are made for man and not man for institutions.

It would, however, be a mistake to say that political freedom suffices of itself to provide the needed institutional freedom. The contrary has been too obvious both in Great Britain and in the United States. But two lesser claims may

⁶ *Two Treatises of Government* (1689), Bk. II, Ch. VI, p. 57.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Bk. II, Ch. VIII, p. 95.

be made: first, that there is an educative effect from an ultimate share in government, it can have real effect to up-build self-respect; and, second, that with ultimate power thus located in the people they have "the right that is preservative of all rights." By this fact no matter of human concern lies beyond the effort of men to control it. In a democratic society selfhood sees this open road before it.

But there are some considerations from which it had been better to start more fundamentally than with government. Even before government, and underneath it, comes the economic effort to supply man's more insistent needs. Until these fundamental needs are met, life is as a rule too insecure to be good. As Horace Kallen has well said: "He who is absorbed by the mere fight against starvation is in bondage to the subhuman conditions of biological existence. . . . Freedom begins where economic necessity ends."⁸ And the danger to personality adjustment enters to aggravate the bondage, especially so under modern industrial conditions. If men are thrown out of employment, even though the government keep them from starving either by a dole or by made-work, evil effects are still probable. Morale is almost sure to suffer and personality tends to weaken. To keep normal, men must work and on terms to preserve self-respect. On no alternative basis can a sound personality be maintained.

Attention is thus turned again to our unsatisfactory economic system—for so fundamental a factor touches life, of necessity, at many points. Up to recently most Americans have upheld the common laissez-faire outlook as fitting best with American ideas of freedom and perhaps as otherwise best suited to our conditions. Now the presumption turns, so many are thinking, the other way. Under modern indus-

⁸ *Individualism: An American Way of Life* (New York, Liveright, 1933), p. 200.

trial and business conditions the freedom offered by laissez-faire seems but specious. In too great measure its freedom is but the freedom of the powerful and unscrupulous to exploit their less fortunate fellows. The existing system, in fact, condemns many, at this writing apparently about a third of the whole nation, to grinding poverty. In this is illustrated the denial of effective freedom pointed out by Kallen. There are, besides, many other ways in which the struggle for profits brings about "man's inhumanity to man." For one thing it tempts many vendors of commercial amusement to degrade by appealing to low tastes; it pays, they say, to do so. The hurt from this is, from the point of view here under consideration, to both sides. It degrades those whom it exploits by reducing in hurtful degree the lives they live; it degrades as truly all who willingly engage in the exploitation. For, as we saw under the discussion on learning in Chapter IX, each one learns what he lives and builds its quality at once into character, whether it be for good or whether it be for evil. Emerson said it, "He who does a good deed is instantly ennobled." So here also he who willingly does an evil deed is instantly degraded. So much do our institutions do for us. The kind of living they encourage manifests itself in the selfhood we therefore build. Our freedom to live is what they therein give us.

But this is not the whole picture of the degree of freedom our institutions withhold or bestow. If there is any one characteristic of the social process that carries control over the rest, it is the degree of freedom granted to intelligence. If our institutional freedom is of the kind to foster the free play of intelligence, we are fortunate, for it is intelligence that in the last analysis must lead us if we are to go aright. But, if our institutional arrangements hinder the free play of intelligence, we are by so much hurt. For instance, consider the character of the press. While many of our newspapers,

probably most, do take seriously their task of building reliable and effective intelligence, there are unfortunately many of the opposite kind. If the libel law did not forbid, certain outstanding instances could be named of widely circulated papers which to all appearances run themselves on a conscious and intentional program of mental deception. Instead of telling the truth as impartially as they can and seeking by editorial comment to clarify thinking, they spread distorted truth and write editorially to build bias and prejudice. Such newspapers, degrading as effectively as they can the minds and souls of their readers, sin not only against those whom they thus immediately damage, they sin as well against the common good. We cannot, without greater hurt, abridge the freedom these newspapers of legal right have; but we can—other newspapers and citizens all—condemn both this evil practice and an economic system which so directly rewards it. Effective institutional freedom is here seriously at stake, for anything that thwarts the free play of intelligence by so much thwarts the search for the best to think and do. By just so much is the common good hurt.

It is no proper part of this chapter either to present a blueprint of the good society or to set forth the proper boundaries of a desirable institutional freedom. The sole aim here is to develop the general conception of such a freedom and to make clearer the relationships existing among a well-developed selfhood, the good life, and a proper set of institutions. If the culture is awry and inadequate, by so much does it develop inadequate if not perverted selves and by so much does it refuse a proper institutional freedom. What we seek is a culture that gives institutional opportunity to live and grow in the best conceivable way.

CHAPTER XI

INDIVIDUALITY

Where entity and quiddity,
The ghosts of defunct bodies fly.—Butler, *Hudibras*

In every man's writings there is something like himself and
unlike others, which gives individuality.—Jowett

What meaning shall we give to the term *individuality*? At least two meanings often suggested we can dispose of at once. First, we do not mean that metaphysical abstraction, ridiculed above by Butler, which was supposed to tell us what gives a thing its uniqueness, that and nothing else. Scoffers have made themselves merry over quiddity, "the whatness of the what"—that we do not mean here. Jowett suggests a better approach. Second, we are not content with a kind of individuality that consists merely of queerness. In out-of-the-way places one often finds old codgers who affect all sorts of peculiarities, oddities of dress or beard, of speech or manner. No peculiarity which is merely odd or queer can furnish the definition we seek for the term *individuality*.

It is, however, possible to get hints from both these rejected definitions. First, the Schoolmen were concerned over uniqueness; so are we—the individuality we seek must have a real element of uniqueness in it. It was this Jowett had in mind in the quotation from him given at the beginning of this chapter. We accept this observable uniqueness as an

essential characteristic. Second, also, these old codgers, these queer old fellows, may have thought over their seeming oddities and so perhaps adopted dress or beard, after consideration, to suit their tastes or needs. If so, and insofar as one does so think out and adopt, after consideration, his seeming queerness, in that degree is he moving in the direction of a second characteristic which seems properly to belong to individuality—intentionally willed character.

It was this element of self-determination after conscious consideration that Edmund Burke had in mind when he criticized the dictatorial totalitarians of his day. His preferred scheme of life, in contrast with theirs, must have a place for self-determination in it, for individual choice and wish.

To them the will, the wish, the want, the liberty, the toil, the blood of individuals is as nothing. Individuality is left out of their scheme of government. The state is all in all.¹

As a correlative of both the characteristics just named, we can add a third necessary element of individuality, namely, that it must have a pattern. It is this pattern which gives or constitutes the desired uniqueness to distinguish one person from another. The same pattern is the correlative of the intentionally willed character. The self, as it makes the successive decisions in life, must therein build a consistent pattern. To be sure, since life is essentially on-going, the pattern is always in process. But, to grant individuality, we must see that the successive choices of life, on the one hand, flow from the character already in existence and, on the other hand, make at the same time suitably for a consistently growing character. Later we shall wish to study the varying contents that individuality-patterns can carry. Here it is the fact of pattern that concerns us. We may believe that it was such

¹ Edmund Burke, *Works* (London, Rivington, 1803), Vol. VIII, p. 253.

a unique and thoughtful pattern Mary Wollstonecraft had in mind when she said:

In the countenance of girls we look only for vivacity and bashful modesty; but the springtide of life over, we look for soberer sense in the face . . . expecting to see individuality of character, the only fastener of the affections.²

Putting together these partial and overlapping emphases, we begin to round out the definition of individuality we seek. It is this fuller and rounded conception that we wish now to follow up.

The specific thesis of this chapter is that any adequate definition of individuality must base itself essentially on the self-other process. In the process of building selfhood we have the indispensable prerequisite and means whereby any worthy individuality comes into being. The self must know the selfhood it is building and must will it so. In this way the self-other element is at once the essential characteristic of any human individuality and the means for building it.

It thus appears that any satisfactory definition of the conception we seek must lie in the area bounded by four defining ideas: (1) the idea of uniqueness—no two individualities will be exactly alike; (2) the idea of self-determination—individuality must somehow build itself and run itself; (3) the idea of pattern, which describes and defines the individual's conduct, not the same pattern for all—far from it—but a recognizably consistent pattern which furnishes the desired uniqueness; (4) the self-other factor, that individuality not only in a true sense creates itself, but that it also knows how its pattern differs from the patterns of others and why and then wills the result before the world.

How such an individuality with these four characteristics

² Mary Wollstonecraft, *A Vindication of the Rights of Women* (London, J. Johnson, 1792), p. 151.

can come into being, in and through the self-other process, will now be considered. We can take our departure from an adaptation of the words quoted earlier from John Caird:

Not what I am or find myself to be by nature, nor what I am made to be by any foreign or external power, constitutes my [individuality, my true self], but that which by conscious activity and will, I make myself to be . . . So long as there is anything within or without—any element of my inner life which is simply and immediately given, and not taken up, transformed, and, so to speak, recreated by the free self-assertion of the rational will, any outward conditions which constitute a limit to my nature, and which have not become the means of its self-development and self-realization—so long and to that extent I have not attained to the [desired type of selfhood and individuality].³

How each one out of his “conscious activity and will” does in a very real sense form his own individuality is not difficult to see.

The child begins at birth on the animal level, taking or rejecting without deliberation whatever life presents. If he remained thus on the animal level, he would build but a simple character. But with the coming of selfhood, and thereafter as the self brings itself continually into ever fuller being, the child can and does think, more or less, over what happens to him, so that each new experience is taken in and understood in terms of prior experiences. Learning, in fact,

³ John Caird, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (Glasgow, James Maclehose, 1901), pp. 247f. The words in brackets are the writer's, the rest are Caird's. In place of the first bracket Caird (as page 180 shows) wrote, “spiritual life”; in place of the second, “true life of spirit.” Because the omitted words might seem to some to commit the writer to Caird's neo-Hegelianism, it seems better here to substitute words that more nearly fit this discussion. However, Caird's operational process so precisely builds the kind of individuality here sought and his wording, except for the omitted phrases, is so admirably adapted to express the thought herein being developed that much use is made of Caird's very words.

so permeates each experience that, as we have seen, each successive element of conscious life as the learner sees it is somehow saved, not lost in the living of it, but stored up within the behavior structure—added to it and woven into it—so that it remains to affect pertinently the experiences that follow. It is in this way that conscious experience is itself possible, for otherwise life would be a succession of isolated, atomistic happenings. And in this way each human, through the intertwining processes of learning and experiencing as these pervade the stream of life and remembered experience, builds an abiding continuity—his very selfhood, his own integration of his own life. Each new experience comes in part out of this abiding unity and goes back into it, integrated with it through two processes, first of thinking and then of learning, the one to create, the other to fix and preserve. The structure so built is one's very personality itself, or—for present purposes—his individuality.

That each such personality, or individuality, is unique in history is easily seen. Each one (except identical twins) begins life with his unique combination of qualities inherited from his ancestors. This starts him off unique. After that, for each one—even for each of identical twins—his succession of environmental influences is unique. Others share certain of life's episodes with him, so that his experience has, fortunately, much in common with others; but no two have exactly the same experiences. We see now already, so it appears, that each one of the Dionne quintuplets has begun to build a distinct personality, which will increasingly select out of the common matrix of their shared life its own way of responding. Thus is individuality, in its unique sense, increasingly built.

But individuality means more than this. In fact, the Dionne sisters have in their six years done little more than lay a beginning foundation, on which they can later build.

For them, to follow Mary Wollstonecraft, "the springtide of life" lies yet ahead. Only later can we discern in these little girls the "individuality of character" to be expected. This can come only as these quintuplets face in time the more serious problems of life. When they ask, as the newspapers report, why Hitler does not follow Ferdinand the Bull in preferring daisies to fighting, we smile and approve; but their question shows only how much lies ahead. We approve the rightness of their suggestion, but it is the rightness of innocence and naïveté, not the penetration of wisdom. However much of ultimate rightness it may contain, their suggestion as to Hitler arises from the surface of individuality, not from its depths.

We are now prepared to read Caird's words more carefully. "Not what I . . . find myself to be by nature" can constitute any worthy individuality, "nor what I am made to be by any foreign or external power." The individuality that I as its thoughtful builder can approve and should therefore seek must be remade, rethought, reconstituted through criticism and behavior, and this of my own "conscious activity and will." The "will" here means that I have considered the matter, have taken into account the difficulties I face, the alternatives I have, and have by my own determined thinking arrived at a new and more adequate and inclusive outlook, which, though acting it out be hard, I will to accept and make prevail in my thought and act. In this way I consciously make each successive experience of life, be it joyous or be it hard, the means of self-development and self-realization. In each such instance I must, further, ask myself whether I, the person so acting, am willing to be and become the kind of person that does such things.

It is of course possible to think too much about oneself. The finest of character can come only as one loses himself in what he does, and this in an ever larger view of life. But

on the other hand, losing oneself should not go forward in such way as to become either absent-mindedness or indifference. It is the giving of oneself to the ever more inclusive life that counts. In a word, I must, morally, always consider the effect on others of what I do; and, from the point of view of a proper individuality, I must, if I think enough about it, always know and take into account the effect on myself.

And, still further, I must increasingly have and approve a growing pattern of my life. Each new situation must be met in a way that includes my digested reactions to it within the inclusive unity of my life pattern. Insofar as the new situation is not simply new in respect of time but includes also novel elements, in that degree must I rethink and enlarge my life pattern to give proper place to these new elements. The process of thus ever enlarging myself—for my life pattern in action is my most inclusive self—gives me the opportunity of coming out victorious from what might otherwise be defeat and failure. I may, by a better understanding of the cause of my failure this time, see better how to succeed next time; or I may see that I should never have tried, that the thing is impossible for me to accomplish. In either instance I do my thinking in a larger setting; I am by that much myself the more as I build my larger self on the larger and more adequate view. If it is a case of final failure so as to try that no more, I do then indeed reduce my pretensions but I gain in security or, as the Stoics had it, in freedom. Again, it may be in a particular case that sorrow or bitter disappointment confronts. If I yield to this, I live defeated and perhaps sore. But, if I rise above it, either by so understanding the experience in its broader relationship as to come to emotional calm and equilibrium; or by so understanding better now the sorrows and disappointments of others as to become myself more sympathetic than before and therefore can better help others in their times of trouble—if I can

conquer in either fashion, then is the pattern of my life not only enlarged but also made more humane. It is in such ways that my sorrow can be a very means of self-development to me. Many a person has not truly lived until sorrow has thus given character to self and life.

Some may have felt that morality and individuality are not sufficiently distinguished in the discussions of the last few paragraphs. The fact is of course that the two have much in common, namely, that in each of the two one must know what one does and choose this only after consideration. The difference between them lies, then, not so much in there being different processes for any two cases but, rather, in the motive, in the moving why of choice. The processes as such are much the same; the end or aim differs. In morality one chooses the course that promises to bring the best to all concerned, and the choice is made with conscious wish to effect this best. It is this that constitutes the moral quality of the act. Where, however, it is a question of individuality, one chooses consistently with oneself because one wills to be the kind of person that acts according to the chosen pattern. This chosen pattern may include morality, but may exclude it, and may in a sense also extend outside it (as we shall in a moment discuss in relation to art). In either case it is still individuality, and it may be a strong individuality. Many we can name in history who have consciously chosen against morality. Others may—as did the Puritans—identify the pattern of life with religion and morals (as they conceived these), that and no more, so that as Puritans they had no certain place for the esthetic side of life.

This reference to the Puritan outlook on life links the problem of individuality with the question of the good life, and the connection is more than accidental. At bottom, as with all serious study of this kind, our ultimate concern is for the good life. Here our further inquiry is as to how

various conceptions of individuality affect the quality of life for good or ill.

As we look thus further into the connection between individuality and the good life, it need not surprise us that, historically, man in his long development has come only through wandering advances to his present highest insight into either individuality or the good life. History and anthropology alike show varied failures and inadequacies along both lines, as we now judge such matters.

In many ancient civilizations the individual had hardly achieved any clear distinction from other individuals within the group. The family or the tribe seemed somehow the only moral individuality. In Old China the family was punished for certain kinds of sins committed by the individual. We see traces of the same thing in *Old Testament* history. It seems to us to stand to the credit of certain later developed cultures that in them the individual stands out more clearly as such. Some among us now fear, needlessly perhaps, that economic developments of the future will subdue and stifle individuality. If so, the result would—as we now see it—constitute a positive loss for life.

In more extreme cases the ideal of life has at times been so negative as to give little or no chance for individuality as such. A Brahman proverb, quoted on the none too careful authority of Miss Mayo, had it that:

It is better to sit than to walk, to lie down than to sit, to sleep than to wake, and death is best of all.⁴

Heine said much the same:

For sleep is good, but Death is better still—
The best is never to have been born at all.⁵

⁴ Katharine Mayo, *Mother India* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1927), p. 379.

⁵ Quoted in Bartlett, 11th ed., p. 1066, from *Gross ist die Ähnlichkeit der beiden schönen*.

The depressing effects of such ideals on individuality calls for little discussion here. In somewhat different fashion Bentham would reduce the quality of life or at least deprive it of refined appreciation:

Prejudices apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry.⁶

In striking contrast with these last three quotations stands the statement of Francis Bacon that:

The more good things we are interested in, the more ardently we live.

These several contrasted positions will serve to open up for us the problem of the relation of the good life to individuality. It is at once evident that we cannot insist that all individualities should desire or enjoy the same content of life. That would be the precise denial of individuality itself. Each individuality, as has been insisted, must have his own unique pattern. Such a pattern can mean only that each shall have and make manifest his own selected and ordered arrangement of the content of life: his own particular sensitivities, his interests and pleasures, his ways of activity and working. Moreover, this pattern is unique not merely as one chance selection may be different from another. Chance will not suffice. If there is to be individuality in the positive sense, the selection must, as already stressed, be intentionally willed and the willing must be done on a consistent pattern.

The phrase "individuality in the positive sense," as it appears in the preceding sentence, will perhaps give us a lead as to the proper connection of "content" with "pattern," as to whether individuality has any proper content, whether anything can be said of content when, as here, we consider what constitutes individuality and how it is to be achieved.

⁶ Jeremy Bentham, *Rationale of Reward* (London, Hunt, 1825), p. 206.

In order to follow up this lead, it will perhaps be well to turn aside a moment to consider what may be called negative instances of ordinarily positive terms. Take the term *order*, for example. It has an essentially positive connotation. When the chairman of a noisy meeting calls out: "Order! Order! We must have order," no one is in doubt as to what he means. The order demanded has a positive content. But, if one should ask the next day, "What about the meeting, what kind of order prevailed?" the reply might be, "The worst you ever saw, none at all in fact, simply bedlam itself." In these two cases the term *order* is used in two different senses or, perhaps better, in the algebraic sense, so to speak, of including both positive and negative. In other words, *order*, as ordinarily used, has a positive connotation but may at other times also admit as a true meaning the absence of order, the very denial of order itself as constituting *that kind* of order. It might be going too far to say that all terms of positive connotation admit also such negative instances, but it is certainly true of many.

The consideration of such negative instances of individuality, whether in life or in literature, will perhaps help us to form a clearer conception of the desirable positive character. Micawber, for instance, waiting always for something to turn up, inclines us definitely to the contrasting trait of effectiveness, to the consistent disposition to vigorous effort. We murmur to ourselves such phrases as, "I am the master of my fate." Similarly Hamlet turns us from his weakness to its correlative strength. In these various ways we build content to the conception of strength of character. A person of strong and marked individuality makes his own decisions, consciously and consistently, and, having decided, pushes his purpose through to a conclusion. He knows thus what he does and respects himself for what he has decided. He is willing to stand on his choice before the world. The pattern

is clear; any may see it; he knows it; he defends himself for so willing; and he is effective, at least in the essential inner workings of his personality, whatever failure unfavorable circumstances may inflict upon him.

We are thus led once more to the conception of the good life and its relation to individuality. We seem now authorized to assert that the positive and typical conception of individuality calls for a positive content to the good life as seen by the person himself. We still allow the fact that persons do exist whose patterns are negative instances, characterized by lack, as Scrooge, for instance; but individuality in its desirable sense stands for a positive content. We must of course hasten to add that what one person—St. Francis of Assisi, for example—would call positive many others would call negative. The patterns that men have conceived are, in fact, infinite in variety: Aristotle, Alexander, Confucius, Mahomet, Julius Caesar, Attila, St. Francis, Genghis Khan, Henry VIII, Machiavelli, Luther, Shakespeare, Voltaire, Rousseau, George Washington, Napoleon Bonaparte, Abraham Lincoln.

In the face of this bewildering variety of outstanding patterns it seems foolhardy to pick out specific content elements for comment. Some, however, may be mentioned. Few people are willing to omit ethical quality for the growing individuality they would approve. It might be argued—though some would question—that no one can justly be called great whose individuality is not outstanding in positive traits, nor even then unless the pattern of his character lies significantly on the positive side of service to man. At any rate strength of character, fineness of texture, nobility of outlook—individuality built along these lines does bring approval from all.

Next after strength of character the element of discrimination presents itself for inclusion in the desirable individu-

ality. Possibly most would at once agree that the more discriminating a person is, the better defined his individuality will probably be and, other things being equal, the more admirable accordingly will be his personality. If any should wish to question in connection, it would probably be to insist that discrimination be taken in its more usual sense of including a just sensitivity to all pertinent factors. No dilettante, no mere aesthete, as Oscar Wilde appeared in his early days, could win acclaim as a desirable type of individuality.

As to the proper content of a just discrimination, we must expect not only differences of emphasis but probably out-and-out differences of opinion. Certain words of I. A. Richards, quoted by Hans Zinsser,⁷ will serve to raise the question:

In the arts we find the record, in the only form these things can be recorded, of the experiences which have seemed worth having to the most sensitive and discriminating persons.

If the statement is meant to stress the adequacy of recording, it may well be that "the arts" do furnish the best available means open to man to fix in permanent and readable form refined experiences as such. In music, for example, or in poetry—to mention but two of the arts—the artist can embody his own sensitive experience in a way to make it highly available to others, so that they, too, can share with him what he first creatively felt and expressed—and all this, it would seem, in a degree impossible outside the realm of the arts.

So far we may agree; but, if the intent be to limit to "the arts" those human experiences which have been judged most "worth having" by "the most sensitive and discriminating persons," then the assertion will certainly be disputed. That some experiences are more "worth having" than others

⁷ *Rats, Lice, and History* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1935), p. 22, footnote.

none would or could deny. Further, most thoughtful people would probably agree, as here suggested, that, other things being equal, any individuality is the more admirable the more surely the life it lives includes experiences of the kind deemed "worth having" by "the most sensitive and discriminating persons." But to restrict such worthy experiences to "the arts" would seem to rule out certain whole areas of life in which equally sensitive and equally discriminating persons have found experiences they have deemed most "worth having."

For example, we could hardly rule out from "the most sensitive and discriminating persons" such a philosopher as Plato or such later thinkers as Spinoza, Kant, or John Locke. Plato's literary quality, to be sure, might give his writings a place among "the arts," but hardly so with the others. Also, many would wish to include among "the most sensitive and discriminating persons" such lovers of men as John Howard, the prison reformer, Abraham Lincoln, Florence Nightingale, through whom the lot of every hospital patient in the English-speaking world has been made easier, or even our own Jane Addams, who gave her life for the unfortunate in our midst. Still others would like to include the areas of considerate manners, lesser morals these have been called, wherein sensitive and discriminating ways of address and behavior enhance life for all concerned. This is indeed an art, but it is seldom named among "the arts." If, in fine, we accept the conception of the good life as furnishing the stuff with which ethics and every other improvement of life has to deal, any sensitive and discriminating treatment of others or of theory relating to the bettering of the life of man must surely be included among the worth-while experiences of life.

In such and other ways may the factor of discriminating appreciation enter into the worthy individuality. One per-

son may appreciate music, another architecture, a third poetry; and each may build accordingly his appropriate individuality. Still another may be sensitive to the sufferings of others and to the untutored aspirations of the lowly and underprivileged and work accordingly for juster social arrangements. Still others may feel with unusual insight the great problems of science and life. Each such may build and show a worthy individuality. But the insensitive, the loud laugh that speaks the vacant mind, the vulgar, the cruel, the overbearing—these we refuse to accept.

Now in all of this it is the fact that one not only does and feels but also knows and approves what he does and, approving, has willed it, has willed it, if need be, against difficulties and dangers—it is this type of character which constitutes the desirable individuality. Such an individual is sensitive, is discriminating—as other capable ones will see. And what the individual thus discriminatingly approves fits into a pattern, itself approved as it has developed. Such a pattern with its details is unique, not in order to be queer but to be true to itself in a defensible way. All this is the creative work of the person himself as, in the way so well described by Caird, he builds and asserts himself consciously out of and beyond the merely given. That this ideal sets a high standard is but true; few attain to the full stature. But still it can be true—it is true—in some degree of all. To make the best individuality possible—this is at least one way of stating the whole duty of man.

CHAPTER XII

SECURITY

It is the interactions of security directly with selfhood and indirectly with civilization that set the problem here to be considered. No full treatment of security as such is here either necessary or possible—only enough will be said to bring out the significant bearings of the fact and conception of security on selfhood and life in civilization. It may, however, be added that the present world situation, with its direct and indirect threats to civilization, has brought the felt need to discuss the question in this connection. As in the rest of the book, it will especially concern us to consider the role of the culture and our institutions in the problem under consideration. In brief, the theme of the chapter is to be found in the mutual interactions among the culture, selfhood, and security as all bear on life and effective civilization.

Security as here discussed has two aspects—internal and external. By internal or psychological security we mean, in general, such a composed and orderly functioning of the inner working arrangements of the self and organism as gives poise and confidence in facing the vicissitudes of life. By external security we mean the condition of being externally safe as against threats and danger. That these two senses are related is obvious: if the external threat be great

enough, a feeling of psychological or internal insecurity must result.

PSYCHOLOGICAL SECURITY AND INSECURITY

Security and *insecurity* as psychological terms are comparatively recent in the literature, having arisen primarily from the study of mental hygiene. To make their meaning clearer it may be well to begin with behavior in general, as seen by biology. This whole ground is, to be sure, familiar; but possibly the further applications to be made here may justify the reader in traversing the ground anew.

As is well known, any organism is a self-regulative pattern necessarily implying a correlative environment. Life is the continual interaction between organism and environment. When by any sufficient change the equilibrium of the organism is upset, there ensues within a strain which we variously call urge, want, wish, or the like. And at the same time with this strain there ensue movements of the organism directed toward the environment which tend—and often in humans are intended—to restore the equilibrium. Thus, if the temperature of the body falls below “normal,” one feels cold and starts movements to counteract this fall. Similarly with hunger or with the threat of an enemy. The aggregate of such reactions of the organism, both of urges and of movements, we call behavior.

As a rule, emotion accompanies behavior, or, more properly, emotion is a normal phase of the behavior reaction. Dumas' three levels of emotion seem pertinent here.¹ First are the slight emotions (*les petits chocs*), which bring a tonic effect in connection with practically all lesser stimulations to action. Second are those strong and definite emotions (*les chocs moyens*), as clear-cut anger, for example,

¹ Georges Dumas, *Nouveau traité de psychologie* (Paris, Alcan, 1932), Tome II, Ch. III.

in which adrenalin seems to give to the body specific pertinent readiesses and in general brings a state of enhanced readiness to play a strong part. Third come those disruptive emotions (*les grands chocs*), in which, through very strong and often contradictory effects, the organism so gets in its own way as to "go to pieces." Effective action is then impossible. The bearing of these distinctions on insecurity will appear in the further discussion.

In normal behavior the emotion aroused by the upset disappears upon the restoration of equilibrium or shortly thereafter. But there are many instances where the aroused emotion does not quite disappear but leaves a residue to affect later pertinent experiences. Resentment at another's behavior, for example, may remain long after the incident itself has passed: the explanation given in apology may not satisfy. Or, on the other side, the sense of guilt may remain with the offender long after he has himself apologized. Normally in such cases this residue of leftover emotion makes it easier to be similarly stirred on a succeeding occasion. If this should happen for several successive times, an accumulation of leftover emotion may result and a chronic attitude be set up accordingly. This chronic state of heightened emotional susceptibility is perhaps the most obvious feature of personality maladjustment. We see many people so troubled. One man will carry a "grouch" which interferes with successful human intercourse; another will get angry on small or "no sufficient" provocation. These of course are but lesser instances.

Under other conditions, instead of dying away as might have been expected, an emotion may get stronger. This is particularly true of failure not accepted as final. When, for example, one finds his efforts blocked, an increase of emotion follows an increase of determination to persevere. And, if the blocking seems arbitrary and intentionally obstructive,

the emotion will be likely to increase to the point of anger. Another important case of increase of emotion is where the situation arouses contradictory impulses such that it is impossible to obey both. Here the mutual blockings will at times increase the attendant opposed emotions until Dumas' third level is reached. Almost any instance of effort where one feels uncertain of himself or of his ground will show a certain amount of this mutual blocking. The impulse to act is opposed by the impulse to "take care." Contradictory emotions are stirred; nervous tension follows, with "palpitations of the heart"; the hand trembles, the knees strike against each other. Stage fright is a lesser instance, shell shock the extreme.

What we have been considering allows us now to define the mental-hygiene term *insecurity*. As is common, the term presents a temporary or passing phase and an abiding or a chronic state. The passing is the emotional stirring which accompanies any significant failure to effect an inwardly unified course of action; one is so nonplused and uneasy over the failure as to approach the feeling of "going to pieces." In the abiding instance insecurity has become a characteristic trait; the temporary emotion of unpleasant uncertainty has accumulated and become chronic. In general, any instance of insecurity is increased by the accompanying self-consciousness; it is hardly too much to say that a disconcerting and disheartening self-consciousness is an essential feature of insecurity. The disapproving self, being especially apprehensive of what others will say, makes matters worse by its greater anxiety to succeed. Tension is increased, as we saw, both to go forward and to take greater care, with mutual blockings correspondingly increased. This state of affairs often marks the transition steps from Dumas' second level to his third. In popular speech we say of one so affected that he is "nervous," "unduly apprehensive,"

"losing his grip on himself," "jittery," "jumpy." In technical terms we can say he is clearly "insecure."

The difference between security and insecurity is perhaps sufficiently implied in the foregoing. In usual and normal behavior the organism, when it is stirred to act, is enlisted as a unitary whole and there accompanies the behavior Dumas' first level of tonic emotional effect. This emotion, possibly resulting from a slight internal discharge of adrenalin, inclines one with at least a slight eagerness to the necessary effort. In such a case one anticipates no final or fundamental failure even though the specific effort now being made may fail: "If I don't catch this bus, I'll get the next one; or, if necessary, I'll take a taxi; in fact, if the worst comes, I don't really have to go." There is not enough at stake to make one feel vitally nervous over the outcome. One still has enough solid ground on which to stand so that, even if failure come, one can view this particular matter as of no vital importance. Success is probable, but even that is not necessary. Of such a one we say he feels "secure."

Those who have studied at greater length this question of personal or psychologic security say that insecurity may begin very early in life. As we saw earlier, the unwanted baby, who therefore lacks from the first the normal amount of loving care, may in a few weeks begin to show the ill effects of insecurity. If so, the advent of selfhood may increase the feeling. Many a school child feels thus insecure because he seems to himself to have no assured hold in the esteem of any pertinent group, either of family at home or of teachers or mates at school. If, on the other hand, one can feel assured of some supporting group in this regard, he stands with a certain security even though many troubles assail.

The language just used is figurative, as is usual in dealing with mental affairs. It is difficult to write otherwise. But it

may help us, starting back a little, to pursue the figure further. Life is active. The organism must work out its salvation practically from the environment. Only therefrom can it secure food, shelter, and safety from enemies. For humans we may think of a scale of varying risks to be faced. At one end the chance of success is very great and the risk therefore small. In comparison one stands on fairly solid ground as he puts forth efforts; he can therein feel relatively secure. As we go farther up the scale, the area of solid ground lessens, the risk is greater; one accordingly feels less secure in outlook. As we recall the difference between security and insecurity, it seems possible to find a point on this scale where, for any given person, his feeling of security changes to insecurity; and besides this another point, farther along, at which even "insecurity" breaks down and one "goes to pieces."

It is in connection with these varying degrees of security and insecurity that the virtue of bravery arises and the usefulness of faith. Josiah Royce, discussing this, says of a soldier who believes he will win in the coming battle:

His belief that he will win is identical with his active manly resolve that he is minded to win, that his teeth are set to win, that this sword is sharpened, that this bayonet has been pointed, that this bullet will soon be winged with the determination of victory. Each army knows that, other things being equal, the force which is thus *most* minded to win is the force destined to conquer.²

Such a brave resolve pushes the range of security farther along the scale into what would otherwise be the area of insecurity. Faith is an active virtue very helpful to success wherever there are grounds for hope but still a significant lack of certainty. Not that faith should be foolish. Its place

² *Spirit of Modern Philosophy* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1892), p. 116.

of service can be shown on another scale of varying difficulty of effecting. At one end of this scale is an area of practical certainty: unless something most unusual happens to prevent, I can pick up my pen, I can raise the window, I can lift this not-too-heavy weight. But at the other end of the same scale is another area of things that I cannot succeed in doing no matter how I try; in these I know that I cannot succeed. I cannot by myself move this boulder, I cannot with my bare hand split its rock. In between these two areas of I-can and I-know-I-cannot lies an area of things in respect of which I do not know, until I try, whether I can succeed or not. It is in this area that faith can help by calling out more effort than otherwise would come. In this area we can agree with Terence that "fortune helps the brave" and with Shakespeare that

Our doubts are traitors,
And make us lose the good we oft might win
By fearing to attempt.

A chronic feeling of insecurity will, however, present another picture. Seldom will it yield to mere manly resolve, or, better, seldom will it give birth to, or even permit, such resolve. Something more basic must be done to cure such a maladjustment. The present discussion is of course no place for psychiatric recipes, but a few words regarding milder cases may not be out of place. A shift of attention and interest will often help, particularly if the new line of attack lends itself readily to promising effort. Also to get a new understanding will often open up a promising lead or at least give hope of it. Insecurity is perhaps well conceived as a self-conscious inability to unify oneself on any promising line of attack. Selfhood has been built for action, and nothing unifies the self like the chance to proceed on a promising opening. To identify oneself with a promising cause is a

further wise move. It not only gives much of this unity but also adds to it the prestige of the cause. And the bigger the cause in the eye of onlookers, the greater the prestige and the more satisfyingly effective will be the resulting unification of self.

Recent history well illustrates what has just been said, both about insecurity from confusion and security from a promising cause. Germany, just before Hitler, showed the inner confusion and feeling of insecurity that may result from a baffling and confused social situation, while with the coming of Hitler we see the astonishing effect of a promising cause to bring unification and a sense of internal security. The post-war period in Germany had been a period of great internal trouble and uncertainty. Many were troubled over their own personal futures as well as highly uncertain over the future of the nation. A widespread sense of insecurity resulted, with loss of faith in the social effort to improve affairs. The religious effect was striking, especially as seen in international gatherings. In various world conferences of the Y.M.C.A., for example, the German members showed positive irritation that the Americans persisted in preaching a "social gospel" of bettering the world through human effort. These irritated Germans had gone back in their "neo-orthodox" theology to older doctrines of despair over both man and the world.

Hitler was able to capitalize the general state of confusion and insecurity partly by distracting attention from discouragement and directing it hopefully along new lines. Most of all he was soon able to furnish a cause with which youth could identify themselves and so gain "saving faith"—so to speak—in the promise of a new order. Afterwards a succession of Nazi victories enhanced this unified feeling of transferred self-esteem until now German youth have in effect a new religion.

It is no mere metaphor to say that the Nazi cause is a religion to the Nazi youth. The psychology of religion shows that an important element in every significant religion has been the way the particular religion, as a personal outlook on a troubled world, has answered to the deep yearning for inner peace and internal unity. The feeling of guilt or the sense of sin, when either has been most significant, is felt as inner estrangement, usually pictured, to be sure, between the soul and its God. Psychologically this can be stated, in the language used earlier in this book, as an instance of inner conflict between the internal self and the internal other, that is, between the internal self which admittedly has lived in sin and the internal other which condemns the internal self for having disregarded the call of right and duty. This internal strain may be a feeling of specific guilt, or it may simply be a more generalized strain in which one's highest ideals are involved on the condemnatory side. And this internal strain with its sense of estrangement is consistent with many varying beliefs as to the metaphysical status of the external other considered as the source and locus of the call to duty.

When such an internal stress with its correlative yearning is present in high degree and when the external other thus involved is taken as defining the final and supreme value, then we have in a true sense and degree a religious experience. And the answer to the problem and yearning thus felt has been found when the individual can fundamentally compose his own mind and heart on a basis of terms consistent with this source or locus of supreme value. In such case the supreme value so seen and accepted becomes one's religion.

In an earlier day this supreme other was conceived in anthropomorphic terms and as many. Later, as men thought more widely and felt more deeply, one supreme deity displaced the many; and still later this one has often been con-

ceived impersonally. Especially in modern times, with the increasing vogue of science and a growing knowledge of comparative religions, the supreme other may be any impersonal cause deemed worthy of supreme valuation. Indeed, for many who have lost faith in the supernatural, nationalism is now such a supreme source and locus of valuation and so becomes for them the only vital religion they hold. German Nazism seems by all the tests available at this distance to be for many of its adherents such a nationalistic religion, with Hitler as its prophet and supreme interpreter. Similarly, in the U.S.S.R., Communism appears to be another nationalistic religion, with Lenin as its national historic founder and Stalin as its present interpreter. In each case we call it a religion because of its apparent ability to get itself accepted as the supreme value with the correlative inner unity and exaltation which follow its acceptance. In each case personal exaltation is enhanced by identification of the self with the popularly accepted supreme cause.

EXTERNAL SECURITY

In immediate concreteness external security refers to safety from the actual threat of external foes. But this would not be a satisfactory manner of living. Any worthy civilization should assure peace and order before these were even called in question. If institutions did exist for settling disputes among nations and if there were settled confidence among men that the institutions could be relied upon to work with reasonable certainty, then there need be no more wars and all men could live together in peace and amity. So far from this state of affairs being now true, it seems probable that not for a thousand years has the very basis of civilization been so threatened as now. Our present problem becomes thus an inquiry into the nature and origin of the present

feelings of insecurity and a search for any hope of a better state of affairs.

Civilization we can define as a quality of living based on accumulated cultural achievements. We have seen in preceding chapters that man has by parallel and interacting steps progressively achieved both his selfhood and his culture. It is in this way that he has built civilization, of which selfhood and culture are the mutually component factors, each increasingly built to make superior use of raw nature. The achieving of civilization has ever been tortuous, the path never straight and not always forward. Indeed at times it has happened—as now seems true—that man's very success defeats itself. His very discoveries may serve to hurt as truly as to help. Just now our marvelous machinery and our new scientific processes go far toward explaining the worst aspects of life both as regards the domestic scene and the war situation. In fact, some cynics have thought that civilization must by its very nature so act to defeat itself. To show otherwise is the aim here.

From the seventeenth century onward to the beginning of the twentieth century western civilization was on the whole optimistic. The seventeenth century laid the foundation for the modern world in a dependable and fruitful science. The eighteenth century, led by new knowledge of the world and a new faith in man, was able to catch in the Enlightenment a new vision of what a life of reason might bring—a bolder vision than any man had before dreamed of, at least for this world. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, while sobered of undue hopes, still gave us unparalleled advances of science and invention. Indeed after the mid-century acceptance of geological and biological evolution there arose an almost fatalistic faith in inevitable progress, and following upon that democracy appeared about to conquer the world. The close of the World War marked

—at least for the Allies—the height of this hope, with Wilson's triumph in Paris as the climax. A new day seemed at hand.

Since 1920, however, the picture has changed. For a while, to be sure, this country vainly hoped that it had found the easy road to boundless wealth. But first in one country and then in another things went awry, and after 1929 this was true for us likewise and very seriously so. Following the destructive effects of the great war, economic distress and nationalistic rivalry brought the downfall of many popular governments, setting up in place ruthless dictatorships. Now across both oceans from us a professed "new order" threatens civilization itself.

This threat to civilization seems to grow out of widespread social confusion and the consequent unrest. And this particular confusion, it appears, has arisen from personal insecurity caused by a world-wide upset in the cultural balance. Again is the ground familiar, but again a brief review seems necessary.

The culture of any nation or other large group, if it be in good working order, maintains a balance among its constituent institutions. Each significant institution must fit with the rest to form an effective working whole. Almost exactly as in a true organism, each constituent part implies the others and is so made as to work harmoniously with the rest. If any one of these constituent members should suddenly grow very different, the balance would be upset and things would work badly until either the unruly member was put back as before or the others should so change themselves as to make a new working whole.

The institution whose growth has upset the world's balance is modern industry, founded on modern scientific discovery and invention. The former balance was built about a farm and village economy. Each farm family raised to

consume rather than to sell. It raised and made at home the most of what it needed, the village mill and shop almost completing the picture. Now, however, large-scale corporate factory production has come to upset this old order. The home now buys from the factory the most of what it needs. Workers have left the old home village for the city and the factory. Many, many changes have taken place; but many problems still face the world. The chief new difficulty perhaps of all is the new dependence of all on "business conditions." If these are in good working order, all who need jobs can get them, and the wages and salaries received will buy what is needed to live on. But, if "times are bad" and business cannot take on all who seek work and the incomes received do not suffice, then trouble comes. If conditions remain bad enough for a long enough time, popular insecurity will increase until people get desperate. A crucial strain upon the social fabric ensues.

It is this situation of economic upset, so it certainly seems, that has combined with nationalistic grievances and ambitions to bring the world to its present state today.

The social unrest just discussed brings with it as one of its worse effects unmistakable signs of a retreat from reason. The retreat seems widespread. Hogben, who made the phrase here used, asserts "a cultural crisis in which Reason is everywhere in retreat." It may well be that these precise words go too far. "Everywhere" is a strong word and liable to misinterpretation, but certainly the evidences of such a retreat are serious enough to be disquieting.

What is this "reason" from which there is such a retreat? In a true sense the reason here under review is the very essence of civilization. The history of civilization is the story of the increased use of meaning in life, an increase in use of intelligence in the forms of social and individual life. When man learned to chip flint arrowheads, it was an in-

crease in the use of meaning, of intelligence, in his ways of hunting and fighting. In this advance the culture embodied that much more of thought and meaning. When man later learned to grind and polish his stone implements, there was by so much a further increase of meaning embodied in man's regularized ways of behaving. In the same way the culture now is precisely the aggregate accumulation of meanings embodied in men's accepted behavior. It is in this sense that the culture has been aptly defined as "communicable intelligence." We are here particularly concerned with certain increases in the use of intelligence that have been marked in the past generation or two. It is from these especially that the "retreat" has taken place.

Until the Industrial Revolution men's ways of living changed very, very slowly. Social behavior was determined largely by tradition uncritically handed down from father to son. Ordinary daily use effected the transmission. Since the culture was learned thus uncritically, any proposed change in it was likely to be resisted. When iron-pointed plows were first offered for use in our own country, they were rejected—really from unwillingness to accept the new, ostensibly (so some alleged) because the iron poisoned the ground. But with the very great increase of social change in recent times this old uncritical hold of tradition is now greatly broken, so broken, for instance, that morals taught only on tradition—and not on a reasoned why—are in danger of dropping out. Thinking thus is now required at many, many points where hitherto the rule was uncriticized tradition. Not only do the new implements of civilization embody more of meaning, as was true of the advance from chipped stone to ground stone, but also the ways of living with the new are so much more complex that the occasions requiring thought greatly increase in number. Thus do advances in civilization always mean a greater use of intelligence.

And it is not simply in everyday living that cultural changes call for increased thinking. Similar needs for new and corrective thinking are, if anything, even more fundamentally required higher up in the scale, in the areas of the most basic theory. Before modern times theology largely determined the mold in which thinking was cast. In this Plato and Aristotle, Euclid helping, furnished the conception of absolute and unchanging ideas while theology proper furnished the conception of divine authority. The result was a type of thinking largely based on absolutes and authority. This held largely among our educated classes until within the memory of men now living. But in the past generation or two very great changes have taken place, first of course with the more advanced thinkers, but increasingly with all others. With the intellectuals and in lesser degree with people in general the authoritarian hold has largely given way under the assaults of natural science, geology, biological evolution, "higher criticism," and comparative religion. Men increasingly demand an experimental reason why, and an increasing number look to science to supply the really reliable methods of inquiry.

But the recent increases in the use of intelligence at both the lower and higher levels sketched in the preceding paragraphs have met resistance, partly through inertia, partly through active opposition. The process of assimilation has never been complete. Old theories live on long after their brains have been knocked out. Plato and Aristotle, for example, in spite of modern criticism, still live and in spots even rule with many otherwise well educated. The science of yesterday becomes the superstition of today. The oft quoted statement that "human nature does not change," discussed earlier, will serve for illustration. In many areas of thought and action proponents of the old, though long repressed by the rising tide, still stand ready at the slightest opportunity

to attack the new. It is this situation of yet unmopped areas, of unconsolidated positions, that makes the retreat from reason at once so easy and so serious.

The fainthearted are always the first to retreat. Failure tries the souls of all and builds faintheartedness in those already so disposed. It is these who are most easily reached by the proponents of the old. When these potentially fainthearted find the newer methods of thought failing to bring success, they are easily persuaded to fall back upon the more familiar methods of their earlier days. For those losing faith in the new, the "old gospel" of whatever kind has a strong nostalgic pull. It is under these conditions that the protagonists of old views can best get in their persuasion to retreat.

The specific cause of the present widespread retreat from reason is to be sought in the world-wide confusion and unrest already discussed. From that confusion, partly as effect, partly as further cause, arose many social problems. Now any unsolved social problem means just that much social strain; the more of such unsolved problems, the greater the strain. And any given society can stand just so much social strain; beyond that it will break. So tsarist Russia broke under war strain. So later Italy broke under post-war strain, and Mussolini took over. So still later Germany broke, and Hitler took over. In such periods of confusion and failure human effort seems unequal to its task. Men lose the faith to carry on, they lose confidence in themselves. Out of this loss of faith and confidence comes the retreat from reason.

Many are the specific lines of despair, and many the substitutes for reason. In all of these both new elements and old commingle to present the composite new that history always shows. And let no American say to himself that the retreat from reason is confined to Europe or Asia. This coun-

try, too, shows its beginnings already clearly present—some old and trivially silly, others old but serious.

Among the trivial and even laughable substitutes for reason are all those old superstitions that pretend to foretell the future. In times of retreat the astrologers and other fortune-tellers come out more boldly from their holes. New-old foolishnesses, like numerology, become fads. Things like these that have no shadow of support in logic are accepted by the lightheaded. Newspapers offer daily columns on astrology. People seriously advocate lotteries as a substitute for taxes. A close view of the Old World background of some proponents of such will help to explain the advocacy. Some world areas and groups have always sheltered their people from effective contacts with reason.

Much more significant are the religious retreats from reason, some native born, others foreign in origin. Prolonged failure to effect satisfactory social conditions has weakened the faith of many religious people in any reliance upon human intelligence to take care of social affairs. It is here especially that the surviving proponents of older positions of human impotence proclaim a return to "faith" in place of human reason. That the particular faith is to be applied unreasoningly—in fact, is often founded on an assumed "irrationality" allegedly resident in man and history—seems not to give trouble, nor that the authority they would invoke seems modeled on despotic anthropomorphism. It is interesting in connection to read in today's paper that "the revolt against metaphysics is the cause of all our misery." So do the proponents of the old call upon us to retreat.

The widespread demand for the teaching of religion in connection with the public schools seems to some at any rate an instance of retreat. That all who advocate this are of one mind in so doing seems highly improbable. Some are surely moved by sincerely religious motives. Others seem

frightened by the black clouds on the social and political horizon and are ready to fall back in hasty retreat even, if need be, to renunciation of the separation of church and state. Others still seem to have curiously nonreligious motives as their prime reasons for advocacy. It seems a *prima-facie* retreat from reason to suppose that the last hour of Wednesday afternoon can be even reasonably effective either to give religious insight or moral character or to build "robust Americanism" (as one advocate words it). Possibly the most curious advocacy comes from the New York State Chamber of Commerce, which has published a report explicitly asserting that the teaching of religion is the first need of our public schools. Is Saul also to be reckoned among the prophets!

Another line of retreat, perhaps not totally separate from the preceding, is the belief of many Tories among us—or of Fascists, to use the current term—that democracy is unworkable because so few people, so these allege, have the native ability to think. This is a different retreat from reason in that its proponents believe in intelligence—that is, in their own—but deny it to the many. This is, in fact, a retreat to the historic Federalist position that the exclusive control of affairs should remain with "the wise, the good, and the rich." This is no place to argue the psychologic question involved; various discussions in preceding chapters bear upon it. There is some difference of opinion among competent thinkers, but the preponderance of opinion seems rather strongly against the Tory contention. In fact, the worst thinking we have seems to come from those biased by privilege and those whom these hire to defend their privilege. We may conclude this phase of the retreat by saying that its proponents seem to belong with a larger group who wish an authoritative type of teaching so that they and their kind may indoctrinate the young with their prior chosen ideas.

A more threatening kind of retreat from reason continues the last point. Many sincere patriots get so stirred by the threat of the Nazi-Fascist attack upon democracy that they wish the schools to "teach" democracy in a way to make our youth as zealous for our side as the Hitler youth are on their side. Without being exactly clear about it, *teach* to these proponents means to present the desired ideas and zeal to our youth and "make" them learn it. Our schools have long been plagued with legislative enactments conceived in just this spirit. One will require that we so "teach" the Constitution; another, manners; another, morals; and another, ~~democracy. That the schools should accept responsibility for~~
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 tion and undesirable of results. Specifically democracy can hardly if at all be taught in an undemocratic way. It must be taught in the spirit of democracy or the results are dangerous. As "the quality of mercy is not strained" so also with the teaching of democracy; to teach democracy in an undemocratic way means a serious lack of faith in both democracy and intelligence. Such a retreat would be hazardous.

Along these and other lines are we called upon to retreat from reason. For the discouraged and fainthearted reason is too slow. With many, in fact, reason itself is suspected because to them it has always seemed cold and heartless and now seems ineffective. What such fainthearted lack is perspective and insight. They do not see in its wider and historic setting the world situation of today. They do not understand how slow is the process of effecting significant cultural changes. Specifically they fail to see that fundamental earth-slide kinds of change, so fundamental as never to be reversed, have already come and that these now require further changes to restore the harmony of working

conditions. And they do not see that for such things the way of intelligence is our only reliable guide to action. The only alternatives are blind force, blind rage, or chance—at bottom chance alone. It is insecurity, psychologic insecurity, that brings these retreats—an insecurity made possible only because the way of intelligence has never yet been thoroughly acclimated among men. To retreat from reason is to give up our only reliable guide—a course that is simply suicide.

The worst instance of suicidal retreat is now to be discussed, the present threat to civilization. There we can see how in "the new world order" men have turned against both reason and civilization. As long as this is true we can have no hope for security either within or without.

The relations of selfhood and the culture to each other and to civilization we saw earlier: how selfhood and the culture have historically brought each other into continually fuller being and definition and how this higher selfhood by living the fuller culture as its means of self-expression exactly constitutes civilization. It is such a civilization that alone can give us the security we seek. That a life of creativeness is the desirable one will hardly be denied by any who are sufficiently developed of selfhood either to create or to enjoy fairly the creations of others. That the creative mind should raise new questions and propose perhaps as yet unattainable ideals is no denial of the worth of creativeness; rather is it the contrary. For various reasons it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than to be lesser and content.

Civilization and the good life require leisure time, leisure in the sense of sufficient freedom from grinding toil to allow time for thought and cultivation. Ecclesiasticus gave classic expression to the idea in the words, "How can he get wisdom who holdeth the plow . . . and whose talk is of bullocks?" In those early days a slave society, an economy of scarcity, seemed a permanent state. Even till recently this idea has

held sway. As Nietzsche worded it, "The many must forever dig, weave, forge in order that the few may learn and paint and write." But such a denial of democratic ethics seems now at last about to lose its force. Modern industry probably could bring comfort to all, with leisure to learn and paint and write in some measure to all and adequately at least for those able thus to contribute.

Such a life of comfort and leisure seems possible only in a complex civilization founded on machine production. On the one hand, mankind will never go back to the toil of the once "simple life" of our frontier period. And, on the other hand, it is not vain to hope for release from the worse evils of our present economy. We can avoid the further exploitation of the many by the few, and we can get rid of the present destructive phases of competition with its conspicuous waste as the sign of success. As we get rid of the present evils of competition we can perhaps substitute a competition for real excellence, a worthy competition at serving others and at living the finest life. What we wish is a shared seeking of the good life for all.

But the complex civilization adequate to support such a good life can be had only as we can achieve the correlative foundations of a broader ethical selfhood, on the one hand, and a stable world order, on the other. The two go together as intimately and inherently as mind and body or, perhaps better, as selfhood and the culture.

By the broader ethical selfhood is here meant the "broad self," discussed earlier, which ethically and actively includes other persons and their welfare within its own very being, that is, among its own active aggregate of ends valued and sought. In other words, no society is possible on a purely selfish basis; we have to work helpfully together if we would live well. We are members one of another—practically so first and therefore ethically so in consequence. We cannot,

then, expect any satisfactory civilization until we, the persons who constitute the civilization, are ethically big enough and inclusive enough to see and feel that humanity is one, that what we wish for ourselves and our loved ones we must wish—and will—for all humanity together. This may once have seemed a mere ideal to be set up no more seriously than other "pious wishes," a phrase to be mouthed as we talked piously—and pharisaically. But that day has passed. Unless we can come, ethically and practically, to see our inherent membership with humanity, then we and the rest of humanity face a very serious and dark future.

The needed world solidity to support the desired good life requires no great discussion here. First of all, there must be no more wars nor threat of wars. True, not all wars are equally bad; a war of defense may at times be necessary, but only as the lesser of very great evils. Such a war, too, may call out great moral effort. But war as war is precisely destructive of any decent good life. And the threat of war, the very fact that wars are a reasonable probability—this means in behalf of preparedness such a destructive waste of current wealth as no nation can now afford without serious loss to the quality of life. And besides there is the psychologic harm that comes from fears and hate.

To prevent both war and the fear of war, there must be, in our effective world order, adequate arrangements for settling disputes on a basis of justice and equality of treatment. We must then work out just and fair trading arrangements, with equal opportunities at the world's raw materials—no more selfish walls to favor some and hurt others. And there must no longer be exploitation of so-called backward peoples or ill treatment of minority groups; instead, we must effect some honest system to help all such as fast as possible toward complete legal equality with all others in self-government—in all the self-government consistent with the

common good. The persecution of minorities must cease; the outrages we daily see are beyond endurance of decent people. Such things as these we may name as the minimal conditions for world order, an order which must do for humanity as one whole what any proper government tries to do for all its people.

But all the foregoing—both the world order and the unselfish spirit to make it work—stands now denied by a “new order” proposed by the Axis powers. That “new order” threatens civilization worse than anything since the Turks threatened to overrun Europe. The wars now waged promise, if Hitler wins, to destroy the very quality of civilization itself. The essence of this threat is easy to state:

(1) whether men and nations shall deal with one another on a basis of reason and justice or whether selfish wish (*sacro egoismo*) and brute force shall rule;

(2) whether all institutions, including government, exist to develop and express human personality or whether the state as such is absolute and individuals exist to glorify it; and

(3) whether honor, justice, and ethics shall hold among nations as of right they rule among men or whether the nation-state, being absolute, shall stand above morality and is accordingly free to break treaties at will, tell lies to its people and the world, and invade peaceful nations—all these as a regular part of admitted statecraft.

And the threat is directed internally toward their own people as well as externally to other nations. They have no respect for persons as such. They do not allow their own people to know the truth but keep them quarantined against information from without. Except by those exactly at the top there are allowed no decisions, no discussion as to what goes or what might be done. The concentration camp or worse awaits any who disagrees.

There can be no safety with these people in the world

except on a basis of complete and permanent military preparedness. No reliance on their word is possible. They make treaties simply to break them at opportune moments. There can be no hope of settled peace again in the world until this Axis is destroyed and collective security established in its stead.

What is the hope that collective security will be established and right and justice enthroned? The military answer lies of course outside this discussion. Perhaps underlying all is the moral answer. Do we of this country see the situation so that we are ready to give our efforts to establish and maintain a world order? The answer here is not clear. Our failure in 1920 is not reassuring, nor are the present current discussions. At bottom it seems a question of building an inclusive enough self to see what confronts and act accordingly. It may be that the world will come out of the present crisis with such vision as to make that great step forward which alone can secure civilization for the future. But the contrary is also possible: it may be that we shall fail and all wander together in the wilderness of wars for our period of forty years. The event turns on the selfhood we can build as we face this situation and on our subsequent ability to embody vision and will into effective institution. This is our hope for security, both without and within. The decision is ours. The crisis is upon us.

CHAPTER XIII

CONCLUDING SUMMARY

A review of the whole developing argument will perhaps best close the book. An old-time Negro preacher, being asked to explain his pulpit method, replied sagely: "Fust I tells 'em what I'se gwine to tell 'em. Den, secondly and mainly, I tell 'em. Thirdly and last, I tells 'em what I done told 'em." It is this "thirdly" that is here attempted. Having seen the outcome, we can perhaps better see the developing coherence of the parts.

As the title, *Selfhood and Civilization*, suggests, the book has two main aims. The first is to show how man in the human sense is a self-other compound such that within the resulting self there is a sense of others so inherently embedded that the person can act as others will see and judge him. This means that selfhood is essentially both self-conscious and other-conscious and therein can make use critically of experience after it has passed, both one's own and that of others. Out of this self-other origin of the human aspect of man comes the second aim of the book: to show how this self-other process thus basic to the creation of language and other cultural forms requires a favorable environment in order to realize its potentialities. History, beside being an account of how men have lived and struggled, is the story of the development of civilization. In this way selfhood and civilization

become reciprocal terms. Historically selfhood has built civilization. Civilization builds on its model the particular selfhood of each child growing up in its midst. In a certain true sense, then, it is in the civilization that we live and move and have our being. If it is in good working order, we can live well. If it goes wrong, we all suffer. It is this fact of dependence of the two that constitutes the grimness of the crisis in world affairs today.

This view that normal man is a self-other compound, dependent on the civilization for his well-being, cuts deep in any study of man. So conceived, man is not born a self but achieves selfhood. He is at birth merely a higher animal, though crucially superior in his ability to learn. His superiority to the other animals is, however, a matter of degree, not of kind. The animals can learn—they do learn as an essential part of their living—but they do not learn to talk nor do they accumulate culture. Human selfhood, beginning thus out of an initial difference only of degree, nevertheless leads—through language and other accumulated culture—to such a crucial differential in intelligence and social outlook as constitutes in effect a capital difference of kind. These self-other derived attributes constitutes man's distinctively human qualities. They make him qualitatively superior to the brutes.

It is this unique shift in characteristics that furnishes the key conception of the book—a shift from difference in degree to difference in kind, with the shift effected by natural processes as opposed to the working of either supernatural or "transcendental" factors. Such a view thus conceives man as continuous with the rest of nature without in the least depriving him of the highest moral and intellectual qualities that any careful study of man can find. It is this outlook as herein argued that is offered in place both of philosophic dualism and the philosophic monisms which have for too

long bedeviled psychology along with every other study of man. The Cartesian dualism of mind and body—both of these taken as real, but neither able to affect the other—has stood resolutely in the way of any continuous treatment of human phenomena. To get out of the dualism, two groups of monists have offered their alternative proposals. One of these, the idealists, have sought continuity by denying final existence to body; at bottom mind is all there is. The other, the materialists, have sought continuity by denying real existence to thinking and ideas; everything is to be explained in terms of matter and motion. Much modern psychology, determined to be scientific, has professed to avoid all philosophy but has, in fact, accepted the metaphysics of materialism. The self-other process is here offered as a way of avoiding in advance the Cartesian dualism and therefore of undercutting both the idealists and the mechanists.

This self-other compounded self can, as we have seen, by virtue of its peculiar constitution, know what it is itself doing and thus criticize its acts more or less as others would. Such a one can as a person take account of foreseeable consequences and act accordingly; in this way he can learn to be both prudential in decision and moral in outlook. Having language and being able to criticize it in relation to what is meant, he is able to develop logic and other conscious methods of inquiry. In these and other like respects he can do all that the metaphysical dualists and the idealists formerly claimed as possible only on their hypotheses. The mechanists and near-mechanists have tried to deny, or at least seriously minimize, thinking and all the other "higher" processes here named. Apparently they have wished to hold to the outward results of such processes while denying or minimizing the processes themselves. The dualists and idealists have for some decades been losing ground in American thinking, while during much of this period the mechanists and their

friends have been very strong. For this reason principal attention has here been given to the mechanists and their disposition to degrade thinking by reducing it to something lower.

With this self-other process as the general foundational conception for psychological study, it became logically necessary, then, to show how this process can, and normally does, so work as to bring to the growing child such human characteristics as selfhood, self-conscious agency, and accountability and to show, further, how human language differs from mere animal cries and signs, and how meaning for man differs from meaning for the brutes, and how moral responsibility and conscience follow active selfhood as attendant results. These things normally come about through the child's participation in the life going on about him in the family and community. Parents and other elders furnish a life already in process. They include the child within this process and expect him to co-operate in living that life. In this way the child comes at his level to speak the language of his group, to live their customs, to think their thoughts, to feel their impulses, and so to accept their values.

In time the child's selfhood grows to the point of conscious choice and conscious self-assertion. But he must still live the life of family and community. Differences among others will then lead him to be more critical in his choices. Objectivity begins to emerge as something outside of all to govern all together. Inherent standards, as opposed to arbitrary and conventional ones, grow more definite. If the child is fortunate, he is finally led to accept the results of competent study as the authority to tell him what he has the right and duty to believe and do. When these things have come about, he has become intellectually mature.

In all of the processes thus studied the culture has been an essential factor—the socially cumulative result of human

achievement sifted for further and common use. Selfhood, language, and the culture thus emerge as the three parallel factors which interact to make the quality of living we call civilization. It was in this phase of the discussion that the title of the book, *Selfhood and Civilization*, began to assume defined pertinence.

The discussion on the culture marked thus a turning point in the book. All before that and much of the specific chapter on the culture constituted the argument on the self-other process as such, showing how it explained the life of the individual considered in and of himself. The section on law and order (within the chapter on the culture) began the discussion on civilization, on how the civilization must itself be in good working condition if the individual is to live well. But the factor of selfhood remains essential in both parts of the picture. Civilization is nowhere studied in general, but always in its bearings on the fortunes of the self as such.

The latter half of the book presents various applications of the self-other process, the most of which need little comment here. The chapter on psychology undertakes to show in detail the inadequacies of the mechanist and near-mechanist position in comparison with a self-other outlook. Specifically these positions fail to explain language and so fail to understand meaning and thinking. In the chapter on philosophy the principal contributions were two: one, the inadequacy of atomistic individualism for any study of science; second, the discussion on the nature of human nature, where the continuity of human nature with nature at large was used to show that on the self-other theory the ordinary scientific processes are possible in a study of man. It was also brought out that many of the ordinary traits ascribed to human nature come by way of the self-other route; that these are therefore not innate but acquired endowments. The discussion on education principally de-

veloped a theory of learning which shows how experience as lived continues within one to influence the further process of experience. This continued permeation of further experience by prior experience became the decisive factor to constitute character and explain the continuity of conscious experience.

The bearing of the self-other compounded selfhood on civilization became more apparent in the discussion on freedom. In fact, it is through the self-other process that freedom of action and moral accountability, which lie at the base of conscious society, become possible. Freedom through institutions took up the discussion on law and order and carried it farther in the effort to show that institutions have to be suitably devised for giving expression to human aspiration. Otherwise, they restrict rather than free. From this consideration we get the definition of a desirable civilization as one that develops and expresses human personality so as to bring about the good life critically considered. Security was here shown to be one definite essential in this process; excessive or long-continued insecurity is a dangerous evil. By definition, then, it is the duty of civilization to provide security for its members, external security from threats and dangers in order that the internal security necessary to the building of the good life may be possible.

Any proper study of civilization and the good life will show that the higher levels of the good life are dependent on the existence and proper working of a complex culture. On no other basis is it possible to support all the varied operations that go to make up civilized life. But no complex culture will work adequately unless it is properly safeguarded by law and order. And any inclusive law and order are in turn impossible unless there is a reasonable degree of confidence among men to bring about satisfactory international relations.

It is such considerations as these that constitute the menace of the Axis today with its threatened "new order." That order pointedly denies almost everything herein discussed in relation to civilization, inclusive law and order, moral responsibility, and confidence among men. The statecraft of the Axis proceeds on a basis of broken treaties, lying propaganda, and violence within and without. If Hitler wins this war, America can find no security short of complete military preparedness. We could have no confidence in treaties made or promises given. We could find no satisfactory basis for any sort of dealing with him; but it would not be possible to ignore him as a factor in the world. Such is the evil state that would obtain on the basis of this "new order."

We turn with horror and dread from such a threat. By contrast we can picture a different world adequately based on law and order and regard for selfhood and its fuller expression. In such a world regard for law and order must be enthroned in the minds and hearts of an effective majority of the peoples of the world. Exploitation of personality must cease, whether of minorities or of so-called backward peoples. Institutions must be created for settling disputes by the operation of reason and good will. With these various provisions secured, it will then be possible for men to give exclusive attention to making a better world. That task will be never-ending; there will be enough domestic problems forever urgent among men to keep active effort continually busy.

Can we ever have such a world of peace and order? In 1920 there were ten certain men who, had they wished it, could have made very considerable strides toward the attaining of this better vision. It may be many a long day before things are once more in so favorable a conjunction; but—who knows?—such a day may soon come again. It will hardly come unless we can all work to clarify the vision so that

more may see it and wish it. Fortunately there are more people today than ever before in these United States thinking about questions of public policy. In 1776 and 1787 we registered great steps forward. We must once more build the structure of a better civilization, this time on a world basis. Here, too, selfhood and civilization as always go together.

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